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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to lay the ground for further work on interpreting Coleridge’s 
Logic and its relation to the rest of his philosophy, particularly the system of speculative 
metaphysics and theology presented in Coleridge’s Opus Maximum fragments. I do this by 
exploring the connections between Coleridge’s conceptions of the a priori, the cognitive 
faculties (or capacities), and the nature of logical theory. Part 1 seeks to place Coleridge’s 
views on logic in their broader historical and intellectual context, showing why Coleridge 
considered the investigation of the faculties, and the analysis of our cognitive operations 
and contents, to be fundamental to logical theory, and arguing that this position is a 
product of Coleridge’s critical engagement with the early modern logic of ideas and 
faculties. Part 2 gives a preliminary account of Coleridge’s interpretation of two key 
Kantian terms, φa priori’ and φtranscendental’, exploring the analogies Coleridge uses to 
elucidate the nature of the a priori and the purpose of transcendental claims. Part 3 
expands on this account, considering how Coleridge’s conceptions of the a priori and the 
transcendental inform his claims, especially in Logic, on the human mental faculties and 
their contribution to sensory experience and cognition; it focuses on Coleridge’s views 
on φthe obvious threefold division’ of our cognitive capacities into sense, understanding, 
and reason, his descriptions of the formal (a priori) and material (a posteriori) elements of 
cognition, and his functional theory of the constitution of our faculties. Part 4 discusses 
the relations between Coleridge’s theory of the cognitive capacities and his conception of 
the a priori, focusing on Coleridge’s claims concerning the origins of a priori forms and 
contents in our cognitive capacities, and the transcendental method of inquiry which he 
contends is able to prove such claims. 
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Preface: Introduction to the Outline for a System of the Philosophy of Reading 
Coleridge’s Logic 
 
I began this project with the intention of producing an exposition of the theory of 
cognition which Coleridge presents in his Logic. Yet it soon become apparent to me that, 
before such an exposition could be produced, many currently unresolved (and largely 
unaddressed) issues in Coleridge studies would have to be confronted. To list a few of 
the most notable examples: The view that Kant is one of the greatest influences on the 
development of Coleridge’s thought has long been a cornerstone of Coleridgean 
scholarly orthodoxy, and yet little has been written concerning how Coleridge actually 
interprets those Kantian principles which he claims to adopt, and in particular about why 
Coleridge thought that Kant offered the most satisfactory theory of the principles of 
sensory cognition (although much has been written about how Coleridge’s supposedly 
takes over Kant’s ideas seemingly without any interpretive input).1 Coleridge emphasises 
the importance of properly understanding the meaning of the term φa priori’ in such well-
known published works as Biographia and the 1818 edition of The Friend, and notes in a 
number of manuscripts and marginalia that Kant provides the best explanation of the 
nature of the a priori, and yet there is, as far as I have been able to discover, currently no 
scholarship which considers Coleridge’s claims about the a priori in any detail (in spite of 
the fact that the attempt to prove the possibility of certain kinds of a priori knowledge is 
one of the main goals of Coleridge’s broader philosophical project).2 A large and distinct 
body of Coleridge criticism has grown up around his two gnomic statements about the 
imagination in Biographia Literaria, and Coleridge’s distinction between Reason and 
Understanding is often cited as one of the founding principles of his philosophy, but one 
finds only a few attempts to explain why Coleridge lays such emphasis on the cognitive 
faculties or powers, or to provide a detailed account of how Coleridge conceives of such 
capacities.3 As I will be arguing throughout, although Coleridge’s Logic remains his most 
neglected major manuscript, it is a text that can shed light on all of these issues. In this 
workσby way of presenting a sort of prolegomena to the LogicσI try to show that if we 
are to make sense of Coleridge’s views on Kant’s transcendental philosophy, the a priori, 
                                                 
1  For this emphasis on Kantian influence, see e.g. Ashton (1980), 40-4, (1998), 196; Orsini (1969); Wellek 
(1931); Wheeler (1981), 15-16; Willey (1972), 86-89. 
2 For Coleridge’s emphasis on the a priori, see BL.II.293n; Friend.I.179n. For his claim that Kant gives the 
best definition of the a priori, see CM.III.218-9, IV.112, 355 (cf. SWF.I.689ff). 
3 Some notable exceptions are Cheyne (2014); 3.2-9; Engell (1981); ch. 20; Pradhan (1999) ch. 1-5; see also, 
Hedley (2008), ch. 2; Warnock (1976), pt III; Webster (2010), Appendices A-B.  
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and the nature of the mental faculties, we must begin with Logic. Indeed, to do so is 
simply to follow Coleridge’s own advice: for he saw his various philosophical works as 
forming part of a single integrated project (working towards a defence of his Trinitarian 
Christianity), and took Logic to be the φpropaedeutic’ first stage of this project.4 
 My principal aim will be to lay the ground for further work on interpreting the 
Logic and its relation to the rest of Coleridge’s philosophy, particularly the system of 
speculative metaphysics and theology which he presents in part in the Opus Maximum 
fragments, but also those more programmatic statements of Coleridge’s philosophical 
views that are found scattered throughout such earlier published works as The Statesman’s 
Manual and The Friend. I do this by exploring the connections between Coleridge’s 
conceptions of the a priori, the faculties, and the nature of logical theory. Part 1 seeks to 
place Coleridge’s views on logical theory in their broader historical and intellectual 
context, showing why Coleridge held the investigation of the faculties, and the analysis 
of our cognitive operations and contents, to be fundamental to logical theory, and 
arguing that this position is a product of Coleridge’s critical engagement with certain 
strands of the early modern logic of ideas and faculties. Part 2 gives a preliminary 
account of Coleridge’s interpretation of two key Kantian philosophical terms, φa priori’ 
and φtranscendental’, exploring the analogies Coleridge uses in an attempt to elucidate the 
nature of the a priori and the purpose of transcendental claims. In Part 3 I expand on this 
account, considering how Coleridge’s conception of the Kantian a priori and 
transcendental informs his claims, especially in Logic, about the human cognitive faculties 
and their contribution to sensory experience and cognition; there I focus, in particular, 
on Coleridge’s views concerning what he calls φthe obvious threefold division’ of the 
cognitive powers into sense, understanding, and reason, his descriptions of the formal 
and material elements of cognition, and his functional theory of the constitution of our 
cognitive powers. Finally, in Part 4, I offer a more detailed discussion of the relation 
between Coleridge’s theory of the cognitive powers and his conception of the a priori, 
giving careful attention to Coleridge’s claims about the origins of certain kinds of a priori 
forms and contents in our cognitive powers, and the transcendental method of inquiry 
that Coleridge contends is able to prove such claims. 
                                                 
4 See Logic, xl-xlii; CL, IV: 589 (Sept 1815); VI: 967 (Oct 1833). 
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1. Coleridge on Logic, Psychology, & the Cognitive Faculties 
 
Kant is widely (and quite rightly) considered to be the major influence on Coleridge’s 
conception of logic. Kant’s texts, particularly the first Critique and Prolegomena, are also 
undoubtedly a principal source for Coleridge’s own writings on logic.5 This has led to the 
conclusion that in Logic Coleridge uncritically adopts Kant’s views, and so reproduces 
(and sometimes even exacerbates) Kant’s errors in the field of logic. Thus, Coleridge has 
been subject to two charges traditionally (though not uncontroversially) laid against 
Kant. Firstly, as in this observation by Robin Jackson, that what Coleridge offers under 
the guise of logical inquiry is in fact not part of logic at all: 
 
Kant has been criticised for paying lip service to the importance of logic while really presenting 
a τcurious mixture of metaphysics and epistemologyυ. Coleridge, who in the matter of logic 
relied upon Kant’s authority, followed suit.6 
 
Secondly, as in Tim Milnes’ view, that Coleridge’s account of logic is not just φunlogical’, 
but also vitiated by the fallacy of the psychologism: 
 
Kant’s arguments [in his transcendental logic] have long been criticized for their tendency to 
blur the distinction between conceptual necessity and mere psychological incorrigibility. If 
anything, however, Coleridge is even more inclined than Kant to fall into what Frege would 
later deplore as the conflation of formal and psychological arguments, equating φlogical 
necessity’ with the limits on thought dictated by φthe constitution of the mind itself.’7 
 
Jackson and Milnes are certainly correct to suggest (i) that Coleridge followed Kant’s 
theory of logic closely in many respects, and (ii) that Coleridge’s conception of logical 
inquiry, like Kant’s, includes much material which would nowadays be considered as 
belonging instead to epistemology, metaphysics, or psychology. However, as I will be 
contending in the sections that follow (1.1-5), there are some serious problems with their 
respective assessments. In particular, Jackson and Milnes, along with many other 
Coleridge scholars, make little attempt to situate Coleridge’s interpretation of Kant, or 
the claims of both thinkers about logic and cognition, within the appropriate historical 
                                                 
5 On the sources for Coleridge’s logic, see Logic, lvi-iii. 
6 Logic, lxii. Jackson (ed.) is citing Kneale and Kneale (1971), 355, which reflects a fairly widespread view of 
Kant’s place in the history of logic. 
7 Milnes, (2008), 46. Milne’s is quoting from Coleridge’s remarks at BL.I.200-1. 
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and intellectual context. They largely ignore the question of why Coleridge’s account of 
the purpose of logical inquiry, and his reading of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, place 
such great emphasis on the need to develop an analysis of the contents and operations of 
the mind, and particularly a theory of the natural or innate cognitive capacities of human 
subjects.8 Thus, Coleridge’s core aims are dismissed from the outset not because he fails 
to realise his own philosophical goals in the Logic, but because such goals are judged to 
be illegitimate from the standpoint of the modern historian or theorist of logic (as Milnes 
and Jackson understand this standpoint). 
I will be arguing here that, much like Kant’s position, Coleridge’s conception of 
logic should be assessed not in terms of contemporary formal or symbolic logic and its 
domain of inquiry, but rather in the context of a notion of logical inquiry which he did in 
fact share. Rather than measuring Coleridge’s Logic by standards that were not historically 
available to him, we should consider this text and its account of the nature of logic in 
light of those notions of φformal and psychological arguments’ and φlogical necessity’ 
which were familiar to Coleridge and which shaped the kinds of logical inquiries pursued 
by his contemporaries.9 In short, to make sense of Coleridge’s views on logic, we need to 
pay attention to the historical and philosophical markers he offers himself, situating his 
statements on logic in their appropriate intellectual context. This will require assessing 
Coleridge’s position in light of the early modern logical theories to which he claims to be 
responding rather than in light of modern criticisms of these theories. To determine if 
Coleridge is at all guilty of φequating φlogical necessity’ with the limits on thought dictated 
by φthe constitution of the mind itself’’ (i.e. the fallacy of psychologism), we first need to 
establish what such terms meant to Coleridge, and how he employs them in the context 
of Logic.10 We should not simply assume that Coleridge’s definitions of terms like φlogical 
necessity’ and φthe constitution of the mind itself’ will map directly onto contemporary 
understandings of these concepts. To make sense of Coleridge’s approach to defining 
such terms, we need to pay careful attention to his account of logic and its relation to an 
investigation of what he calls φthe forms and functions of the understanding’.11 As I will 
show, when Logic is viewed in the context provided by the early modern philosophical 
traditionσespecially in relation to the logic of ideas and cognitive facultiesσit becomes 
                                                 
8 For example, Milnes’ lengthy essay (2004) on Coleridge’s logical theory gives no attention to the role of 
faculty analysis in Coleridge’s logic, or in the popular long eighteenth-century logical textbooks that 
Coleridge cites in his own Logic (for further discussion of this issue, see 1.1-4). 
9 For some recent examples of this sort of context-based approach to Kant, see Hatfield (1990), (1997) 
and Waxman (2005), (2014). On Kant’s logic specifically, see Mosser (2008). 
10 Milnes (2008), 46. 
11 Logic, 146-7 (cf. 37, 45-6). 
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possible to see that this text is not a φcurious mixture of metaphysics and epistemology’, 
but rather an attempt to engage critically with the logical conventions of its time. To get 
a sense of Coleridge’s motivations for criticising the early modern logical tradition which 
had come to dominate the philosophy of his own age (at least in Britain and France), we 
will need to look more carefully at the case for Kant’s influence on the account of logical 
inquiry presented throughout Coleridge’s Logic (see 1.2), as well as placing this account in 
the context of Coleridge’s claims about logic, psychology, and the faculties (see 1.1).12 
 
1.1 Coleridge on Logic, Psychology, & the Understanding 
i. Coleridge’s Criticisms of Eighteenth-Century Logic: An Overview 
Coleridge begins his Logic with some complaints against eighteenth-century logicians that 
help to situate his views in relation to both Kantian and early modern approaches to 
logic. He identifies two problems that he suggests are φperhaps nowhere more strikingly 
exemplified than in the most popular modern books, French and English, professing to 
teach logic and having its name in their title’. First, he criticises the textbooks, such as φDr. 
Watts’ Logic’, which present the φessentials of common logic’ (i.e. the rules and forms of 
the syllogism) in a confused and unsystematic way, φblended with metaphysics, theology, 
psychology, grammar’ and other miscellaneous subjects.13 Second, Coleridge censures the 
works that, in his view, attempt the illicit substitution of a materialist and associationist 
psychology for the study of logic proper (although he does not yet specify precisely what 
such study should involve): 
 
In the far-famed Logic of Condillac, on the other hand, the student may find the whole theory 
of materialism (borrowed without acknowledgement from David Hartley) only not one syllable 
concerning logic itself.14 
 
Both species of misnamed logic, Coleridge avers, are guilty of φhazard[ing] confusion by 
co-ordinating heterogeneous subjects’. In short, Watts, Condillac, and their followers 
have introduced into the domain of logical inquiry, and indeed into the teaching of 
                                                 
12 See CL.IV.760 (Jul 1817), V.138 (Feb 1821); cf. SWF.I.128 (c. 1803), II.947 (c. 1821). 
13 Logic, 6. Coleridge is of course referring to the popular Logick (1725) of Isaac Watts. Coleridge may also 
include the laws of (non-)contradiction and identity as part of φthe essentials of common logic’, but he 
sometimes suggests that these laws have a subordinate status to syllogistic rules (see esp. 87-92).   
14 Logic, 6. The mention of Hartley here makes clear that Coleridge is referring to materialist theories of 
mind (cf. his reference to Hartley’s φvibrations’ in a similar context at 37). Coleridge does not appear to 
have ever offered evidence to substantiate his claim that La Logique (1781) is plagiarised from Hartley’s 
Observations on Man (1749).  
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logical theory, methods and principles that have no claim to logical status. According to 
Coleridge, this is because such φpseudo-logical’ works ignore the methodological rules 
(furnished by logic itself) that facilitate an φinsight into the distinct import of terms as 
well as into the necessity of new or newly defined [logical or natural-philosophical] terms 
for the expression of different objects’.15 Coleridge later explains that these shortcomings 
of contemporary logicians are largely the consequence of their failure to recognise what 
makes logical rules distinct from those kinds of rules that are employed in other fields of 
inquiry. As we shall see, this is not just a question of form and function, but also a matter 
of the source or origin of any particular rule.16 
Given Coleridge’s mention of Hartley, coupled with his critical remarks on the 
Lockean-influenced work of Watts and Condillac for its confusion and/or substitution 
of logical rules with psychological ones, it may seem that Coleridge’s aim here is to deny 
that the study of mental or cognitive operations has any place in logic. However, if these 
comments are placed in the context of his statements elsewhere concerning the nature 
and purpose of logical inquiry, it soon becomes evident that Coleridge’s intention is not 
to criticise such logicians for their attention to the human mind and its functions. Rather, 
his point is that logic involves a particular kind of method or approach to the analysis of 
our cognition and its basic elements to which these philosophers do not adhere, and 
which is absent from the most popular contemporary textbooks. Indeed, just before he 
launches into the abovementioned lamentation on the state of logical theory in Britain 
and France, Coleridge gives a clear indication of his view that the methods and principles 
of logic must be grounded in or derived from the human mind, and supplemented by 
our knowledge of cognitive processes.17 Having credited Aristotle with the invention of 
logic, Coleridge claims that Aristotle’s development of logical and methodological rules 
was guided by his sense φthat a method, which should be suited to all understandings, 
must be drawn from the laws and constitution of the understanding itself’.18 It is the 
neglect of this Aristotelian insight, Coleridge goes on to imply, which vitiates many of 
the major logical works of his own day. What Coleridge means by φa method suited to all 
understandings’ is a logic grounded in universal and necessary (a priori) principles. What 
                                                 
15 Logic, 6-7. See CL.V.133 (8 Jan 1821) for Coleridge’s dismissal of Condillac’s work as φƸƥƵƤƯ-logic’ and 
cf. SWF.I.128n (c. 1803, in the MS Outlines of the History of Logic) for the claim φIt wd be more accurate 
perhaps to say that the study of Logic altogether is exploded in France, for Condillac’s book is rather 
psychological than logical’. I discuss this problem in 1.4. 
16 See Logic, 37, 44-5n, 196-7. 
17
 Throughout, I follow Pippin in holding that to refer to something (say, a form of mental activity) as 
φgrounding’ something else (say, a kind of representation or cognitive state) is just to say that the former is 
what is required to account for the latter (usually as the φground of its possibility’); see (1982), 9 
18 Logic, 5. 
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he means by claiming that such principles φmust be drawn from the laws and constitution 
of the understanding itself’ is that the nature and purpose of logic and its principles 
cannot be fully understood without due attention to the relation of such principles to the 
human cognitive powers in which they have their source.19 The φpsychological’ approach 
of Hartley and Condillac goes astray not because it attempts to analyse cognitive powers, 
but rather because of the conclusions it draws from such analysis, and in the definitions 
it provides of φthe laws and constitution of the understanding’. 
 
ii. Coleridge’s Definitions of ‘Logic’ & ‘the Understanding’ 
To make sense of Coleridge’s views on logic and psychology, we will need to consider 
more closely precisely what he means when employing two of the key phrases taken 
from the introductory passages of Logic outlined above: φlogic itself’ and φthe laws and 
constitution of the understanding’. Coleridge offers various definitions of logic and its 
subject matter, and distinguishes between a range of different subfields of logic.20 For 
now, I focus on his more general (and conventional) definitions of the term and on how 
such definitions relate to Coleridge’s conception of the understanding and its φlaws and 
constitution’. Before presenting his own theory of logic in detail, Coleridge provides the 
following two definitions of logic in passing: (i) it can be defined φas the art and science 
of discoursing conclusively’, and (ii) it is a science φof which no other definition need be 
given than that it contains the rules and forms of the understanding, on whatever objects 
[these rules] are employed, in exclusive reference to the correspondence of these objects 
to its [the understanding’s] own forms’.21 By φdiscoursing conclusively’ Coleridge means 
reasoning in accordance with the rules and figures of the syllogism; by the φobjects’ of 
the understanding he means φthoughts or conceptions’ (including the contents or 
referents of such cognitive states); and by φthe rules or forms of the understanding’ he 
means the rules that are taken to govern all discursive thinking and concept-application 
(i.e. φthe laws of thought’).22 For Coleridge, then, the reasoning process and the rules 
                                                 
19 This is made clear at Logic, 34-7, 42-3, 146-7. 
20 See esp. Logic, 51-2 where Coleridge outlines his distinctions between formal or φcanonic’ logic (the logic 
of the syllogism), φdialectical’ or φcriterional’ logic (the transcendental logic of the a priori conditions of 
experience, which furnishes criteria for φthe distinguishing of truth’ in judgements concerning sensory 
objects), and φorganic’ or φheuristic’ logic (the logic of ideas in the Platonic sense, i.e. the rules of noesis 
which serve as φan organ for the discovery of [speculative metaphysical] truth’). 
21 Logic, 22, 34. Cf. 205n, 233n for suggestions that Coleridge uses φobject’ (of the understanding) here in a 
similar sense to that in which Locke employs the term φidea’. 
22 See e.g. Logic, 37ff, 51-2, 68ff. Cf. n. 15 above; it is likely that Coleridge, like Kant, regards the laws of 
(non-)contradiction and identity as rules or conditions of φdiscoursing conclusively’ (forming coherent 
propositions), but at times Coleridge talks as if these laws were trivial and had only a psychological status 
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taken to guide or govern it are closely connected to the mental acts of reasoning and 
rule-application. In fact, he refers to this class of cognitive activityσwhich also includes 
conceiving, judging, abstracting, and inferringσas φthe Logical Acts’.23 The nature of this 
connection is especially clear in Coleridge’s explanation of what it means for logic, the 
various branches of which he takes to consist in the exercise and analysis of the cognitive 
activities (or operations) just listed, to be conceived as φa formal science’: 
 
When I say that what is true of all must be true of each, or [Whatever is affirmed of a generic 
conception applies to all subordinates (or particulars) comprehended in that conception], or 
simply affirm that [Every notion, of whatever it may be, is either general or particular], I am 
not speaking of anything, but of the acts of my own mind and the law or form according to 
which it acts or ought to act. Now the sciences which treat of these forms are hence 
contradistinguished as formal sciences, and in this acceptation of the word, logic, geometry, 
and arithmetic are all alike formal sciences.24 
 
On this view, logical rules are not simply principles that govern or constrain the kinds of 
statements or propositions we can formulate, or the kinds of knowledge-claims we can 
assert or justify; they are also φthe acts of [the] mind and the law[s] or form[s] according 
to which it acts or ought to act’. Thus, to enumerate and analyse the rules of logic, we 
need to survey and specify the various kinds of cognitive operations in which such rules 
are grounded. This is why Coleridge says the rules and method of logic φmust be drawn 
from the laws and constitution of the understanding itself’, i.e. from those operations in 
which the exercise of understanding, or our capacity for discursive thought (especially 
conceiving and judging), is taken to consist.25 As we shall see later, many of Coleridge’s 
disagreements with the logical theories of thinkers like Condillac and Hartley turn on his 
interpretation of what it means to describe those rules or forms of the mind φaccording 
to which it acts or ought to act’ (especially when it comes to determining what kinds of 
cognitive laws can be taken to have a normative force or function, prescribing standards 
or criteria for φtrue knowledge’).26 In particular, as I will show in 1.4, Coleridge takes the 
view that, when we discuss the φlaws or forms’ according to which the human mind acts 
or ought to act, we can describe these φlaws or forms’ of thought only in what Coleridge 
                                                                                                                                           
(in his sense of something non-normative), even though he also grants that anything that does not meet 
these criteria cannot qualify as a coherent thought or proposition. See 87-92; cf. 174-80. 
23 See esp. Logic, 60-103 (φOn the Logical Acts’); cf. 53-9, 239-71 (esp. 262-6ff). 
24 Logic, 43. The phrases in square brackets are translations of Coleridge’s Latin. 
25 See Logic, 5-6, 34-7, 146-9, 211-4, 245-7. 
26 For Coleridge’s views on such logical rules and criteria, see 34-7, 51-2, 111-2. 
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calls φlogical’ terms (i.e. as the normative criteria that govern discursive cognition). For, 
on Coleridge’s account, even if there are certain psychological or neurophysiological laws 
which govern or determine some features of our sensible experience, such physical laws 
can have no bearing on questions, normative or otherwise, concerning the epistemic 
properties of our φconceptions or thoughts’ (i.e. although physical laws may play a role in 
certain aspects of knowledge acquisition ς e.g. by controlling the receptive functions of 
human sense organs ς such laws do not determine what constitutes valid knowledge for 
human subjects).27 Consequently, there are both normative and descriptive elements to 
Coleridge’s logical theory, though he contends that logic, viewed as a theory of cognitive 
operations and the norms of thought, must exclude from its description of the mind all 
materialistic or naturalistic terms (which belong to empirical psychology).28 
Given that Coleridge defines logic as the science which φcontains the rules and 
forms of the understanding’, his conception of the understanding and its operations is, 
unsurprisingly, closely related to his conception of logic. In fact, it could even be said 
that for Coleridge logic (in the general sense of the term) is a theory of understanding or 
discursive cognition, including cognitive activities and operations ranging from the 
construction of syllogisms (a process involving what Coleridge calls φthe mental acts’ of 
φseclusion’, φinclusion’, and φconclusion’) to making judgements about sense-impressions 
and their φcorrespondence’ to φobjects without us’ (a process Coleridge calls φthink[ing] of 
[sensory] phenomena as objects’ or φsubstantiation’).29 As was noted above, it is the 
understanding which Coleridge takes to be responsible for the bulk of those cognitive 
operations with which logical inquiry is concerned. It is variously defined as the φfaculty 
of judging’, the φfaculty of conceptions’, the φfaculty of thinking’, the φreflective faculty’, 
and the φdiscursive faculty’.30 In such contexts, Coleridge uses the term φfaculty’ in much 
the same way as Descartes, Locke, or Kant: it designates the capacity for a specific kind 
of cognitive activity, or the capacity for an interrelated set of cognitive activities, such as 
discursive thinking (taken to include the activities of judging, conceiving, reflecting, 
                                                 
27 See esp. Logic, 37. Put another way, it can be said that Coleridge regards such non-normative laws as 
having nothing to do with the essence of thought, or with whatever it is that makes our cognitive states 
what they are (i.e. psychological or neurophysiological laws can, at most, be said to determine the 
accidental but not the substantial features or properties of our thoughts or concepts). 
28 See e.g. Logic, 37, 139-40. This is (briefly) discussed further in 1.4. 
29 For Coleridge’s theory of the syllogism, see Logic, 53-9. For his account of how the φimpressions (or by 
whatever name we designate the materials supplied to the understanding by the sense [λ]) become objects 
in and by the mind’s judgments and modes of judging’, see Logic, 262-6 (cf. 239-41). 
30 See e.g. Logic, 68-70, 149, 154, 245-7. 
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etc.).31 Because Coleridge takes logic to consist partly in the study of rules and concepts 
(considered as both forms and contents of discursive cognition) and partly in reflection 
on the cognitive operations taken to ground or make possible (i.e. produce or originate) 
such concepts and rules, he views the understanding as the faculty that makes logic itself 
possible (i.e. as the cognitive capacity in the analysis of which logical inquiry consists). 
His view is encapsulated in the claim that φthe end or final aim’ of education, which for 
Coleridge must culminate in the study of logic, is φthe formation of right notions, or the 
mind’s knowledge of its own constitution and constituent faculties as far as it is obtained 
by reflection’.32 So, for Coleridge, the nature of a given logical theory is largely determined 
by the account of the understanding and its operations which informs and underpins this 
theory. A complete system of logic must thus include an account of the φconstitution and 
constituent faculties’ of the mind φobtained by reflection’.33 Coleridge calls the branch of 
logic that studies rules and concepts (considered as the forms of thought) φcommon’ or 
φformal’ logic, and takes this branch to be purely normative. He terms the branch of logic 
that analyses the cognitive operations taken to make possible logical rules and concepts, 
and indeed all the forms and contents of discursive cognition, φtranscendental’ or φcritical 
or judicial’ logic, and takes this branch to serve both descriptive and normative purposes 
(i.e. it specifies those modes or forms of cognitive activity ς Kant’s categories ς in which 
the normative criteria of discursive thought are grounded).34 
 
iii. Coleridge on Logic & the Problem of Faculty Terminology 
The connection between Coleridge’s definitions and employment of the terms φlogic’ and 
φthe understanding’ has some further implications that must be noted before considering 
the historical and intellectual context of his theory of logic and cognition in more detail. 
Coleridge’s definitions emphasise the relationship between logical theories and analyses 
of the understanding and its operations partly because he wants to establish (i) that logic 
is a discipline which is concerned only with a particular kind of cognitive content and its 
principles (i.e. discursive or conceptual knowledge and the rules or forms that ground, or 
make possible, such knowledge), and (ii) that the understanding is the cognitive capacity 
                                                 
31 I discuss Coleridge’s conception of the faculties further in 1.5. On the early modern view of faculties as 
capacities for certain kinds of cognitive activity, see Hatfield (1990), ch. 1, Waxman (2005), ch. 1. 
32 Logic, 13-14. On how the understanding makes logic possible, see e.g. 34-7, 212-3, 265-6n. 
33 See e.g. Logic, 9-12ff, 37, 51-2, 111-2, 139-47. 
34 For this distinction between φformal’ and φtranscendental’ logic, see e.g. Logic, 139-43, 146-9, 211-4, 
248ff. On Coleridge’s account, the normative element of transcendental logic determines the epistemic 
criteria that apply to or govern our judgements concerning perceptual objects (or rather, concerning the 
contents of our sensory cognitive states); its descriptive element determines the cognitive operations or 
φforms and functions’ that make discursive cognition possible. 
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whose operations produce this cognitive content (i.e., to use Coleridge’s terms, concepts, 
as the form(s) and content(s) of discursive cognitions, are the φacts and products’ of the 
understanding).35 He also aims to explain why, given this relationship, we must be sure to 
keep the contents and operations of the understanding distinct from those attributed to 
other faculties (like sense or reason), and likewise keep the subject matter and principles 
of logic separate from those of other disciplines (like mathematics or theology). So when 
Coleridge contends that φthe knowledge of every understanding that is the same with the 
human [understanding] is a knowledge by means of conceptions, not intuitive but 
discursive’, he does so to underline that such cognitive content and the mental operations 
taken to produce it must be sharply distinguished from the kinds of intuitive cognitive 
contents given through the faculties of sense (sensible intuitions) and reason (intellectual 
or spiritual intuitions). In particular, Coleridge wishes to emphasise that we should not 
use the terms φreason’ or φunderstanding’ as general terms serving to designate the whole 
range of the mind’s cognitive capacities, both intuitive and discursive.36  
This is why Coleridge disputes the kind of definition of φreason’ that is offered  
in, for instance, Isaac Watts’ influential textbook Logick (1725): φThe Word Reason is not 
in this place confined to the mere Faculty of reasoning or inferring one thing from 
another, but includes all the intellectual Powers of Man’.37 For, on Coleridge’s view, we 
have a distinct set of discursive cognitive capacities (as made use of in logic) and intuitive 
cognitive capacities (as employed in such fields as theology and ontology). The discursive 
capacities yield discursive (conceptual) knowledge and are collectively designated by the 
term φunderstanding’. The intuitive capacities yield nondiscursive (noetic) knowledge of 
ontological, theological, and moral principles, and are collectively designated by the term 
φreason’.38 Moreover, Coleridge distinguishes both these sets of cognitive capacities from 
the intuitive sensory capacities, which include what he calls our φcapability of acquiring 
representations’ (i.e. objects given in sensible intuition), and certain φsynthetic functions’ 
of the φintuitive power’ of imagination. These capacities are collectively designated by the 
term φsense’ (as φthe source and faculty of [sensible] intuitions and perceptions’).39 Thus, 
Coleridge also rejects broad definitions of φunderstanding’ as a cognitive capacity which 
includes both sensory and intellectual functions or operations, such as that presented by 
                                                 
35 For Coleridge on acts and products of the understanding, see esp. Logic, 68-81; cf. 211-4, 262-6. 
36 See Logic, 235-8, 246-7ff. 
37 Watts (1755), 1. 
38 See Coleridge’s account of reason, sense, and understanding as φthe [cognitive] powers from which the 
sciences derive their name and character’ at Logic, 34-7, which is summarised in his table of φpure’ and 
φmixed’, or nonempirical and empirical, sciences at 44-5n (see also 4.1-2 below). 
39 See Logic, 34-6, 68-70, 72-3ff, 153-4ff, 201-2. 
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Condillac in La Logique (1781): φthe reunion of all these faculties is called understanding[, 
λ it] comprehends perception, attention, comparison, judgement, reflection, imagination, and 
reasoning; we cannot form a more exact idea of it’.40 According to Coleridge, ever since 
the establishment of the earliest Athenian schools of Platonism and Aristotelianism, φthe 
understanding [has traditionally been designated] as the discursive faculty, or that which 
employed itself on the conceptions of the mind and the general terms representing them, 
in distinction from the intuition, or intuitive power of the mind [i.e. the sense, including 
perceptual imagination], as employed on the forms of perception in time and space’.41 
Consequently, any definition of understanding as a faculty or cognitive capacity which is 
responsible for (or taken to include) sense-perception or sensory aspects of imagination 
oversteps its bounds, blending sensory and intellectual (especially conceptual) operations 
that Coleridge contends ought to be conceived as distinct sets of cognitive functions.42 
On Coleridge’s terms, insofar as we speak of reasoning or the use of reason at all 
in logic, we should be taken to mean only the φdiscourse of reason’, the exercise of the 
discursive capacities of understanding φin the light of reason’, or the application of the 
principles of reason to the discursive cognitive contents given or produced through the 
operations of understanding.43 The complexities of Coleridge’s conception of the 
relationship between the cognitive capacity of reason and the rules or forms of discursive 
cognition (i.e. of the understanding) need not concern us here. For now it is sufficient to 
note that Coleridge makes a clear distinction between intuitive and discursive intellectual 
powers, and therefore uses φreason’ to refer only to the former kind, and φunderstanding’ 
to refer only to the latter kind.44 This distinction helps to indicate what Coleridge shares 
with conventional eighteenth-century conceptions of logic, and also what separates his 
methods and terminology from such accounts. Consider, for instance, how Coleridge’s 
reason/understanding distinction appears in light of the following entry on logic in Rees’ 
                                                 
40 Condillac (1809 [1781]), 47. Presumably, Coleridge would also reject Locke’s claim that φThe power of 
perception is that which we call the understanding’ (Essay, II.xxi.5), insofar as this claim is taken to entail that 
the term φunderstanding’ designates, in part, the sensory capacities of the mind; for evidence that Coleridge 
interprets Locke in this way, see TT.I.312; BL.I.141-2 (cf. I.110). 
41 Logic, 32-4. His next sentence makes the distinction clear: φHere ƫόƣƯƲ is distinguished from ƨƥƹƱία, as 
the understanding from the sense’. Coleridge often claims that Alexandrian philosophers like Plotinus use 
the term ƨƥƹƱία to refer to the functions of both sense (as the φcapability of acquiring representations’ [i.e. 
sensible intuitions]) and the perceptual or φintuitive imagination’ (as φour power of combining a multiplicity 
of presentations’ or of φapprehension or primary combination’σwhat Kant calls φtranscendental synthesis 
of the imagination’). See Logic, 34, 68-70ff, 245; cf. CPR, B151, 156ff. See also 1.5, 3.3 below. 
42 It must be noted, however, that in such contexts distinction does not mean division for Coleridge (i.e. 
the mind is unified, although its capacities can be distinguished for purposes of analysis and enumeration, 
esp. in working out theories of logic and cognition (see e.g. Logic, 68-70, 251-4). 
43 See e.g. Logic, 236ff (esp. Coleridge’s reference to those φprinciples of reason inseparably connected with 
the understanding as a foundation is with its edifice’ at 237; cf. 87-92, 211-2). 
44 Coleridge’s classic statement of this distinction is Friend.I.154-5 (cf. Logic, 33-6, 43-4, 68-70). 
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Cyclopaedia, published in 1819 (the year before Coleridge began composing Logic), but still 
very much reflective of the eighteenth-century view of the nature of logical inquiry that 
remained standard in Coleridge’s own time:  
 
LOGIC, the art of thinking justly; or of making a right use of our rational faculties, in defining, 
dividing, and reasoning : or, as it is defined by an excellent writer on the subject, [φ]logic is the 
art of using reason well in our enquiries after truth, and the communication of it to others[’, 
quoting from the opening paragraph of Watts’ Logick]. 
 
[λ I]n order to think aright, it is necessary that we apprehend, judge, discourse, and dispose, or 
methodize, rightly : hence perception or apprehension, judgement, discourse or reasoning, and 
disposition, whence results method, [are] the four fundamental articles of this art; and it is 
from our reflections on th[ese] operations of the mind that logic is, or ought to be, wholly 
drawn [another view popularised by (Lockean) logicians like Watts].45 
 
Returning to Coleridge’s definitions of logic as (i) φthe art and science of discoursing 
conclusively’, and (ii) the science that φcontains the rules or forms [i.e. the operations] of 
the understanding’, it is evident that his views are closer to the Wattsian conception of 
logic presented here than Coleridge’s opening criticisms of Watts in Logic might be taken 
to suggest. The main difference is terminological: Coleridge would not accept this broad 
definition of what it means to be engaged in φthe use of reason’; however, he would not 
dispute, on technical grounds, that logic does involve some use of reason, or the exercise 
of our φrational faculties’ and capacity for reasoning. Moreover, as was made clear above, 
Coleridge accepts the general view that φit is from our reflections on [the] operations of 
the mind that logic is, or ought to be, wholly drawn’, even if he has disagreements with 
eighteenth-century logicians like Watts or Condillac about what sorts of cognitive forms 
and contents such reflective procedures are employed to analyse and describe (i.e. what 
kind of theory about the φlaws and constitution of the understanding’ and its relation to 
logical rules may be derived from such reflection).46 Similarly, while Coleridge agrees that 
a logical theory should involve some account of the mental operation of φperception or 
apprehension’, he argues that the terminology of such a theory must distinguish between 
the respective contributions of our discursive intellectual capacities and intuitive sensory 
                                                 
45 Rees (1819), Vol. 20, 277, with quotes from Watts (1725), 1. On Watts as a populariser of the φLockean’ 
logic of ideas and faculties, see Buickerood (1985). 
46 See e.g. Logic, 5-7, 37ff, 196-7. 
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capacities to perceptual processes (rather than stating that the understanding includes or 
φcomprehends’ both sensory and intellectual operations, like Condillac).47  
To get a better sense of why Coleridge is so insistently critical of the proponents 
of an eighteenth-century view of logic which he seems to hold himself, we need to look 
more closely at what Coleridge has to say about Aristotle’s contribution to logical theory, 
considering how these statements reflect the influence of Kant on the one hand, and the 
assumptions that Coleridge shares with his eighteenth-century logical adversaries on the 
other. I will begin by looking at the case for Kant’s influence on Coleridge’s conception 
of logic (1.2). I then discuss how this influence needs to be considered in the context of 
the early modern logic of ideas and cognitive faculties that shaped Coleridge’s reading of 
Kant (1.3). Part 1 concludes with (i) a discussion of how Coleridge’s distinction between 
φlogic’ and φpsychology’ reflects his rejection of what he sees as an untenable materialistic 
version of facultative logic, rather than being evidence for his denial that the analysis of 
cognitive operations and contents should form part of logic (1.4), and (ii) a more detailed 
account of Coleridge’s conception of the cognitive faculties or powers, and the different 
ways in which he thinks such mental capacities can be described (1.5).  
 
1.3 Coleridge, Aristotle, & the Question of Kant’s Influence  
i. Coleridge’s Kantian Reading of Aristotle 
Coleridge’s opening statements on Aristotle, and his contrast of the approach to logic 
first developed by Aristotle with that of φthe most popular modern books, French and 
English, professing to teach logic and having its name as their title’,48 is a useful reference 
point for contextualising Coleridge’s own approach in Logic. While Coleridge does not 
explicitly mention Kant here, his emphasis on the methodological purposes of logical 
rules (for keeping diverse fields of knowledge distinct), and on the need for such rules to 
be a priori (universal and necessary, or φsuited to all understandings’49), is a clear indication 
of Kant’s influence. For Coleridge not only frames Aristotle’s contributions to the early 
development of logic in this Kantian fashion; he also repeats Kant’s well-known claim 
that Aristotle was the first to enumerate and systematise the core principles of general or 
formal logic (Coleridge’s φcommon logic’), and in doing so left little need for the further 
                                                 
47 See Condillac (1809 [1781]), 47. 
48 Logic, 5-6. 
49 Logic, 5. Although Coleridge does not say so directly here, it becomes clear elsewhere (e.g. 34-7, 43-5, 
146-7) that any rules or principles φdrawn from the laws and constitution of the understanding’ must, on 
his conception of logic (as a theory of the human understanding), be a priori. 
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development of this field.50 Given that there had been many advances in formal logic 
since Aristotle’s time with which Kant was surely familiar, this statement has often been 
criticised. However, precisely what Kant meant in asserting that since Aristotle, φ[formal 
logic] has also been unable to take a single step forward, and therefore seems to all 
appearance to be finished and complete’ remains a matter of some dispute.51 Coleridge’s 
statement that φthe essentials of common logic [λ] have remained without change from 
their first promulgation by Aristotle and [λ] are indeed as little susceptible of change as 
the rules of common arithmetic’52 appears to place him in line with some contemporary 
commentators on this issue. It suggests not that Coleridge reads Kant’s claim as denying 
the possibility of any further progress in formal logic, but rather that Coleridge takes 
Kant to mean that because the core principles of logic discovered by Aristotle (Kant’s 
φformal rules of all thinking’53) have a special a priori status, these principles cannot be 
subject to further development or change.54 The source or ground of this special status is 
φthe laws and constitution of the understanding’, just as the rules of common arithmetic 
have their ground in our forms of intuition (the faculty of sense): a source which confers 
upon these rules the same a priori status.55 In short, it is because Aristotle recognised that 
the fundamental principles of logic must be grounded in this way, and thus drew them 
from their original source in the human understanding, that the set of logical rules which 
he was the first to systematise cannot be improved upon.56 
That Coleridge is most likely following Kant here is further confirmed by two 
other notable parallels with the first Critique preface in which Kant presents the above 
assessment of Aristotle’s place in the history of logic. Like Kant, Coleridge states that 
logic is a φscience’. In Coleridge’s terms, φany kind or quantum of knowledge that has 
been reduced to rules’ qualifies as a science.57 What is required to reduce the field of 
knowledge that is constituted by general or common logic to rules (and thereby render it 
φscientific’) is to identify those φrules or forms of the understanding’ in which these 
                                                 
50 See CPR, Bviii. Kant’s term φgeneral logic’ is widely taken to refer only to an Aristotelian system of 
formal syllogistic logic and its fundamental rules (although some scholars, like Mosser, claim that Kant 
includes more than just the rules of the syllogism in a general logic). Coleridge uses the term φcommon 
logic’ in much the same way, with an emphasis on φthe form of the syllogism’ (see Logic, 51-2). Unless 
otherwise stated, I use the terms φgeneral-’, φcommon-’, and φformal logic’ as roughly equivalent. 
51 CPR, Bviii. For a reassessment of Kant’s claims about Aristotle, see Mosser (2008), 88-92. 
52 Logic, 6. 
53 CPR, Bviii-ix. Cf. Coleridge’s similar statements at Logic, 34-7, 41, 43, 51-2. 
54 Here I follow Mosser’s reading of Kant, see (2008), esp. ch. 2-3. 
55 That Coleridge follows Kant in arguing that the ground or source of the basic rules of arithmetic and 
their apriority must be our form of intuition or sensibility (specifically, time, as the form of inner sense) is 
clear at Logic, 36, 41, 165-8, 213-4 (cf. CPR, B46-8). 
56 See Mosser, (2008), 88-92. 
57 Logic, 5 (φthe word τscienceυ being here taken in its highest sense’). 
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fundamental φlaws of thought’ are grounded.58 Along with claiming that logic must be a 
science, Coleridge emphasises φthe high expedience of drawing as sharp and distinct a 
line as possible around each several science’, and the consequent need to keep logic and 
its principles separate from those of other disciplines.59 This is why he praises Aristotle’s 
recognition of the need for the kinds of methodological principles (furnished by logic) 
that enable such a systematic differentiation and classification of different sciences or 
fields of knowledge. It is also the reason for Coleridge’s criticism of those contemporary 
logic textbooks that present the principles of formal logic φblended [together] with 
metaphysics, theology, psychology, grammar, [etc.]’, or which seek to substitute some 
kind of materialist psychological theory for a formal analysis of cognition (usually by 
reducing the formal laws of thought provided by a general logic to neurophysiological 
mechanisms or psychologically grounded habits of thought).60 The implications of this 
Kantian influence for Coleridge’s conception of logical inquiry will be discussed further 
later (see 3.2, 4.1-2). For now I want to focus on another aspect of the connection here 
with Aristotle (as viewed from Coleridge’s Kantian perspective): Aristotle’s historical role 
as a significant figure in the development of a φfacultative logic’ which concerns itself 
with the relation between logical rules or forms and the human cognitive faculties and 
their operations, and reached its high point in the early modern period.61 This point is 
important as it has bearing not only on how Coleridge was influenced by Kant’s logical 
doctrines, but also on how Coleridge interpreted such Kantian doctrines before he decided 
to incorporate them into his own Logic (i.e. on how whatever influence Kant had on 
Coleridge was mediated by the historical and intellectual context within which Coleridge 
encountered Kant’s ideas concerning the nature of logic). To see why this matters, it will 
be useful first to say a bit more about Coleridge’s relation to Kant and the general lack of 
emphasis on the relationship between the cognitive faculties and logical rules or forms in 
many current interpretations of their respective logical systems. 
 
                                                 
58 See Logic, 34, 37, 41, 146. Cf. Kant’s claims at CPR, Bviii-ix, B76-8. 
59 Logic, 5. Cf. Kant’s observation at CPR, Bviii that φIt is not an improvement but a deformation of the 
sciences when their boundaries are allowed to run over into one another’. 
60 Logic, 6, 37, 133. Cf. CPR, Bviii for Kant’s criticism of those φmoderns who have thought to enlarge 
[general logic] by interpolating psychological [λ], metaphysical [λ and] anthropological chapters’ 
(this φproceeds only from their ignorance of the peculiar nature of this science’). 
61 This term was coined by Buickerood (1985) and subsequently employed by many other historians of 
early modern logic. See e.g. Capozzi and Roncaglia (2009), Schuurman (2004), Sgarbi (2013). 
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ii. Logical Rules & the Cognitive Faculties in Kant & Coleridge  
Many contemporary interpretations of Kant’s general and transcendental logic, and of 
the relations between these two branches of Kant’s logical theory, downplay or seek to 
remove altogether the role of Kant’s account of the human cognitive powers in his 
description of the nature and purpose of both the general and transcendental forms of 
logical inquiry.62 Such readings tend to focus instead on how Kant’s notion of form and 
his theory of concepts as rules may be redefined in terms of the conceptual framework(s) 
provided by more recent developments in formal logic and epistemology;63 or on how 
Kant’s claims concerning the rules of sensibility and understanding can be interpreted as 
statements about the epistemic conditions or criteria that must govern our cognition or 
cognitive experience rather than as references to specific functions of our cognitive 
faculties or capacities.64 While some recent approaches give closer attention to Kant’s 
claims about the nature of human mental processes, emphasising the significance of the 
psychological elements of Kant’s first Critique and attempting to present its main insights 
in terms provided by contemporary cognitive science, these readings seldom have much 
to say about the role of Kant’s theory of cognition in relation his account of general logic 
and his arguments in the Metaphysical Deduction.65 What this means, in short, is that 
logical or epistemological interpretations of Kant generally separate his claims about 
logical rules and epistemic conditions from his claims about our cognitive faculties, 
whereas psychological or φcognitivist’ interpretations typically do the converse, separating 
Kant’s claims about the formal principles of human cognition from his claims about the 
formal principles of (general) logic. This often results in questions about why Kant 
emphasises the relationship between logic (in both its general and transcendental forms) 
and the investigation of our cognitive faculties being glossed over as historical curiosities, 
or recast as problems that fall outside of the sphere of logical inquiry.66 Given that 
Coleridge, too, not only emphasises the need to keep logic and its principles sharply 
separated from other fields of knowledge, but also contends that the source or ground of 
all logical principles must be the human faculty of understanding, this state of scholarly 
affairs has important implications for any attempt to make sense of Coleridge’s reading 
of Kantian logical (and cognitive) theory.  
                                                 
62 Here the interpretations of Allison (2004 [1983]) and Strawson (1966) are particularly influential. 
63 See e.g. Friedman (1992), Tiles (2004). 
64 See e.g. Allison (2004), Pippin (1982). 
65 See e.g. Falkenstein (1995), Kitcher (1990). 
66 For an overview of this traditional response, see Waxman (2005), ch. 1, esp. 6-11. 
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However, in the relatively small area of Coleridge studies concerned with his 
Logic there has been little attention to the relations between Coleridge’s conception of 
logic and his account of the φforms and functions’ of the cognitive faculties, or to how 
Coleridge interprets Kant’s claims concerning the nature of logical forms (considered as 
norms of thought) and cognitive forms (considered as mental operations, or modes of 
human sensory and intellectual activity).67 As was pointed out earlier, Jackson and Milnes 
repeat the prevailing scholarly assumptions concerning Kant’s theory of logic as either 
strangely intermixed with metaphysical and epistemological principles (thus removing it 
from the sphere of logical inquiry), or as a long since exploded version of psychologistic 
logic (so disqualifying it from consideration as a logical theory).68 The alternatives to their 
two approaches tend either to read Coleridge’s account of logic in relation to eighteenth-
century linguistic theory with little reference to his theory of the cognitive faculties, or to 
focus on Coleridge’s accounts of cognitive and perceptual processes without considering 
how these accounts relate to his theory of logic.69 In all these cases, as with the readings 
of Kant just outlined, little attention is given to Coleridge claim that the φinvestigation 
into the constitution and constituent forms of the understanding’ forms an essential part 
of logical inquiry, or to Coleridge’s possible reasons for interpreting Kant’s logic along 
such lines.70 Here I will follow the lead of those Kant scholars who seek to frame their 
interpretations of his views on logic and cognition not in terms of contemporary logical, 
epistemological, or cognitive theory, but rather in the terms provided by those early 
modern philosophical traditions to which Kant was responding, and by which he was 
strongly influenced, in developing his own theories of logic and cognition.71 For while 
the core terms of Coleridge’s account of logic and theory of cognition are largely drawn 
or adapted from Kant, it should be recognised that Coleridge’s sense of the meaning and 
significance of Kant’s terminology is in many ways determined by his prior engagement 
with the influential tradition of the early modern φlogic of cognitive faculties’.72 
 
                                                 
67 For some representative remarks on the φinherent forms and functions’ or φseveral functional powers’ of 
sense and understanding, see e.g. Logic, 12-14, 145-9, 213-4, 242-8. 
68 See Logic, lxii; Milnes (2008). 
69 See e.g. Jackson (1983), McKusick (1986), Reid (2001), (2002a), (2002b). 
70 See 146-7. That Coleridge interprets Kant’s logic in this way is made clear at 148-9, 213, and 268. 
71 In particular, I follow the examples of Hatfield (1990) and Waxman (2005). 
72 I take this phrase from Capozzi and Roncaglia (2009), 103; cf. Schuurman (2004). 
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1.4 Faculties, Ideas, & Origins: Coleridge & Long Eighteenth-Century Logic  
i. The Development of Facultative Logic: An Outline 
Before considering Coleridge’s views concerning the connections between Kantian and 
early modern logical theory in more detail, we need to look more closely at the historical 
background of the structure and content of the eighteenth-century logic textbooks which 
he criticises in the opening passages of Logic.73 As was suggested earlier, the way in which 
Coleridge contrasts Aristotle’s contribution to the early development of logic with the 
theory and practice of logic typical of the popular English and French textbooks of his 
day is significant not just because of what Coleridge thinks separates the logical work of 
thinkers like Watts and Condillac from that of Aristotle (i.e. their different views of the 
origin and status of φthe laws of the understanding’).74 For, although Coleridge sees these 
authors as taking fundamentally different positions concerning the nature, source, status, 
and classification of logical principles, he also views their works as forming part of the 
same broad tradition of φfacultative logic’. This is an approach that standardly considers 
the objects of logical inquiry in relation to the cognitive faculties and which attempts to 
characterise (and sometimes to justify) the principles of logical doctrine with reference to 
the operations of these faculties.75 As Coleridge was aware, while this way of theorising 
about logic and its relationship to the cognitive faculties began to reach new levels of 
sophistication late in the seventeenth century, it is a philosophical practice that goes back 
much further.76 In this section (1.3) I give a brief overview of the historical development 
of facultative logic, and discuss how Coleridge seeks to situate his own logical work in 
relation to this tradition. In 1.4 I will discuss how the development of facultative logic 
resulted in substantive changes in the structure and content of long eighteenth-century 
logical texts, as well as showing that while Coleridge criticises certain materialistic strands 
of this new faculty-oriented logic, his own logical texts follow a similar pattern, focusing 
on the nature and origin of cognitive operations and contents rather than the traditional 
topics of Aristotelian formal logic.  
Capozzi and Roncaglia, amongst others, have noted that while φmany logicians 
developed an interest in the analysis of the cognitive faculties’, during the seventeenth 
century, the incorporation of discussions of the human cognitive activities into logic has 
a much earlier historical precedent (well-known to early modern logicians): 
                                                 
73 See 1.1 above. 
74 See Logic, 5-6 (cf. 37). 
75 See Capozzi and Roncaglia (2009), 95-106, Easton and Falkenstein (1997), Schuurman (2004).  
76 For Coleridge’s views on the ancient roots of the facultative approach, see CL.II.679ff, SWF.I.124-40. 
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dealing with the nature and object of logic and with the justification of the traditional partitions 
of logical treaties through a reference to mental operations had been a well-established practice 
since Aristotle’s Organon: The operations of simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning had 
[thus already] been mentioned as mental counterparts to the logical doctrines of concepts, 
judgments, and inferences.77 
 
As they go on to point out, this Aristotelian approach is reproduced in such influential 
early seventeenth-century textbooks as Robert Sanderson’s Logicae artis compendium but 
was superseded in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries by a different kind 
of φlogic of cognitive faculties’. Traditional facultative logics sought to use φThe study of 
the cognitive faculties [λ] to provide an expositive framework for logical doctrines’, by 
identifying certain sorts of cognitive operations as the φmental counterparts’ to particular 
terms or components of logical theory (e.g. concepts and judgements). What separates 
Locke, Descartes, and the Port-Royal logicians from their Aristotelian forerunners is that 
they pay closer attention to questions concerning the role of our cognitive faculties in the 
production and manipulation of the kinds of cognitive content with which logical inquiry 
is concerned. In these newer developments of facultative logic, the expositive framework 
of mental counterparts is thus further extended: φthe cognitive operations involved in the 
formation and use of ideas become a central concern of logicians’.78 This new focus on 
how ideas or φthe immediate objects of the mind’79 come to be formed resulted in further 
concentration on questions concerning the origin of ideas and other such mental objects 
or contents, as well as in renewed attention to perception and cognition (as problems for 
logic).80 As noted in 1.1, Coleridge takes such questions of origin, especially as applied to 
the forms or rules of the understanding, are central to logical inquiry.81 In what follows, I 
consider some further textual and contextual evidence for my claim that Coleridge’s Logic 
should be placed within the new facultative tradition which developed in the wake of the 
Cartesian and Lockean logic of ideas and faculties. 
 
                                                 
77 Capozzi and Roncaglia (2009), 103. Cf. Coleridge’s remarks on this tradition in CL.II.679-85. 
78 Capozzi and Roncaglia (2009), 103-6. On Sanderson as a proto-facultative logician, see Schuurman 
(2004), 11-16; cf. Sgarbi (2013), 152-7 on Sanderson’s logic and British Aristotelianism. 
79 This is Coleridge’s definition of Locke’s sense of the term φidea’ (see Logic, 210n). 
80 On the focus on perception and cognition in early modern logic, see Michael (1997), Hatfield (1997). 
81 See Logic, 34-7, 68-70, 151-4, 183-4n, 254, 265-6n. 
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ii. Facultative Logic in Coleridge’s early 1800s Letters & Manuscripts 
As it happens, sometime before Coleridge formulated his first plans for a work on logic 
and committed them to paper in mid-1803, he had already carried out a fairly detailed 
study of (perhaps) the two most influential figures in the tradition of the early modern 
logic of ideas and cognitive faculties: Locke and Descartes.82 Coleridge’s series of 
φphilosophical letters’ on Locke on Descartes is well-known, but it has seldom, if at all, 
been considered in relation to Coleridge’s conception of logical inquiry, or indeed to 
Coleridge’s projects for a logical work in 1803 and the 1820s.83 This may be because 
Coleridge himself does not explicitly raise questions concerning logic and its domain of 
inquiry at any point in these letters (although he does claim that Locke’s misconceptions 
concerning the nature of innate ideas could have been avoided had he φever looked into 
the logical or metaphysical works of Aristotle’).84 However, the main topic of Coleridge’s 
letters, Locke’s criticism of Cartesian innate ideas and the relation of ideas of sensation 
and reflection to the human cognitive faculties, makes clear the connection with early 
modern logic here. Moreover, while Coleridge admits in the first of these letters that he 
had not previously read Locke’s Essay very closely, his familiarity with the writings of 
Locke-influenced thinkers, like Hartley, Berkeley, and Condillac, before 1801 means that 
Coleridge would have been aware that the problem of the nature and φoriginal Sources of 
our Ideas’ was of fundamental concern in the early modern logic of ideas and cognitive 
faculties.85 What I want to propose is that Coleridge’s letters on Locke and Descartes 
must be recognised as the starting point for his interest in the history and theory of logic 
(especially questions on the relationship between logical principles and the contents and 
operations of the mind, framed as a matter of ground or origin). As I will be arguing, this 
is why we should take seriously the possibility that Coleridge’s reading of Kant’s theories 
of logic and cognition (as presented in his Logic) was influenced in significant ways by his 
prior engagement with the early modern logic of ideas and cognitive faculties. 
 For our present purposes, we will not need a detailed account of the arguments 
of Coleridge’s 1801 letters on Locke and the problem of innate ideas; rather, I discuss 
some common themes connecting these letters to the 1820s Logic manuscript, in order to 
                                                 
82 Here I follow the characterisation of this tradition in Schuurman (2004), esp. ch. 2. 
83 For the history of this sequence of letters, prepared for Coleridge’s patron Josiah Wedgwood and his 
brother Tom early in 1801, see CL.II.677-8 headnote. On Coleridge and Locke, see Brinkley (1949). 
84 CL.II.693. 
85 This is Coleridge’s own statement of the problem at CL.II.685. See CL.II.679 for Coleridge’ admission 
that φMr Locke's Essay was a Book which I had really never read, but only looked thro'’ before beginning his 
comparative study of Locke’s and Descartes’ theories of ideas. Coleridge was also studying §II, φOf the 
Origin of Ideas’, of Hume’s Enquiry at this time (see CL.II.672, 681). 
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show the continuity of Coleridge’s views on logic across this period (especially his sense 
of the centrality of the theory of ideas and faculties to logical inquiry). There are two key 
points of connection here, which are themselves closely related: (1) the claim that Locke 
misinterpreted Descartes’ definition of innate ideas, having failed to realise that they are 
in fact identical to his own definition of ideas of reflection (and also that Descartes had 
already anticipated and refuted the kind of objection framed by Locke); and (2) the claim 
that there is a tradition going back to ancient philosophy that sees the φinnate principles’ or 
φprimary notions’ which Locke supposedly mischaracterises as φinnate ideas’ not as some 
special kind of knowledge or truth residing originally in the mind, but rather as the innate 
or natural cognitive capacities of the human mind. For, according to Coleridge, φBy [the 
term] Ideas Plato, notwithstanding his fantastic expressions respecting them, meant what 
Mr Locke calls the original Faculties & Tendencies of the mind’, and this conception of 
innate or natural cognitive faculties can be found not only in Plato and Aristotle, but also 
in the writings of Sennert, Descartes, and Hume.86 On his account, this is a principle of 
logical theory that was well established by Aristotle’s time. Both (1) and (2) show clearly 
Coleridge’s early interest in the problem of the origins of our ideas (or representations) 
and their relation to our cognitive faculties. The list of sources Coleridge draws on for 
these claims also provides evidence for his familiarity with the ancient and early modern 
philosophical traditions which seek to explain the connections between the cognitive or 
epistemological content studied in logic and the cognitive faculties or operations taken to 
correspond to or produce such content.87 
 What is most important about (1) and (2) for our purposes is that they provide 
fairly stable reference points for charting the development of Coleridge’s conception of 
logic. (1) is stated in much the same form in Coleridge’s 1801 philosophical letters and in 
his Logic manuscript twenty years later. The case of (2) is more complicated as Coleridge 
was, after 1801, to revise his interpretation of the Platonic ideas substantially; however, 
his conception of the φoriginal Faculties & Tendencies of the mind, the internal Organs, 
as it were, and Laws of human Thinking’ that he refers to in the 1801 letters is much the 
                                                 
86 See CL.II.679-91. Coleridge cites from a wide range of texts to support claims (1) and (2), including 
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, Diogenes Laertius’ Life of Plato, Sennert’s Epitome 
Naturalis Scientiae, Descartes’ Meditations and Discourse on Method, Locke’s Essay, and Hume’s Enquiry (see CL 
editor’s notes for details; cf. Logic 184n, 236-7n). On the view that ideas originate either in sensation or in 
reflection on the operations of the mind, Coleridge states, φDes Cartes and Locke agreed with each other in 
[this] Tenet common to all the Philosophers before them’ (686). 
87 i.e. the φproto-facultative’ Aristotelian tradition (represented here by Aristotle and Sennert), and the early 
modern logic of ideas and cognitive faculties tradition (represented by Locke and Descartes). 
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same in Logic (and presented in terms that Coleridge had coined in the earlier text).88 This 
is significant because it is thus clear that Coleridge’s interpretation of these claims about 
the nature and origin of the contents and operations of the human mind (which he first 
studied closely in the works of Aristotle, Locke, Descartes, and other influential ancient 
and early modern authors on logic and cognition) changed little over this twenty year 
period.89 Conversely, though many textual details of the Logic manuscript do suggest that 
Kant had become one of the dominant influences on Coleridge’s view of logical inquiry 
by the early 1820s, one finds no similarly unequivocal documentary evidence for Kant’s 
impact on Coleridge’s conception of logic in the early 1800s.90 Indeed, the limited textual 
record we have of Coleridge’s responses to Kant’s first Critique (a core source for Logic) 
during these years suggests not only that Coleridge initially struggled to make sense of 
Kant’s theory of experience, but also that he doubted the validity of Kant’s doctrine of 
the categories, arguably the foundation of Kant’s account of logic and cognition.91 By the 
1820s, Coleridge had clearly come to accept Kant’s tables of judgement- and concept-
forms and many of the major implications of Kant’s arguments in his Metaphysical and 
Transcendental Deductions; but there is no evidence that Coleridge held this view when 
he began to work on logic c. 1801, and so no grounds to assume that it was Kant rather 
than any of the numerous other philosophers that Coleridge was reading over this period 
who shaped his early theory of logic and its relation to the cognitive faculties.92 
Of course, such historical data alone will not prove that the early modern logic of 
ideas and cognitive faculties was ultimately any more influential on Coleridge than Kant’s 
logical doctrines. However, what it does suggest is that Coleridge came to terms with the 
basic principles of early modern (and ancient) logical theories rather more quickly than 
he did with those of Kant’s philosophy. More importantly, putting aside the question of 
influence, this also gives us further reason to believe that Coleridge would have been 
inclined to read what he found in Kant’s writings on logic and cognition in terms of the 
framework of ideas and faculties provided by the early modern texts with which he was 
engaging at this time, as well as to place Kant’s ideas within the traditions of facultative 
logic stretching back to Aristotle. Coleridge had not yet, so far as may be inferred from 
                                                 
88 For (1) see CL.II.684-5 and Logic, 184n; for (2) see CL.II.682 and Logic, 133. 
89 The same is true of Coleridge’s c. 1803 Outlines of the History of Logic MS (SWF.I.123-40) and his c. 1820s 
φSketch of the History of Logic’ (Logic, 24-41). 
90 But see e.g. Ashton (1980), 40-4, (1998), 196; Wheeler (1981), 15-16; Willey (1972), 86-89, for the 
assertion of such Kantian influence from c. 1800-1 onwards, in spite of the lack of textual evidence. 
91 See CM.III.248-9 (conjecturally dated to c. 1801-8; the earlier date seems more likely, as Coleridge had 
evidently better come to terms with Kant’s philosophy by 1809; see CN.III.3605 (Aug-Sep 1809). 
92 Coleridge’s acceptance of the categories is clear at Logic, 254-71, esp. 263-6. 
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the available evidence, made up his mind about the categories or the nature of Kant’s 
idealism when he began to plan his work on logic. But what we do know of this period is 
that in 1801, just as in the 1820s, Coleridge contended that φDes Cartes and Locke held 
precisely the same opinions concerning the original Sources of our Ideas’, and that the 
sensory and reflective reception of ideas (representations) depends upon the operations 
of φthe original Faculties and Tendencies of the mind’ or the φoriginal moulds of the mind’ 
(later φprimary moulds or forms’).93 Coleridge was later to comment that he took Kant to 
be φthe first scientific analyst’ of these cognitive faculties.94 But, as the foregoing analysis 
should make clear, Coleridge certainly did not think of Kant as the first philosopher to 
have recognised or taken up these particular problems; nor did he initially regard Kant to 
have provided the most persuasive theoretical account of the nature and origins of the 
contents and operations of the human mind (considered as a matter for logical inquiry). 
Rather, Coleridge came to endorse Kant’s logical theory only after adopting a facultative 
framework in terms of which he was able to make sense of Kant’s claims.  
 Another useful reference point here is the June 1803 letter where Coleridge first 
outlines his plan for a work on the history and theory of logic. It is perhaps the earliest 
occasion on which we find Coleridge conflating the systems of Hartley and Condillac, as 
well as referring explicitly to the works of these philosophers as theories of logic (he also 
states his intention here to develop φa philosophical examination of [Condillac’s] Logic’). 
More importantly, Coleridge’s sketch of the plans for this logical work indicates that, by 
1803, he had decided to adopt the kind of facultative approach to logic outlined in the 
preceding part of this section. For here, after giving a chapter-by-chapter overview of the 
historical aspects of his projected work, Coleridge states that his analytical history of the 
development of logic from the pre-Socratics to Condillac will be φfollow[ed by] my own 
Organum verè Organumσwhich consists of a ΣύƳƴημα [system] of all possible modes of 
true, probable & false reasoning, arranged philosophically, i.e. on a strict analysis of those 
operations & passions of the mind, in which they originate, & by which they act’.95 This 
shows that well before Coleridge had championed Kant as offering φa true analysis of the 
understanding’, he considered the principal aim of logical inquiry to be an analysis of the 
operations of the human mind that could determine the ground or origin of our capacity 
to reason, by tracing the modes of such reasoning back to their sources in our cognitive 
                                                 
93 See CL.II.684-5 and Logic, 184n; CL.II.682 and Logic, 133. 
94 See Logic, 268 
95 CL.II.947 (Jun 1803). 
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faculties.96 I will now consider how Coleridge’s endorsement of this facultative approach 
is evident in some of his remarks on Kant and Aristotle in the 1820s Logic manuscript. 
 
iii. Facultative Logic in Coleridge’s 1820s Logic Manuscript 
There are a number of places in the Logic where Coleridge claims that Kant is the first 
modern logician to have fully resolved the problem of the origin and formation of the 
different kinds of cognitive content with which logic is concerned, and the further 
question of the relation of such content to the operations of our cognitive faculties.97 It 
is for this reason that Coleridge adopts without much alteration Kant’s representation-
terminology and its classification of the different grounds or origins (in our cognitive 
faculties) of the diverse kinds of cognitive content(s) presented to us by the mind.98 Why 
Coleridge chose to adopt this solution is a matter for later sections.99 What needs to be 
noted here is (1) that Coleridge interprets Kant’s logical theory as a version of facultative 
logic that is concerned with the φanalysis of our intellectual faculties’100 (this is why he not 
only proclaims Kant φthe greatest logician since the time of Aristotle’, but also the φfirst 
scientific analyst of the logical faculty’ or human understanding101); and (2) that Coleridge 
was primed to read Kant’s account of logic and cognition in this way because of his prior 
engagement with the early modern tradition of facultative logic (which remained the 
dominant approach to logic in Britain at the period Coleridge was composing Logic, as he 
himself often observes102). This is important because Coleridge did not read Kant only as 
a faculty theorist, but also as a philosopher who made major contributions to accounting 
for the epistemic criteria or formal conditions that govern all (human) sensory cognition. 
In fact, contrary to the interpretation dominant in Kant studies since the early twentieth 
century, Coleridge takes Kant’s analysis of the cognitive faculties to be the foundation of 
his most important insights into the nature and function of such epistemic criteria, and 
emphasises the connections between these two aspects of the Critical Philosophy.103 As I 
discuss further in 1.4, Coleridge’s interpretation of this connection between epistemic 
criteria and the cognitive faculties is what informs his distinction between φlogical’ and 
                                                 
96 This is, at least on some readings, a central feature of Kant’s account of logic and cognition (see esp. 
CPR, B90); as we have seen, however, Coleridge could just have easily adapted such an approach from 
Locke or Condillac, who often discuss this problem of origins in more detail (see nn. 94-6 above). This c. 
1820s assessment of Kant as an analyst of the understanding is from Logic, 210 (cf. 268).  
97 See Logic, 148-9, 210, 268. 
98 See esp. LS, 111-2; Coleridge uses these terms throughout Logic (see e.g. 34-7, 151-2ff, 213-4) 
99 See 2.1-3, 3.2-3, 4.1-3 below. 
100 Logic, 147. Cf. 213: 
101 Logic, 63, 268 (cf. 33-4, 147-9). 
102 See e.g. SWF.II.947 (c. 1821), CL.V.138 (Feb 1821), CN.IV.5123 (Feb 1824).  
103 See esp. Logic, 148-9 (cf. 51-2, 239-42). 
 33 
φpsychological’ analysis of φthe laws and constitution of the understanding’, and underlies 
his criticism of the theories of cognition offered by Hartley and Condillac as fallacious 
attempts to substitute psychological laws for logical rules.104 For the moment I will focus 
some other passages, which show that Coleridge shares the view that a complete system 
of logic should involve an investigation of the origins of our cognitive content (especially 
ideas or representations) and an analysis of our cognitive faculties.  
Once again, Aristotle is an important reference point here. This is because, while 
Coleridge refers to Kant as φthe first scientific analyst of the logical faculty’, he mentions 
Aristotle as one of the first philosophers to define the understanding itself as our φlogical 
faculty’ (designated by the term φƫόƣƯƲ’), and to distinguish the understanding from other 
cognitive capacities such as reason and sense:105  
 
That Aristotle, however, did not differ from his great master and rival [Plato] as to the 
existence of the distinction which I am now about to notice is evident from his own words: 
τthere must be something transcending the ƫόƣƯƲυ, that is, the logical faculty, viz. that which is 
the principle of this faculty [i.e. φthe ƭƯƵƲ or pure reason’], to which numerous other passages 
of the same import might be added from his logical and metaphysical works.106 
 
Having introduced the distinction between understanding or ƫόƣƯƲ as our φlogical faculty’ 
and ƭƯƵƲ as that which φtranscends’ or is the φthe principle of this faculty’, Coleridge goes 
on to provide an overview of the faculty terminology employed by ancient philosophers 
after Aristotle to distinguish between different cognitive capacities: 
 
At this time the substantive ƫόƣƯƲ, we have said, acquired a new sense, and was employed to 
express the intelligential faculty itself and this in a threefold relation: first it signified the logical 
faculty, the reasoning power, in short the understanding including the judgment, in distinction 
from the ƭƯƵƲ or reason. Secondly it [φƫόƣƯƲ’] signified the understanding, as the discursive 
faculty, or that which employed itself on the conceptions of the mind and the general terms 
representing them, in distinction from the intuition, or intuitive power of the mind, as 
employed on the forms of perception in time and space, that is number and figure: [λ] Here 
the ƫόƣƯƲ is distinguished from ƨƥƹƱία, as the understanding from the sense, and [λ t]hirdly 
the ƫόƣƯƲ was used in a somewhat larger sense, as the mind or intellective power abstractedly 
                                                 
104 See Logic, 5-6, 37ff, 139-43. 
105 Logic, 33; cf. 65-70. I discuss Coleridge’s reading of Aristotle’s employment of the term φƫόƣƯƲ’ further 
below, when turning to account of the historical development of faculty terminology (see 3.3). 
106 Logic, 33. As at 5-6, where Coleridge also mentions Aristotle’s φlogical and metaphysical works’, no 
passages are actually cited. The editor suggests Coleridge is here paraphrasing De Anima 3.5. 
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from the ƭƯƵƲ or pure reason [λ]; from the reason, I say, as at once the light of the mind and 
its highest object [i.e. as the φpower of ideas’ or capacity for noesis].107 
 
After outlining this φthreefold relation’ between ƫόƣƯƲ, ƨƥƹƱία, and ƭƯƵƲ, and providing 
English equivalents for these ancient Greek terms (in the faculty terminology familiar to 
his readers), Coleridge offers a further explanation of what it means to refer to ƫόƣƯƲ or 
understanding as our φlogical faculty’: 
 
Th[is] sense is [λ] an application of it [i.e. the term ƫόƣƯƲ] to a particular and correspondent 
scienceσthat of logic; of which no other definition need be given than that it contains the 
rules or forms of the understanding, on whatever objects they are employed, in exclusive 
reference to the correspondence of these objects to its own forms.108 
 
I return to these passages in 3.3 to offer a more detailed account of Coleridge’s views on 
the import of Greek faculty terminology; for now it is sufficient to note that Coleridge’s 
statements here show that he considers the tradition of facultative logic, conceived as a 
discipline concerned with the classification and analysis of our cognitive faculties and 
their operations, to have its roots in ancient philosophy. More importantly, it suggests 
that Coleridge conceives of logic specifically as the discipline concerned with developing 
a theory of the understanding (defined as our φlogical faculty’), considered as one of our 
fundamental cognitive faculties, and the origin or source of those cognitive contents and 
operations with which logical inquiry is concerned (i.e. concepts and judgements).109 That 
Coleridge seeks to emphasise such a connection between logic and the understanding is 
perhaps nowhere more evident than in his employment of the adjective φlogical’ to refer 
specifically to the acts and operations of the understanding and to the cognitive content 
produced, or presented to the mind, by its cognitive functions.110 With this in mind, we 
can now consider some representative examples of long eighteenth-century facultative 
logic and Coleridge’s response to these theories. I look first at the differences between 
the influential logical textbooks of Sanderson and Watts, and then turn to a discussion of 
how the work of Condillac and Hartley fits into the facultative tradition popularised by 
                                                 
107 Logic, 34. See 68-70 on reason as a φpower of ideas’ (cf. 43-4, 237-8). 
108 Logic, 34 (cf. 5-6, 37, 212-3). 
109 Coleridge makes this clear at Logic, 66-70, 147-9, 154, 255 (cf. 44-5 and nn). 
110 See esp. Logic, 64-5 where Coleridge defines φlogical’ as φsubjective in reference to the understanding, 
aloof from the question of its [i.e. the act or object of cognition’s] reality independent of the 
understanding’ (cf. 66-70, 77-81). Coleridge entitles the chapter on his theory of the understanding φOn the 
Logical Acts’ (see 60-103, where Coleridge employs the term φlogical’ in this sense throughout). 
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Watts, giving particular attention to Coleridge’s criticisms of the claims about the human 
mind and its cognitive mechanisms which he attributes to Hartley and Condillac. As we 
shall see, Coleridge argues that these philosophers have substituted psychology for logic 
not because they focus on analysing the faculties, but rather because they attempt (in his 
view) to derive the human capacity of discursive cognition (i.e. the understanding and its 
operations and contents) from the faculty of sense. 
 
1.4 Long Eighteenth Century Logic & Coleridge’s Critique of Hartley & Condillac 
i. Locke’s Influence on the Structure & Content of Logical Theory 
To see why Coleridge’s criticisms of Hartley and Condillac are central to his account of 
logic as a discipline concerned with the analysis of our cognitive faculties, we must return 
to Coleridge’s dismissive account of eighteenth-century British and French logical theory 
(as represented by some of the popular contemporary textbooks). As was noted in 1.2-3, 
while Coleridge criticises the logical texts of Watts and Condillac on different grounds, 
he would have recognised both works as strongly influenced by the approach to logic 
established by Locke (but anticipated in some respects by Descartes and the Port-Royal 
logicians).111 Of particular significance here is Locke’s role in initiating a shift in the focus 
of logical inquiry away from a concern with the forms of the syllogism and the modes of 
argumentation bound up with these logical forms, and reorienting it towards a concern 
with analysing the operations and products of our cognitive faculties and investigating 
the origins of certain kinds of cognitive content (e.g. ideas).112 The content of Coleridge’s 
Logic is reflective of this shift: It contains only a single short chapter concerned with the 
syllogism, while the majority of the manuscript is devoted to an analysis of the cognitive 
faculties and discussion of a range of cognitive operations involved in the production of 
different kinds of cognitive content (even Coleridge’s theory of the syllogism and his 
discussions of epistemic criteria are framed in terms of their relation to specific cognitive 
acts or capacities).113 Indeed, as I have been arguing, although the form Coleridge’s Logic 
eventually took was strongly influenced by Kant’s transcendental theories of logic and 
                                                 
111 See Logic, 5-6. A closely contemporary letter (Feb 1821) also attests to Coleridge’s sense of Locke’s 
influence on eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century approaches to logic (see CL.V.139). In a series of far 
earlier letters Coleridge claims that Locke’s analysis of cognition is heavily dependent on the prior work of 
Descartes (see CL.II.679-85, Feb 1801).    
112 See Schuurman (2004), ch. 1-2; cf. Capozzi and Roncaglia (2009), 103-6. 
113 Of the 271 pages in the Bollingen edition of Coleridge’s Logic, his theory of the syllogism is covered on 
just 53-9, while 24-47, 60-103, 139-74, 181-256 all concern aspects of logic (broadly construed) and its 
relation to (an analysis of) the cognitive faculties (esp. understanding, but also sensibility).  
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cognition, Coleridge’s reading of Kantian logic was clearly developed in response to a set 
of philosophical terms and problems provided by the early modern logical tradition. 
 As a number of historians of early modern logic have pointed out, although the 
logic of ideas (or logic of cognitive faculties) developed during this period in Locke’s 
Essay and other influential texts made little contribution to formal logic (neither to the 
discipline as it was understood in the late seventeenth century nor to its contemporary 
forms), it did bring about important developments in theories of sensation, perception, 
and cognition.114 As noted in 1.3, many of these developments relate to a new concern 
with the problem of the origin and formation of different kinds of cognitive content or 
mental objects (such as ideas or representations, concepts, and judgements), and with 
analysing the cognitive faculties or operations thought to be responsible for producing 
(and manipulating) such content.115 The impact of this new approach (through Locke’s 
influence in Britain, and through the influence of Locke, Descartes, and the Port-Royal 
logicians in France) is reflected in significant methodological changes in the presentation 
and organisation of material in many subsequently influential logic textbooks.116 If we 
compare the structure and content of the popular eighteenth-century logical works that 
Coleridge mentions to that typical of the Aristotelian logical handbooks that were the 
standard texts in the early seventeenth century, the nature of this methodological shift 
and the extent of Locke’s influence becomes clear (especially the influence of Book II of 
the Essay, but also that of the Introduction and Book I).  
On the one hand, to take an influential example from the British Aristotelian 
tradition: although Sanderson’s Logicae artis compendium (1615) works within the φmental 
counterparts’ framework of early (or proto-) facultative logic, specifying those mental 
operations taken to correspond to particular components of Aristotelian logical doctrine, 
this textbook’s general structure and content are determined by other considerations. 
Thus, it begins not with an analysis of the human cognitive powers or an investigation of 
the origins of different kinds of cognitive content, but with formal definitions of the 
basic terms of Sanderson’s logic, then moving on to a consideration of the structure of 
propositions, and a discussion of the principles of argumentation and scientific method 
                                                 
114 See e.g. Michael (1997), 18: φIn the two hundred years in which the logic of ideas was dominant, it was 
in fact the theory of perception that was the principal focus of attention; [and] it is this which was 
principally developed’. Cf. Capozzi and Roncaglia (2009), 103. 
115 As Michael puts it φthe chief focus in the logic of ideas was not on form but on content, principally on 
epistemological content’ (1997, 3). 
116 See Schuurman (2004), esp. ch. 2, 5; cf. Capozzi and Roncaglia, 95-106, Michael (1997), 9-18. 
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(framed in terms of traditional logical topics and syllogistic forms).117 On the other hand, 
as I discuss below, Watts and Condillac follow Locke in beginning their textbooks with a 
consideration of the nature of certain kinds of cognitive content (ideas), particularly with 
reference to questions of its origin and its relation to our cognitive faculties (especially 
sense and understanding), leaving discussion of the syllogism and definition of its formal 
terms until much later, or simply dismissing the utility of such terms at the outset.118 
 We saw above that Locke’s Essay helped initiate a significant shift of focus in 
logical inquiry, moving away from an emphasis on the syllogism and other such formal 
logical matters in favour of closer attention to the analysis of cognitive content and the 
cognitive operations involved in the formation or production and use of such content. It 
is obviously an oversimplification to suggest that logic before Locke was concerned only 
with the theory of the syllogism, just as it is an oversimplification to suggest that Locke’s 
new logic of ideas and cognitive faculties has no concern with formal problems (broadly 
construed). The point is just that Locke’s influence led to new approaches to theorising 
about the relation between logical principles and the cognitive faculties taken to produce 
the cognitive content with which logical inquiry is concerned, and to greater emphasis on 
questions concerning the origins and status of such content. Thus, Locke’s Essay begins 
with an overview of the value and purpose of inquiring into the faculty of understanding, 
emphasising the utility of acquiring a knowledge of the limits and extent of our cognitive 
capacities.119 Book I states his case against innate ideas, while Book II considers, amongst 
other problems, possible alternatives for the source or origin of our ideas (sensation and 
reflection, rather than from within the mind itself, prior to all sense-experience).120 Since 
it is this focus on origins that is particularly evident in the texts of Watts, Condillac, and 
others influenced by Locke’s approach, I focus on the impact of Book II in particular on 
the structure and content of such logical works (although Book IV is also an important 
influence on their approach to questions of knowledge and opinion).  
 
                                                 
117 As Sgarbi notes, the three parts or divisions of logic are arranged according to Sanderson’s φtripartition 
of mental operations leading to scientific knowledge’ (2013, 153); cf. Capozzi and Roncaglia for the view 
that Sanderson’s approach involves a φmental counterparts’ framework (2009, 103). See 152-7 for Sgarbi’s 
useful overview of the structure and content Sanderson’s logic (1617).  
118 Locke does not introduce any discussion of the syllogism until Book IV, §4, only to dismiss its claim to 
intellectual utility (see 1824, I.195ff, an edition contemporaneous with Coleridge’s Logic). 
119 Interestingly, in a letter in which he claims that he values Kant φnot [λ] as a Metaphysician but as a 
Logician’, Coleridge suggests that CPR ought to be entitled φAn Inquisition respecting the constitution and 
limits of the Human Understanding’ (in CL.V.421, Apr 1825). This is because Coleridge disagrees with 
Kant about the limits of human reason and the possibility of acquiring knowledge of the noumenal realm 
through speculative metaphysical inquiry (see e.g. Logic, 139-40n; cf. 44-5 and nn, 168-9). 
120 This, at any rate, is how Coleridge reads Locke (see esp. Logic, 184n, 209-10, 233n). 
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ii. Watts, Condillac, & Hartley in the Context of Facultative Logic 
My aim here is to give a better sense of the aspects of eighteenth-century logical theory 
which Coleridge has in mind when criticising Watts, Condillac, and Hartley. I will also 
show why Coleridge treats the work of Hartley and Condillac as equivalent: what matters 
in this case is not the unsubstantiated charge that Condillac’s logic is φplagiarised’ from 
Hartley, but rather the fact that Coleridge considers their respective accounts of logic 
and cognition to be similarly problematic forms of materialistic faculty-theory. This is 
important because while it is not clear that Coleridge had read Condillac’s La Logique 
(1781) closely, we know that he was very familiar with Hartley’s Observations (a text which 
was one of the principal early influences on Coleridge’s views on cognition).121 In this 
way, Coleridge’s close association of the logic of Hartley and Condillac makes it possible 
to identify the likely targets of his criticism of these two thinkers, even though Coleridge 
himself does not supply any textual support for his claim that φin the far-famed Logic of 
Condillac, [λ] one may find the whole theory of materialism [λ] only not one syllable 
concerning logic itself’.122 It will also help to show what Coleridge means when he asserts 
φthat the study of Logic altogether is exploded in France, for Condillac’s book is rather 
psychological than logical’,123 even though his own Logic focuses far more on the analysis 
of cognitive activity than on the rules of formal (i.e. syllogistic) logic.  
 If we turn now to the texts of Watts, Condillac, and Hartley, we can see clearly 
the influence of Book II of Locke’s Essay on their structure and content, particularly in 
the opening chapters of these works, where the focus is on questions concerning the 
nature and use of our cognitive faculties, and the origins of the sensory and intellectual 
content upon which these faculties are exercised.124 In Watts φThe First Part of Logick’ is 
subtitled φOf Perceptions and Ideas’, and he begins his textbook with the statement that φThe 
first part of Logick contains Observations and Precepts about the first Operation of the 
Mind, Perception or Conception’.125 In Watts’ definitions, φPerception is the Consciousness of 
an Object when present [and] Conception is the forming of an Idea of the Object whether 
present or absent’.126 Thus, his logical theory presents as its foundation an account of the 
                                                 
121 Although Coleridge often mentioned plans to write a detailed criticism of Condillac’s φpseudo-logic’ (see 
CL.II.947-8, Jun 1803, III.238-9, Oct 1809), there is little surviving textual evidence that suggests he ever 
carried it out. Comments in CL.II.675, 706 (Feb-Mar 1801) suggest that Coleridge was reading Condillac at 
various points c. 1800-1. 
122 Logic, 6. 
123 SWF.I.128n. 
124 The first five sections Book II, ch. I of Locke’s Essay deal specifically with the problem of the origin of 
our ideas and their sources in sensation and reflection (upon the operations of the mind). 
125 Watts (1755), 7. 
126
 Watts (1755), 8n. 
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operations and contents of the mind, rather than the kinds of formal definitions of terms 
found in Sanderson. Having given an overview of the contents of his work, which opens 
with these sections on the general nature of ideas and φThe Objects of our Conception, or the 
Archetypes or Patterns of these Ideas’, Watts then draws attention to the novelty of such an 
approach in a textbook on logic: φFIRST, the Nature of Conception or Perception shall just be 
mentioned, tho’ this may seem to belong to another Science rather than Logick’.127 This 
suggests that, while Watts’ textbook was produced at a time when Locke’s influence had 
begun to be widespread, he still saw a need to acknowledge that this Lockean facultative 
approach was not the only, nor indeed the most well-established, method of doing logic. 
Indeed, Watts’ initial definition of logic as φthe Art of using Reason* well in our Enquiries after 
Truth, and the Communication of it to others’, could be read as placing his work within the 
scholastic and humanistic traditions preceding the early modern logic of ideas, even with 
the following explanatory footnote: φ*The Word Reason is not in this place confined to 
the mere Faculty of reasoning or inferring one thing from another, but includes all the 
intellectual Powers of Man’.128 This is because Watts still shares with these earlier logics 
the view that φthe Design of Logick is to teach us the right Use of our Reason, or Intellectual 
Powers, and the Improvement of them in ourselves and others’.129 Where Watts differs is 
in working from the assumption that a knowledge of sensory and perceptual processes 
(particularly in the production of ideas and concepts) is required to facilitate the correct 
use and further improvement of our cognitive faculties. For φIn order to attain this [kind 
of logical knowledge], we must enquire what are the principal Operations of the Mind, which 
are put forth in the Exercise of our Reason’.130  
 In Condillac’s logic we find a rather more direct claim to novelty and originality, 
with no hint of a concession to prior logical traditions. Condillac contends not only that 
φthis logic resembles none of those which have been composed hitherto’, but also implies 
that no previous logician has managed to uncover the true laws of thought, claiming that 
all his φpredecessors’ have φsearched for the laws of thinking where they are not’.131 What 
Condillac means becomes clearer when he states φWe shall not [λ] begin this logic by 
                                                 
127 Watts (1755), 7-8. 
128 Watts (1755), 1. Coleridge offers a similar general definition of reason at Logic, 34-5 (but cf. 69-70 for a 
more specific definition on which Coleridge places great philosophical emphasis). 
129 Watts (1755), 1. On Watts as a Lockean logician, see Capozzi and Roncaglia, (2009), 105-6. 
130 Watts (1755), 4. Cf. his subsequent statement that φthe Art of Logick is composed of those Observations 
and Rules, which Men have made about these four Operations of the Mind, Perception, Judgement, Reasoning, 
and Disposition [i.e. the cognitive operation of systematically arranging our ideas (6)], in order to assist and 
improve them’. 
131 Condillac (1809 [1780], 1-2, tr. by Joseph Neef). Capozzi and Roncaglia observe that Condillac 
φdeveloped a concept of logic that owes much to Locke, although he proudly maintains that it is similar to 
no one else’s’ (2009, 106). 
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definitions, axioms, or principles; we shall begin by observing the lessons which nature 
gives us’.132 What nature teaches us is how to regulate our mental faculties, which allows 
us to analyse the sensory contents of experience in a systematic way. With the assistance 
of this φanalytical method’, we can φexplain the origin and generation either of ideas or of 
the faculties of the mind’ (in sensation).133 Such a method of analysis must be applied not 
only to the contents of experience and thought, but also to the cognitive faculties whose 
operations are employed in sensing and thinking. In this way, we can acquire knowledge 
of those rules that govern φthe art of reasoning’ (i.e. the analytical method of Condillac’s 
logic): φin the art of reasoning, as in the art of calculating [algebra], every thing amounts 
to composition and decomposition; and we must not imagine that they are two different 
arts’.134 In short, the rules of logic will not be discovered by considering the φdefinitions, 
axioms, or principles’ involved in the formal theory of the syllogism, but by the analysis 
and systematic reorganisation of our sensory cognitive content. This approach enables us 
to uncover the rules which regulate our cognitive faculties, and thereby to define the true 
φlaws of thinking’, and determine φwhat is the origin and generation of the faculties of the 
human understanding’.135  
As in the case of Watts, to ask such questions about our faculty of understanding 
is, for Condillac, φto ask what is the origin and generation of the faculties by which man, 
capable of sensation, conceives things, by forming ideas thereof’. Condillac, like Watts, 
lists under this head those basic operations of the mind taken to be involved in sensing 
and conceiving: φwe see immediately that perception, attention, comparison, judgement, reflection, 
imagination, and reasoning, are together with the sensations, the known data of the problem 
to be solved’.136 Where he departs from logicians like Watts is in asserting that all these 
mental operations (comprehended under the term φunderstanding’) must derive from a 
single original faculty: the faculty of feeling or sensation. For, having φexplained how the 
faculties of the mind successively arise from sensation, [λ] we see that they are nothing 
                                                 
132 Condillac (1809 [1780]), 3. Cf. 132: φit is therefore from nature we must learn the true logic’. 
133 Condillac (1809 [1780]), 3-4. Cf. 16ff: φTo analyse is [λ] nothing else but to observe in a successive 
order the qualities of an object, so as to give them in the mind the simultaneous order in which they exist 
[λ] Thought is analysed in the same way as exterior objects; we decompose it the same way’. See 42-7ff 
for the application of this method to φthe analysis of the mental faculties’. 
134 Condillac (1809 [1780]), 120. Here Condillac introduces the idea that logic, like algebra, should be a 
systematic language (cf. 3: φthe art of reasoning will [by Condillac’s method of analysis] be reduced to a well 
constructed language’). 
135 Condillac (1809 [1780]), 124. In Condillac’s earlier work, An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, 
already translated into English by 1756 and marketed as a supplement to Locke’s Essay, we find the same 
emphasis on questions of origin and analysis. In particular, Part I, §II deals with φThe analysis and origin of the 
operations of the mind’ (see lv, 26-103). 
136 Condillac (1809 [1780]), 124; cf. 47, where these operations are linked to the understanding. 
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but the faculty of sensation which is transformed in order to become each of them’.137 In 
other words, our cognitive equipment is not divided into a traditional scheme of distinct 
faculties or capacities of sense, understanding, imagination, memory, etc. which are taken 
to be somehow innate in the human mind. Rather, the traditional faculties are all derived 
from (and so grounded in) that of sensation, and must be drawn or developed out of this 
original faculty of sensation through a gradual process of learning, whereby we acquire 
new cognitive skills or abilities (Condillac claims the rules of this process are presented in 
systematic form by his logic).138 This point is particularly important, as it provides a clue 
to the reasons for Coleridge’s claim that Condillac’s logic was φbasely purloined’ from the 
in many respects quite different system presented by Hartley.139 
 Hartley’s Observations on Man constitutes a new extension of the Lockean logic of 
ideas and cognitive faculties. For Hartley does not begin with an account of the general 
nature of ideas and the operations of the mind exercised upon such cognitive content by 
the understanding, but instead with a theory of the neurophysiological mechanisms and 
psychological laws on which, Hartley claims, all such cognitive contents and operations 
must be grounded. I discuss why Coleridge rejects Hartley’s aim to account for the rules 
that govern cognition in terms of such a purely naturalistic framework as a candidate for 
a system of logic below; for the moment, I will focus on why Coleridge contends that 
Condillac, who proposes nothing resembling either Hartley’s mechanism of vibrations or 
his law of association, is dependent upon Hartley’s doctrines for the core principles of 
his logic.140 Given that Hartley does actually not anticipate Condillac’s attempt to trace all 
our cognitive faculties or abilities back to a single original faculty, we need to consider 
some alternative possibilities to make sense of Coleridge’s claims here. 
 
iii. Coleridge’s Conflation & Criticism of Hartley & Condillac 
Now, given that Coleridge usually introduces Condillac’s name in polemical contexts, as 
a typical representative of French materialism, it seems likely that his identification of the 
logic of Hartley and Condillac turns on Hartley’s materialist theory of mind, particularly 
                                                 
137 See Condillac (1809 [1780]), 50 (cf. 44-7); cf. Locke (1824), I.108-10 (II.i, §§1-5).  
138 See Condillac (1809 [1780]), 42-50 (cf. 5-6, 9). Interestingly, although Coleridge ordinarily mentions 
Condillac only to attack him, CL.II.706 (Mar 1801) suggests he was momentarily under Condillac’s 
influence: φI shall be able to evolve all the five senses, that is, to deduce them from one sense, & to state their 
growth, & the causes of their difference’. CL.II.675 (Feb 1801) accuses James Mackintosh of having 
plagiarised Condillac in a series of lectures given in 1800 (see CL.I.569, Feb 1800), suggesting that 
Coleridge was familiar with Condillac’s thought, and perhaps La Logique, by this point. 
139 CL.II.947 (Jun 1803). 
140 See Logic, 6; CL.II.947 (Jun 1803). In fact, Condillac attacks the φsupposition’ of vibrations as φaltogether 
imaginary’ (1809 [1780], 51). 
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his attempts to reduce all cognitive operations to the law of association, and in turn show 
that all acts of association are grounded in the physical mechanism of vibrations.141 Since 
Condillac does not actually endorse anything like Hartley’s φmaterial hypothesis’, it seems 
that Coleridge bases his claim about the similarity of their logical systems on their shared 
view that all cognitive content (both simple and complex ideas) φarise[s] from Sensation; 
and that Reflection is not a distinct Source’ (Hartley notes this is one of the only points 
on which he φdiffer[s], in respect of logic, from Mr. Locke’s excellent Essay on Human 
Understanding’).142 For Coleridge, this view amounts to an attempt to φmake [λ] the Mind 
from the Senses’, an approach that he associates with the claim that there can be no non-
sensory or a priori cognitive content, and which he seems to think must ultimately reduce 
to some form of mechanistic materialism.143 Indeed, Coleridge’s principal charge against 
Condillac is that in his La Logique φthe student may find the whole theory of materialism 
(borrowed without acknowledgement from David Hartley) only not one syllable 
concerning logic itself’.144 The source of this puzzling claim could be the final chapter of 
Part I of Condillac’s logic, where he offers an overview of φthe causes of sensibility and 
memory’ and discusses some of the speculations about their possible mechanical basis.145 
This covers similar material to the far longer chapters II and III of Hartley’s Observations, 
which provide detailed accounts of φthe Application of the Doctrines of Vibrations and 
Association to each of the Sensations and Motions’ (i.e. the neurophysiological basis of 
sensorimotor functions) and a further φApplication of [this] Theory to the Phaenomena 
of Ideas, or of Understanding, Affection, Memory, and Imagination’ (i.e. the neural basis 
of all sensory ideas and cognitive functions).146 However, while Condillac remains open 
to the possibility that our ideas and cognitive faculties and functions have their basis in a 
neurophysiological mechanism of some kind, he dismisses speculative hypotheses about 
mechanisms that cannot be observed (e.g. Hartley’s vibrations) as fruitless.147 While this 
                                                 
141 Hartley puts forward his doctrines of vibration and association in (1791) ch. I, §I, moving on to 
discussion of the generation and association of ideas in §II (this is an edition Coleridge owned and 
annotated, which includes an additional volume with notes on Hartley by Hermann Pistorius). 
142 Hartley (1791), I.360-1. Pistorius’ biography of Hartley notes that φHe received his first principles in 
logic and metaphysics from the works of that good and great philosopher Locke’ (III.xii). The principle 
that all ideas originate in sensation (rather than in sensation and reflection, as Locke states in Book II of 
the Essay) is not explicitly stated in Condillac’s logic, but could be inferred from (1809 [1780]), 44-5, 48, 50. 
Cf. Locke (1824), I.108-10 (II.i, §§1-5). See Coleridge’s remarks at BL.I.142; Logic, 237n. 
143 TT.I.312; BL.I.141-2 (cf. I.110). See also Logic, 183-5, 236-7n. Coleridge also attributes this view to 
Locke, so it may be that Hartley’s different answer to the origins question is immaterial here. 
144 Logic, 6. 
145 Condillac (1809 [1780]), 51-66. 
146 Hartley (1791), 114-267, 268-403. 
147 Condillac, (1809 [1780]), 65-6. He does not specify if he thinks such observation may be possible in the 
future, given sufficient improvement in our natural-scientific instruments. 
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doubtless undermines Coleridge’s case, his general point may be allowed to stand: where 
Hartley and Condillac are similar is in introducing consideration of the φmechanical basis’ 
of the cognitive contents and operations that traditionally form part of facultative logic, 
and in arguing that all such contents and operations ultimately derive from sensation (or, 
rather, in our faculty of sense or intuitive sensory cognitive capacities)148 
Coleridge’s claim may also depend on some more general similarities between the 
systems of Hartley and Condillac: Both thinkers emphasise the connection between logic 
and language; both give extensive attention to the role of the five (or more) senses in our 
acquisition or apprehension of ideas (this is what grounds their respective theories of the 
understanding and its operations); and both contend that the fundamental rules of logic 
must be grounded in some basic psychological law or mechanism (which can be inferred 
from observing the way in which children learn).149 Like Condillac, Hartley also uses the 
traditional definition of logic as φthe art of thinking or reasoning’,150 and both philosopers 
believe that it is possible to reduce all complex ideas to simpler units of sensory content, 
through a process of analysis or decomposition.151 However, in the main, it seems that if 
Coleridge has any grounds for asserting that the logical theories of Hartley and Condillac 
are in effect identical, it is the fact that both hold that the fundamental units or primitive 
terms in a system of logic, taken as the analysis of our cognitive contents and operations, 
must be ideas of sensation (with all concepts or ideas of reflection being taken to derive 
from such primitive sensory contents).152 In any case, what matters here is that, rightly or 
wrongly, Coleridge viewed Hartley and Condillac as philosophers who sought to ground 
their logical theory in a mechanistic account of the faculty of sensation and the nature of 
sensory ideas (with such ideas being taken as the primitive cognitive content upon which 
all the operations of understanding must be exercised, given that reflection itself is not φa 
distinct Source’ of ideas).153 
 
iv. Coleridge’s Distinction between Psychological & Logical Theories of Cognition   
Having considered Coleridge’s criticisms of Hartley and Condillac, I will turn now to his 
reasons for claiming that Condillac and Hartley’s theories of the principles of cognition 
(or laws of thought) are φrather psychological than logical’. As we shall see, Coleridge’s 
                                                 
148 See BL.I.110, 142. Cf. Logic, 6, 37. 
149 See Hartley (1791), ch.I-II, Condillac (1809 [1780]), Part I. 
150 Hartley (1791), I.270; Cf. Condillac (1809 [1780]), 1-3. 
151 See Hartley (1791), I.360-1; Condillac (1809 [1780]), 3-4, 16ff, 42-7. 
152 See Hartley (1791), I.360-1; Condillac (1809 [1780]), 25-6, 47-8 
153 See BL.I.141-2; Hartley (1791), I.360-1. 
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claim is based on two principles: (i) that those rules or forms of thought with which logic 
is concerned cannot be determined by any sort of physical necessity, and so cannot be 
reduced to the sorts of physiological mechanisms and psychological laws postulated by 
mechanistic psychological theories (which means that a logical theory that invokes such 
mechanisms and laws is φrather psychological than logical’); and (ii) that logical theory is 
concerned with only the a priori necessary aspects features of cognition (which Coleridge 
claims cannot be grounded in any kind of physical necessity), whereas it is the task of 
empirical psychology to analyse the a posteriori or contingent aspects of cognition.  
That Coleridge holds (i) is evident in the following assertion that logic involves 
no reference to the physiology of the mind or the physical mechanisms of cognition: 
 
for aught that we are here concerned with, thought may be the mere result of organisation; the 
brain may be an organ for the secretion of mind, according to the recent assertion of a medical 
philosopher; or the aggregate of ideas, conceptions and images may be founded in vibrations, 
either of strings, or of a tremulous fluid, permeating on strings. With all this the logician has as 
little to do as common sense has; [it is] sufficient for him that thoughts are thoughts and the 
laws by which they act are the laws of thought [i.e. φthe rules or forms of the understanding’], 
for to these laws, and to these only as far as they contain the science of reasoning conclusively, 
is his science confined.154 
 
Coleridge’s point is not that such φlaws of thought’ cannot be shown (or postulated) to 
have some sort of neurophysiological basis, or some connection to neural mechanisms 
and physical processes or structures located in the brain. Rather, he is contending that, 
whatever relation the objects of logical inquiry bear to the putative material or physical 
structure of the mind, this relationship is (a) not a problem with which logic is concerned, 
and (b) cannot form part of the kind of theory that could provide an adequate account of 
those laws or forms of thought (the rules of understanding) that it is a principal task of 
logic to investigate and define. Coleridge is not denying the possibility of describing the 
mental states or processes in which logical rules may be instantiated in naturalistic or 
quasi-scientific terms (with reference to, say, the structural organisation of the brain, or 
some neural mechanism, such as Hartley’s vibrations). He is, however, purposely trying 
to circumvent the claims of those theories of mind which present such naturalistic (and 
in his view reductive) descriptions of cognition as part of logical inquiry, conceived as an 
investigation of the operations of our cognitive powers and the contents of our cognitive 
                                                 
154 Logic, 37. 34-5 makes clear Coleridge’s view of the laws of thought as rules of understanding. 
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states. For Coleridge is claiming here that there is a fundamental distinction between the 
kinds of laws that govern cognitive activity (e.g. as normative constraints on thought or 
epistemic criteria governing judgements) and the kinds that may govern the material or 
physical phenomena taken to be located in the brain and postulated as the physiological 
basis of our cognitive activity.155 Given this distinction, Coleridge holds, the naturalistic 
approach can tell us nothing about thought per se: even if the terms and categories of this 
approach refer to cognitive states and processes, they refer only to aspects of these states 
and processes belonging to a sphere of inquiry which is clearly distinct from the realm of 
logic, namely (empirical) psychology. 
 That Coleridge holds (ii) is made evident in his distinction between the φempirical 
conditions under which the exercise of the understanding takes place’ and φprinciples a 
priori, i.e. [λ the] principles derived from the construction of the [mind] itself, not from 
its uses’.156 He introduces this distinction in a discussion of the general kind(s) of a priori 
cognitive content said to φinhere in the forms and functions [of sense and understanding] 
and the rules generalised from these [forms and functions]’ and the more specific kind of 
a priori cognitive content said to be φderived from a knowledge of the constitution of the 
understanding itself and of the universal forms of the sense’ in the context of an account 
of the methods and principles of common logic (Kant’s general logic).157 Coleridge starts 
off by considering what makes pureσas opposed to appliedσcommon logic a φformal 
science’, i.e. a discipline in which φI am not speaking of any thing [e.g. a sensible object], 
but of the acts of my own mind and the law or form according to which it acts or ought 
to act [i.e. the laws of thought]’, and which therefore φmust abstract from all the contents 
or material of [cognition]’158: 
 
Now the common logic is either pure or applied; in the first [λ] we abstract from all empirical 
conditions under which the exercise of the understanding takes place; we abstract from the 
influence of the sense, from the interference of the imagination, from the laws of memory, 
from the weight of customs, of inclination, of passion, and, inclusively, from the sources of 
human prejudicesσin short, we abstract from all causes from which any given and particular 
cognitions arise, or out of which any counterfeits of knowledge proceedσbecause all these 
                                                 
155 He makes this clear at Logic, 133 (cf. 265-6n). 
156 Logic, 139-40. 
157 Logic, 146, 149. 
158 For Coleridge’s definition of φformal science’ see Logic, 41, 43; cf. 34-7; this makes clear his view of logic 
as the formal science concerned with φthe laws of thought’ or φthe rules or forms of the understanding’; see 
110-2 for Coleridge on φthe contents or material of [our] knowledge’ (cf. 12n). 
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respect the understanding, under certain contingent occasions of its application, or [respect 
those] objects, to which and by which the application was determined.159 
 
Coleridge’s aim here is to emphasise that insofar as this subfield of logic is considered as 
a pure or formal science, it must be nonempirical, and therefore can have no reference to 
sensory cognitive content (φthe influence of the sense’, which is always empirically given), 
or to any of those φempirical conditions under which the exercise of the understanding 
takes place’. As he puts it elsewhere, such a method φrequire[s] that I should consider the 
mind in and for itself, separately from the objects of the senses and sensations’, because 
the pure or formal sciences are concerned with φa higher evidence than that which the 
senses can afford, or which can belong to objects of the bodily sense considered as 
matters of fact’ (a category to which the φcontingent occasions of [the understanding’s] 
application’ belong).160 In short, logic as Coleridge conceives of it cannot consist in any 
kind of empirical knowledge, and logical theories should not derive their principles from 
any analysis of φthe empirical conditions under which the exercise of the understanding 
takes place’. If we accept φthat logic [λ] presents the universal and necessary rules of the 
understanding’, then we must reject attempts to derive these rules from the φcontingent 
occasions of its application’. For any rule, or system of rules, which claims to be φsuited 
to all understandings’, i.e. universal and necessary, φmust be drawn from the laws and 
constitution of the understanding itself’.161 As we shall see below, Coleridge claims that 
Kantian transcendental logic is the first logical theory to succeed in explaining how such 
rules derive from the φconstitution of the subject’. He thinks Kant is the first philosopher 
to develop a pure (i.e. nonempirical) analysis of the understanding that serves not only to 
classify the various contents of the understanding, but also to explain how certain φpure 
operations of the understanding’, or what Coleridge calls φits inherent forms or its several 
functional powers’, make possible our apprehension of this content (i.e. φa knowledge by 
means of conceptions’).162 But first we need to consider some implications of Coleridge’s 
negative characterisation of a priori cognitive content, as quoted above.163 
                                                 
159 Logic, 139. Coleridge takes this distinction between pure and applied logic from Kant (see e.g. CPR, 
B75-9; cf. Coleridge’s claims at Logic, 51-2, 139ff, 196-7).  
160 Logic, 42, 36; see also, 37-41, 43. 
161 See Logic, 112, 6. 
162 For this definition of the conceptual content of the understanding (taken as our φdiscursive faculty’ or 
φfaculty of conceptions’), see Logic, 244ff (cf. 65-70). 
163 For Coleridge’s characterization of a priori or pure cognitive content as formal knowledge (or as the 
formal element of our knowledge), see e.g. Logic, 34-7, 42-4, 111-2. 
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 Coleridge’s decision to begin his account of pure common logic and its sphere of 
inquiry in negative terms is quite deliberate: he opens this section of Logic with the claim 
that φin order to see distinctly what a thing is we must ascertain what it is not’.164 This is 
an approach which he continues to follow later, when considering how transcendental 
knowledge is to be distinguished from formal knowledge (a priori cognitions in general) 
on the one hand, and noetic knowledge (a special class of a priori cognitions that is taken 
to derive from φthe unindividual and transcendent [λ] reason’ or ƭƯƵƲ, and to include the 
truths of reason apprehended through intellectual intuition) on the other.165 He starts by 
listing those φempirical conditions under which the exercise of the understanding takes 
place’ not just to indicate the contents and operations of the mind from which the pure 
or formal sciences φabstract [their] attention’, but also because he wants to suggest that 
any adequate account of φthe laws of thought, [λ] as far as the[se laws] contain the rules 
of reasoning conclusively’, cannot take contingent, empirically determined conditions of 
this kind as its starting point.166 For instance, Coleridge refers to φthe laws of memory’ 
here as a way of implicitly contrasting his own logical theory with the systems of Hartley 
and Condillac, which seek to reduce all the φrules or forms of the understanding’ to the 
law of association (Coleridge says that the memory φreceive[s] all its materials ready made 
from the law of association’, so it seems reasonable to infer that Coleridge takes the law 
of association to be a law that governs the functions of memory).167 Coleridge’s reference 
to φthe weight of customs, of inclination, of passion, and, inclusively, [λ] the sources of 
human prejudices’ could similarly be read as an implicit contrasting of his approach with 
that of Hume and others who contend that concepts like causality and necessity can be 
derived from psychological mechanisms or habits of thought.168 In Coleridge’s view, 
such accounts may be able to tell us about certain empirical conditions under which we 
exercise the understanding, but they cannot give us any insight into the non-contingent 
or necessary features of cognition ς its a priori principles ς that Coleridge defines as φthe 
                                                 
164 Logic, 139. 
165 See Logic, 43-4, 69-70, 168-9, 211-4. 
166 For these definitions of logic as a formal science, see Logic, 37, 41ff (cf. 34-5). 
167 See BL.I.305; cf. Logic, 125-6ff for Coleridge’s account of φthe too habitual passiveness of the mind to 
the automatic trains of the memory and the fancy, the sequency of which is mechanically determined by 
accidental proximity of time and place in the original impressions [i.e. by association]’, framed in a similar 
way to his claim at BL.II.305 that fancy is φa mode of Memory’ that is subject to, or operates in accordance 
with the law of association. See also BL.I, ch. 5-6; The Friend, I.456ff; Logic, 13-4ff.  
168 See esp. Logic, 183: φWhat [Hume] called on the metaphysician to do was to assign the origin of this 
notion [i.e. φthe notion of causality’], to give proof that it was not a mere prejudice, and to ground this 
feeling of a necessity [i.e. of a necessary causal connection between two events] on the rational conviction 
that accompanies insight’ (cf. 187-8ff). 
 48 
acts of [the] mind and the law[s] or form[s] according to which it acts or ought to act’.169 
Thus, insofar as accounts of this sort are presented as logical theories (i.e. theories of the 
understanding and its operations), their claims that it is possible to derive logical rules or 
laws of cognition from the analysis of such empirical conditions cannot be accepted. For 
Coleridge, no empirical account of cognition (which he terms φpsychology’) can provide 
the means for distinguishing between φcounterfeits of knowledge’ and φtrue knowledge’, 
the epistemic criteria for determining the truth or validity of any given claim.170 
Coleridge claims principles derived from repeated experiences, or psychological 
laws and mechanisms inferred from the regularity of such experiences, cannot properly 
account for the features of our cognition and its objects. Thus, he takes such accounts to 
be necessarily incomplete.171 He introduces a negative characterisation of common logic 
at this point in Logic partly to show what kinds of principles are required for a complete 
account of cognition. Coleridge’s main concern here, however, is arguing that knowledge 
of such principles, i.e. φformal knowledge’, must be grounded in a transcendental theory 
of those cognitive faculties from which the a priori or pure cognitive content that yields 
formal knowledge is derived.172 This concern becomes further apparent in his next set of 
statements on what separates pure common logic and its principles from an empirical (or 
psychological) analysis of cognition that is concerned with the φcontingent occasions of 
[the understanding’s] application’:  
 
[I]n order to the knowledge of these [i.e. the φempirical conditions under which the exercise of 
the understanding takes place’ and φthe objects of the senses’], experience is required. But the 
pure common logic appeals wholly to principles a priori, i.e. to principles derived from the 
construction of the machine itself, not from its uses; from the construction of the 
understanding altogether abstracted from the material on which it acts, or the causes by which 
it is called into action. [Common logic] is therefore, and so we have called it, a canon of the 
understanding [λ] but only in respect of the formal, let the subject matter be what it may, 
drawn from outward experiences or from inward consciousness and reflection.173 
  
Coleridge’s conception of what it means for a priori principles to be φderived from the 
construction of the machine [in this case, the mind] itself, not from its uses’ is covered in 
more detail in 3.4, where I consider the connections between Coleridge’s account of the 
                                                 
169 Logic, 43 (cf. 37). 
170 See Logic, 37ff for Coleridge’s account of φtrue knowledge’; cf. 51-2, 110-2.  
171 See e.g. Logic, 38-41, 139-44. 
172 On this claim, see esp. Logic, 211-4 (cf. 141-3, 215-24, 242-8). 
173 Logic, 139-40. 
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φconstruction’ or constitution of the cognitive faculties and his interpretation of Kant’s 
theory of transcendental knowledge. There I shall also examine Coleridge’s reasons for 
beginning the section of Logic which serves to introduce his account of transcendental 
knowledge with the opposition outlined above between the pure a priori contents and 
principles of logic and the empirical contents and principles which Coleridge elsewhere 
refers to as φthe subject [matter] of Physics or Psychology’.174 But before turning to these 
problems, we need to consider Coleridge’s theory of the human cognitive faculties more 
closely. This topic is the focus of the next section (1.5), which will help to make clearer 
Coleridge’s views concerning the opposition between the φpsychological’ logic of Hartley 
and Condillac and Kant’s transcendental or φcritical’ logic, viewed as different approaches 
to accounting for the nature of discursive cognition.  
 
1.5. Powers & Plantules: Coleridge on the Nature of the Faculties 
i. Education & Inquiry into the Faculties: An Overview 
As was noted in 1.4, Coleridge rejects the kinds of mechanistic and materialistic theories 
of cognition he takes to be offered by philosophers like Hartley and Condillac because 
he thinks that such theories cannot provide an adequate account of the rules that govern 
(sensory) cognition. According to Coleridge, in order to determine such rules we need to 
adopt Kant’s transcendental logic, which Coleridge often characterises in the following 
metaphorical terms, as a philosophical method for analysing the mind and its capacities 
(as well as the contribution the mind makes to cognition):  
  
[Kant’s method is] that logical ưƱƯưαίƤƥƩα docimasticia [φexamination preparatory to learning’], 
that Critique of the human intellect, which previous to the weighing and measuring of this or 
that begins by assaying the weights, measures, and scales themselves [or] 
 
a pre-inquisition into the mind [considered] as part Organ, part Constituent of all Knowledge: 
an examination of the Scales, Weights, and Measures themselves, abstracted from the Objects 
to be weighed or measured by them.175 
 
In Parts 2-4 I consider Coleridge’s claims about the way in which Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy, conceived as φthe pre-ponderative inquisition of the Weights & Measures of 
                                                 
174 CN.IV.4764 (c. 1820-1); cf. Logic, 6, 37, 44-5n. 
175 See CM.III.918, V.81. For further discussion see 3.1-4.5. Coleridge may have adapted this metaphor 
from Herbert’s De Veritate. See e.g. (1937 [1624]), 75-6: φIn the first place, then, I shall proceed to examine 
truth itself, and in the second place, assertions which claim to be true, just as scales are tested before goods 
are weighed out; for unless the scales are accurate, what we measure by them will also fail to be exact’. 
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the Human Mind’, enables us to demonstrate how sensory experience and cognition is 
possible, and in particular to prove φthat experience would be impossible but for the a 
priori origins of certain features of our cognition’.176 To lay the ground for these parts of 
the thesis, however, we first need to look at how Coleridge describes those faculties or 
capacities of the mind that transcendental inquiry seeks to φenumerate and define’.177  
As we shall see, Coleridge’s brief account of his philosophy of education in the 
introduction to Logic is a useful reference point here. For Coleridge defines φeducation’ as 
consisting in the two closely connected processes of drawing out and then training the 
φforms and faculties’ of the mind, and then describes the way in which these φintellectual 
powers’ or cognitive capacities are gradually φeduced’ or drawn forth from within the 
mind by the effects of external sensory stimuli, before being φtrain[ed] up’ or φspecially 
disciplined’ through a series of self-conscious or reflective mental exercises.178 My aim in 
this section is to show how the analogy (with the growth of plants) that Coleridge uses to 
illustrate the nature of this process also offers useful insights into his conception of the 
nature of the faculties, viewed as capacities or potentialities for certain kinds of cognitive 
abilities which can be actualised in certain forms of cognitive activity. 
 
ii. The ‘educible and eductive nature’ of the faculties: Coleridge’s Plantule Analogy 
Coleridge introduces his account of the process of φeducation’ with one of his favourite 
procedures: providing a brief etymological history of the term(s) under consideration as a 
means of bringing out deeper, underlying meanings and illustrating the different ways in 
which the term in question may be applied and employed.179 In this case ς although he 
does not explicitly draw attention to the point himself ς Coleridge’s etymological analysis 
of the word φeducate’ helps to shed light on his conception of the φintellectual powers’ or 
φseveral faculties of the mind’ and the ways in which our cognitive capacities and abilities 
are called into action.180 His overview of the gradual changes in the meaning of the Latin 
terms educare and educere, from which the English φeducation’ is derived, gives a sense of 
how Coleridge conceives of those natural or inherent capabilities of the mind which his 
programme of education is intended to develop and discipline. It also suggests what 
characteristics Coleridge thinks are required for some kind or form of mental activity to 
                                                 
176 Kitcher (1995), 15. 
177 Coleridge uses these terms at Logic, 213. 
178 See Logic, 8-14. 
179 For Coleridge’s use of this procedure in Logic, see 9-10, 24-37, 91-2, 114-5 (cf. 79, 81). 
180 Logic, 12-13. 
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qualify for this status (as an activity that is natural to or part of the nature of the mind).181 
Leaving aside the finer historical and linguistic details of Coleridge’s account, I will focus 
here on what his etymologising can reveal about his conception of the cognitive faculties 
or powers, and on how this conception informs Coleridge’s approach to analysing the 
contents and operations of the mind. Before proceeding, it must be noted that Coleridge 
makes a distinction between φreason as a presence to the human mind, not a particular 
faculty or component of the mind’ and φτthe understandingυ and τthe senseυ as its [the 
mind’s] two component faculties’.182 I return to this distinction briefly at the end of this 
section (1.5), discussing how it relates to Coleridge’s account of sense and understanding 
as the φcomponents’ or φconstituents’ of the human mind. Coleridge’s claims about what 
separates reason from sense and understanding will also be considered in further detail in 
3.2-3 and 4.3-5. For now, all that need be noted is (i) that Coleridge thinks of reason as a 
special kind of cognitive capacity which should not be described in faculty terms, and so 
(ii) does not include reason in his account of the process whereby the φseveral faculties of 
the mind’ are φeduced’ and φeducated’ under the conditions of sensory stimulation. As we 
will see later, this is because Coleridge considers reason, in contradistinction to sense and 
understanding, to be an φorgan of the Super-sensuous’, a capacity which φbear[s] the same 
relation to spiritual [i.e. noumenal] objects [...] as the eye bears to material and contingent 
phenomena’, and which is thus concerned only with what is non- or super-sensible.183 
 Let us return to Coleridge’s claims about education and the faculties. According 
to Coleridge, φThe Latin word from which our τeducateυ is taken is itself a derivative. 
Educare ab educere: τeducateυ from τeduceυ, that is, τdraw forthυ, τbring outυ.184 Here he 
describes how such terms originally applied to horticultural contexts and specifically the 
ways in which the inherent qualities or tendencies of plants drawn forth by Nature can 
be further managed and nurtured by human hands: 
 
In its primary sense it is applied to plants, and expresses the process by which man imitates 
carries on, and adapts to a determined human purpose the work of education (evolution, 
development) performed by Nature. What Nature has educed, man educates or trains up.185 
 
                                                 
181 The question of what it means for a faculty or form to be inherent or innate, especially as a φconstituent’ 
of the mind, is one of the dominant themes in Coleridge’s Logic. I consider this problem in further detail in 
3.4 on Coleridge’s theory of the cognitive constitution of the human subject (cf. 4.3). 
182 Logic, 69-70; cf. 43-4. See also Friend.I.155-8. 
183 Friend.I.155-6. This aspect of reason is discussed further in 4.5 below. 
184 Logic, 9. 
185 Logic, 9 (cf. 18n). 
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Subsequently, Coleridge claims, the extended meaning of φeducare’ comes φto include all 
the [means] by which the eductive powers and tendencies of Nature are protected, 
invigorated, or even called into act by adjustment of circumstances[, i.e.] surrounding 
influences’. As an example of this usage, Coleridge cites a poem by Catullus in which a 
spring shower is said to φeducate the flower’ by stimulating φthe educible and eductive 
nature in the seed or plantule, [λ] bringing it at once to excitement and nurture’.186 
Finally, φin its most comprehensive acceptation’, this term comes to apply to the ways in 
which parents bring up and nurture their children, conceived as a process analogous to 
the developmental influence of environmental factors (such as weather and soil) on the 
growth of the φplantule’ or seedling.187 Although Coleridge goes on to describe how this 
process applies in the case of φthe forms and faculties’ of the human mind,188 his further 
claims about how the cognitive faculties should be educated or trained, need not concern 
us here. However, before moving on to discussion of how Coleridge’s theory of faculties 
relates to his conceptions of the a priori and the transcendental (see Parts 2 and 3), it will 
be useful to consider what Coleridge’s account of φthe eductive powers and tendencies of 
Nature’ or φthe educible and eductive nature in the seed or plantule’ suggests about his 
conception of the nature of the cognitive faculties themselves.189 In particular, I consider 
how Coleridge’s plantule analogy informs his view that one can speak of both a potential 
and an actualised form or state of a cognitive faculty.  
 The starting point for my comparison is Coleridge’s idea that one can speak of 
seedlings as possessing latent or dormant φpowers and tendencies’ that, under suitable 
conditions, may be excited or drawn forth and then further developed by some kind of 
external stimulus. As we shall see, this notion of a natural tendency that is φcalled into 
act’ by stimulation from without is a defining feature of Coleridge’s conception of the 
human cognitive faculties or intellectual powers. Here Kant’s employment of the term 
Vermögen is an important reference point. For, as I will be arguing throughout, while 
Coleridge tends to translate this key Kantian term as φfaculty’, his usage is much closer to 
the now widely preferred rendering of Vermögen as φcapacity’ or φpower’.190 That is to say, 
                                                 
186 Logic, 9-10. 
187 Logic, 10. 
188 See Logic, 10-12ff. 
189 Logic, 9-10. 
190 See e.g. Pluhar: φI render Vermögen (and likewise Kraft in this sense) as φpower’ (sometimes also as 
φability’) rather than as φfaculty,’ in order to dissociate Kant’s theory (of cognition, desire, etc.) from the 
traditional faculty psychology. [λ] My point here is to keep the Kantian powers, which are simply abilities, 
from becoming reified, i.e., turned into psychological entities such as compartments, sources, or agencies 
τinυ the mind’ (translator’s note, CPR, Axii, n16). See also Pippin (1982), 218-9. For a similar statement 
from Coleridge, see Logic, 255-6 on cognitive powers as φfunctionaries’ of the mind. 
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Coleridge uses the term φfaculty’ to refer to a capacity for some kind of cognitive activity 
(e.g. perceiving, conceiving, judging, etc.), rather than to some kind of putative material 
(i.e. neurophysiological) or immaterial mental structure taken to be responsible for such 
activities. Indeed, as I explain further in section 3.4, Coleridge’s views on the φcognitive 
constitution’ of the human mind are closely bound up with his claim that what it means 
to describe the constitution of the mind, or of a particular cognitive faculty such as the 
understanding, just is to describe or φenumerate and define’ the set of cognitive activities 
or abilities ordinarily attributed to the faculty in question (this is a process Coleridge 
refers to as identifying φits [i.e. a given faculty’s] inherent forms or its several functional 
powers’).191 In short, what Coleridge variously refers to as φthe forms and faculties’, 
φforms and functions’, or φconstituent forms’ of the human mind, he takes to be 
constituted, in his special sense of the term, by those cognitive activities in which the 
exercise of our cognitive faculties or capacities consists. Thus, Coleridge often uses the 
terms φform’, φfaculty’, φpower’, and φfunction’ almost interchangeably, presenting them as 
a set of closely related concepts that can be defined in terms of one another.192 In some 
contexts, Coleridge does attempt to distinguish between φfaculties’ and φpowers’, and also 
to define a φfaculty’ as the collection of those cognitive powers or abilities which may be 
said to φconstitute’ it.193 For the most part, however, he tends to speak in broad terms of 
forms, functions, faculties, or powers whenever he wants to designate a capacity for 
some kind of cognitive activity.194 For our present purposes, it need only be noted that 
Coleridge employs such terms to refer to cognitive capacities and abilities. Having given 
a preliminary outline of Coleridge’s conception of cognitive faculties or powers, we can 
return to the question of the links between Kant’s notion of a Vermögen and the φpowers 
and tendencies’ of Coleridge’s plantules. 
 As hinted above, the connection I have in mind here depends on the parallel or 
analogy between the seedling, or rather φthe educive and educible nature in the seed or 
plantule’, as a potentiality for growth and development (into a specific type of flower, 
say), and the Kantian Vermögen or Coleridgean faculty, as a potentiality for cognitive 
activity (realised in specific cognitive ability such as reflection or judgement, say). In both 
                                                 
191 Logic, 213-4 (cf. 45, 145-9, 202n). 
192 See e.g. Logic, 68-9n on φfunction’ and φpower’, 146-7ff on φfaculties’ and φconstituent forms’, 213-4 on 
φinherent forms’ and φfunctional powers’. 
193 Thus, the faculty of sense is our capacity for intuiting or apprehending the sensory manifold (making it 
an φintuitive power’), while the faculty of understanding is our capacity for the various acts Coleridge takes 
discursive thought to consist in, such as reflection, abstraction, conception, and judgement (which makes it 
our φreasoning power’ or φdiscursive faculty’). See Logic, 34-7, 68-70; cf. 146-9, 213-4. 
194 See e.g. Logic, 9-12ff, 34, 245-7. 
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cases, such a potentiality or capacity is actualised (or φcalled to act’, as Coleridge puts it) 
when it is affected by the appropriate kind of external stimulus or condition, or by an 
alteration of its φsurrounding influences’: a φprocess of educing from without’ is required to 
excite the inherent φpowers and tendencies’ of a seedling, and likewise the φforms and 
faculties’ of the human mind.195 What it means for a cognitive faculty to be educed or 
drawn forth in Coleridge’s sense may be brought out by considering Kant’s distinction 
between Vermögen and Kraft (i.e. faculty and power, a distinction that Coleridge sometimes 
employs in Logic196). As Beatrice Longuenesse summarises this point: 
 
The Vermögen (facultas) is the possibility of acting, or tendency to act, that is proper to a 
substance. Following Baumgarten, Kant writes that a conatus is associated with every Vermögen. 
This conatus is a tendency or effort to actualize itself. For this tendency to be translated into 
action, it must be determined to do so by external conditions. Then the Vermögen becomes a 
Kraft, in Latin vis, force.197 
 
Longuenesse draws attention here to Kant’s warning that the human mind should not be 
considered as a substance. However, she suggests that if the terms φcapacity’ and φpower’ 
are used with due awareness of the different meanings they possess in Kant’s lectures on 
the metaphysics of substance, then they can offer some insight into the concepts of 
Vermögen and Kraft that Kant employs in his φtranscendental analysis’ of cognition in the 
first Critique. Bearing this caution in mind, Longuenesse claims, we can think of the kind 
of capacity or Vermögen that forms part of Kant’s descriptions of the forms of cognition 
in an analogous way: as φa possibility or potentiality’ for a particular kind of cognitive activity 
that is φactualiz[edλ] under sensory stimulation’. Thus, Kant’s Vermögen zur urteilen or 
capacity to judge (i.e. the human understanding) becomes actualised as the Urteilskraft or 
power of judgement under the φexternal conditions’ of sensory stimuli, those factors that 
enable or φdetermine’ a potentiality or capacity for cognitive activity to φactualize itself’ or 
be φtranslated into action’ (put another way, we can consider the φcapacity to judge’σone 
of Kant’s definitions of the understandingσas φa possibility or potentiality of forming 
judgements’).198 As should now be evident, Coleridge’s idea of the φthe educive and 
educible nature in the seed or plantule’ or φpowers and tendencies’ latent in the seedling 
involves a similar notion of a conatus or φtendency or effort to actualize itself’ (a tendency 
                                                 
195 Logic, 8-10. 
196 See e.g. Logic, 239-40. 
197 Longuenesse (1998), 7. 
198 Longuenesse (1998), 7-8. 
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that becomes actualised, say, in the growth of the seedling into a fully developed flower). 
Below I discuss in further detail how Coleridge applies this conception of powers and 
tendencies as potentialities for some kind of activity in his claims about the actualisation 
and exercise of the cognitive capacities or φintellectual faculties of man’, considering how 
it informs Coleridge’s description of how φwe first draw or bring out the faculties of the 
nascent mind’ through the process of φeduction’ (a process which is initiated by sensory 
stimulation, taken as a condition under which cognitive capacities are actualised).199  
 
iii. From Faculties to Powers: The Potential & Actualised Modes of Sense & Understanding 
That Coleridge holds the view of the cognitive faculties just outlined, as potentialities or 
capacities for some kind of cognitive activity (actualised as a particular cognitive power 
when a particular faculty is excited or exercised), is evident from the following definition 
of φthe faculty of sense’ or φsensuous nature’: 
 
The capability of acquiring representations [i.e. sensible intuitions which are taken to refer or 
relate to some φcorrespondent object’], which our elder logical and metaphysical writers entitled 
τreceptivityυ, is what we call sensibility or sensuous nature, or the property of having the sense 
or sentient faculty called into action.200 
 
Here our φsensuous nature’ or φcapability of acquiring representations’ functions in a way 
analogous to the φeducible and eductive nature of the seed or plantule’.201 The faculty of 
sense is φcalled into action’ by being excited or φeduced’ from without by some external 
object affecting the senses: this faculty’s φsensuous nature’ responds to these impressions 
or affections in much the same way that the φeductive nature’ of the seedling responds to 
the effects of the spring rain which stimulates the growth of the plantule.202 In certain 
contexts Coleridge also uses a faculty/power dichotomy similar to Kant’s Vermögen/Kraft 
distinction between a cognitive capacity considered as a potentiality for activity on the 
one hand, and as actualised in some kind of cognitive ability called into action by sensory 
stimulation on the other. We find Coleridge talking of the faculty of sense as an φintuitive 
power of the mind’ that is φemployed on the forms of perception in time and space’: i.e. 
                                                 
199 See Logic, 9-10, 12-14. Coleridge himself draws attention to the analogies between the growth of the 
seedling and the development of the cognitive faculties, considered as a kind of potentiality or capacity for 
action (see esp. 10-11; cf. 166n). 
200 Logic, 153-4. For this Kantian definition of φrepresentation’, see LS, 113, CN.III.3602; cf. Logic, 37-8, 
239-40, 254 on the way in which such a representation φrefers’ or φcorresponds’ to an object. 
201 Logic, 9. 
202 Thus, Coleridge also refers to the faculty of sense as φthe capability of sensation’ (Logic, 164). 
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the faculty of sense or φcapability of acquiring representations’ becomes actualised as the 
intuitive power when it is stimulated, or φcalled into action’, by φvarious impressions or 
influxes from without’.203 Put another way, if we consider it prior to any such sensory 
apprehension (as a potentiality for such activity), the faculty of sense is just a φcapability 
of sensation’. It is when we exercise the senses, which are excited through being affected 
by diverse external impressions or influxes, that the φsentient faculty’ is actualised as the 
φintuitive power’ which makes possible our apprehension of spatial and temporal data in 
the perceptual manifold.204  
Coleridge talks of the understanding in a similar way, as φthe faculty that enables 
[us] to think of [sensible] objects’ and φthe organ of our thoughts and conceptions’, by which 
he means our capacity for discursive thought.205 Coleridge takes such discursive cognitive 
activity to consist primarily in making judgements about the objects given through 
sensible intuition, so he also defines the understanding as our capacity for or φfaculty of 
judging’.206 As with the description of the faculty of sense above, this definition involves 
a conception of the understanding as a potentiality or capacity for a particular kind of 
activity that is actualised in some cognitive ability, or set of cognitive abilities, under the 
conditions of external sensory stimulation. This is why Coleridge also refers to the 
understanding as φthe substantiative power [λ] by which we give and attribute substance 
and reality to phenomena and raise them from mere affections and appearances into 
objects communicable and capable of being anticipated and reasoned of [i.e. objects or 
cognitions of objects that have intersubjective or φobjective validity’]’.207 When the faculty 
of understanding is stimulated or called into action from without by sensory impressions 
or φaffections’, our capacity for judgement (and for discursive thought more generally) is 
actualised in φthe substantiative power’ through which we exercise our ability for φjudging 
concerning the substantiality of phenomena’, or making judgements about the φsubstance 
and reality’ or claims to intersubjective validity of what is given in sensible intuition.208 As 
                                                 
203 See Logic, 34, 153-4, 12n. 
204 Coleridge follows Kant in conceiving of this process of sensible apprehension or synthesis as carried 
out by the imagination, which is also taken to be responsible for the integration of spatial and temporal 
data in the synthetic cognitive process Kant calls φcombination of the manifold’. Thus, Coleridge refers to 
both sense and imagination as our φintuitive power’ or φvis intuitiva’ (see Logic, 201), and appears to treat 
imagination as a function of the faculty of sense (see e.g. Logic, 223 on φproductive imagination’ as φthe 
form and constructive power of the inner sense’; cf. 71-2, 75). Cf. Kant at CPR, B151-2ff.  
205 Logic, 154 (cf. 66-8 and esp. 132 on our φreflective and discursive powers’). Coleridge makes it clear that 
such thinking and conceiving must be discursive at 249; cf. 26, 132, 258. 
206 See Logic, 239-40; cf. 79.  
207 Logic, 239; see 227 for Coleridge’s notion of φjudgments possessing objective validity’; 142-9 makes clear 
that his view entails a standard of objectivity defined in terms of intersubjective validity. 
208 See Logic, 239-40, 253-5; cf. 262-4, 265-6. 
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with φthe sentient faculty’ above, if we think of the understanding prior to such judging, 
as a potentiality for such cognitive activity, it is just a capacity for discursive thought. It is 
when we exercise the understanding, making judgements about the sensory φaffections 
and appearances’ which have excited its discursive activities, that this φfaculty of judging’ 
is actualised as the φsubstantiative power’ that makes possible discursive cognition, or a 
φknowledge by means of conceptions’.209 Thus, just as Coleridge refers to the capacity for 
intuitive sensory activity as the φsensuous nature’ of the faculty of sense, he refers to the 
capacity for discursive cognitive activity as the φessence’ of the understanding.210  
 It is useful here to recall the conceptual background of Kant’s Vermögen/Kraft 
distinction in the eighteenth-century metaphysics of substance, and the definition of the 
concept of a Vermögen as φthe possibility of acting, or tendency to act, that is proper to a 
substance’.211 This will help us to see how the analogy between the tendencies or powers 
proper to a substance and the activities or abilities characteristic of the human mind (i.e. 
its cognitive capacities) applies to Coleridge’s definitions of the faculties of sense and 
understanding. As we have just seen, Coleridge defines our capacity to acquire sensory 
representations or φsensuous nature’ as φthe property of having the sense or sentient 
faculty called into action’.212 So, following the mind-substance analogy, we can think of 
the mind as being possessed of a latent property or tendency to act which is actualised or 
φtranslated into action’ when the mind is determined by external conditions, i.e. affected 
by φimpressions or influxes from without’. In other words, the φproperty of having the 
sense or sentient faculty called into action’ which is actualised through the exercise of the 
φintuitive power of the mind’ that allows such impressions to be intuited or apprehended 
as spatiotemporally arrayed sense data (i.e. the manifold of sense).213 Coleridge takes this 
sensory capacity or φsensuous nature’ to be proper to the human mindσconsidered as 
analogous to a substance of some kindσin much the same way that φthe educible and 
eductive nature in the seed’ is a property or tendency proper to seedlings. Thus, just as it 
is part of the seedling’s nature to respond to rainwater and the various other external 
conditions which actualise and determine its capacities for growth, it is part of the nature 
of the human mind to respond to the impressions or influxes from external objects that 
affect the faculty of sense, thereby calling it into action.214 In Coleridge’s terms, this is the 
                                                 
209 Logic, 249. 
210 Logic, 239; cf. 153-4. 
211 Longuenesse (1998), 7-8. 
212 Logic, 153-4. 
213 For Coleridge on intuiting sense data, see Logic, 34-7, 71-2, 150-73; cf. CN.III.3602, LS, 113.  
214 See Logic, 8-11, 34-7ff, 152-4ff. 
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process in which φan affection of the subjective sense [by external stimuli] call[s] forth 
that mode of action which results from its [i.e. the sentient faculty’s] own constitution 
and characteristic property [i.e. its receptivity or sensuous nature]’.215 
 We can apply the same analogy to Coleridge’s account of the understanding. As 
just noted, Coleridge states that we he calls φthe substantive power’ is φthe essence’ of the 
understanding. In other words, our capacity to make judgements about the contents of 
our sensible intuitions is an essential property of the faculty of understanding, and of the 
human mind more generally. This cognitive capacity is exercised in making judgements 
in which we φattribute substance and reality to phenomena’, i.e. determine the φobjectivity 
or correspondency to a real object’ of those φaffections and appearances’ given through 
sensible intuition.216 Coleridge takes this process of φsubstantiation’ to be the ground or 
starting point of all discursive cognition (in short, it is by means of such judgements that 
we acquire discursive knowledge of sensible objects). Thus, if we adapt the terms of 
Coleridge’s definition of the faculty of sense, it could be said that this capacity to acquire 
discursive cognitions, the intellectual or discursive nature of the mind, is the property of 
having the understanding or φdiscursive faculty’ called into action. The capacity to judge 
(i.e. to know things discursively) is thus, like the capacity to receive sensible intuitions, a 
property or tendency (of the mind) to act that is called into action under the conditions 
of external sensory stimulation. This discursive capacity is actualised through the exercise 
of φthe substantiative power of the mind’, which enables such subjective sensory stimuli 
to be φraise[d] from mere affections [λ] into objects communicable and capable of being 
anticipated and reasoned of’.217 Put another way, as Coleridge says elsewhere, the faculty 
of understanding, considered as our capacity to judge, is actualised through the cognitive 
process whereby φ[sense] impressions or [λ] the materials supplied to the understanding 
by the sense [λ] become objects [of cognition] in and by the mind’s judgements and 
modes of judging’.218 Thus, what it means for the substantiative power of the mind to be 
the φessence’ of the understanding is just that the understanding has a φdiscursive nature’: 
it is a capacity for discursive cognition that is proper or natural to the mind, a tendency 
to respond to and process sensory stimuli in particular way (i.e. discursively, through 
judgement and conception) that is part of the nature of the (human) mind. In concluding 
                                                 
215 Logic, 162; cf. 153-4. 
216 Logic, 239-40. According to Coleridge the process of substantiation, like any other kind of discursive 
cognition, must involve concepts (thus the understanding is also our φfaculty of concepts’). However, it is 
enough for present purposes to discuss only the role of our capacity to judge in this process. 
217 Logic, 239-40. 
218 Logic, 265-6. 
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this part of the thesis, I shall discuss how Coleridge’s talk of the sensuous and discursive 
natures or φessences’ of the mind relates to his claim that sense and understanding are the 
φtwo component faculties’ or φconstituents’ of the human mind, as well as considering, in 
brief, why Coleridge thinks reason must be distinguished from these two φcomponents’, 
as a cognitive capacity which is φa presence to the human mind, not a particular faculty or 
component part of the mind’.219 
 
iv. Cognitive Constitution & Capacities as Components 
In sections 3.4 and 4.3-5, I consider Coleridge’s views on what it means for a cognitive 
faculty or capacity to be part of the nature or constitution of the mind in closer detail. In 
particular, I show that while Coleridge is more confident than Kant about the possibility 
(or permissibility) of treating the human mind as a substance, he still follows the Kantian 
principle that, in the field of transcendental analysis, questions concerning the underlying 
nature or substance of the mind must be suspended. As we will see in 3.4, this is because 
Coleridge agrees with Kant that transcendental talk about the forms of human cognition 
and the φconstitution of the human subject’ has no reference to the neurophysiological 
mechanisms or immaterial substance in which such cognitive forms might be grounded. 
Rather, transcendental talk about cognitive constitution refers only to those a priori rules 
that govern or condition all sensible and discursive cognition; taken collectively, these 
rules or forms are said to be the conditions constitutive of (the possibility) of all such 
cognition.220 This is the special sense in which Coleridge speaks of φthe understanding 
and the sense as the two constituents of the mind’, taken as φits [i.e. the human mind’s] 
two component faculties’.221 That is to say, sense and understanding are considered as 
components or constituents of the mind in the sense that these terms, taken to refer to a 
specific set of sensory and intellectual capacities, designate the collection of cognitive 
capacities and abilities in which human cognition consists. For Coleridge, as for Kant, it 
is only in this limited sense that we can talk of the forms of the faculties of sense and 
understanding disclosed by a transcendental analysis of cognition as constitutive of all 
sensible experience. Without this set of intuitive and discursive cognitive capacities being 
inherent in the mind, such experience (especially discursive cognition of sensible objects) 
would not be possible. However, as Coleridge puts it, we can only speak of such forms 
                                                 
219 See e.g. Logic, 43-4ff, 69-70, 143-7ff for this use of φcomponents’ and φconstituents’.   
220 For Coleridge on a priori or transcendental conditions of cognition and experience, see Logic, 146-9, 
165-8, 187-8. See 37, 252-4, 265-6n on how claims about the forms of cognition in such an φanalysis of our 
intellectual faculties’ have no reference to either material or immaterial mental structures (cf. 213). 
221 Logic, 35, 70. 
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and faculties (i.e. cognitive capacities) as φinnate, in the alone rightful and alone intended 
sense of inherent in the constitution of the understanding [and sense], or as constituting 
what we mean by understanding [and sensibility]’: the transcendental point of view sees 
faculties only in terms of their characteristic activities.222 
For the remainder of this section I focus only on how Coleridge’s conceptions of 
cognitive constitution and mental φcomponents’ relate to the faculty/power distinction, 
taken as a way of differentiating between a potentiality or capacity for some general kind 
of cognitive activity (a faculty) and the actualisation of this general capacity through the 
exercise of a particular cognitive ability (a power or function). To begin, it will be useful 
to note some potential limitations and ambiguities in the faculty/power distinction. In 
her discussion of Kant’s use of the terms Vermögen and Kraft, Longuenesse observes that 
when Kant employs this terminology in his descriptions of the cognitive faculties and 
their operations, the distinction between Vermögen, as a potentiality for a certain kind of 
cognitive activity, and Kraft, as the actualisation of this activity in some kind of cognitive 
ability, φis not always entirely clear’. As she observes, Kant’s φvocabulary is [λ] far from 
fixed, and it would be a mistake to expect [Kant’s faculty terminology] to sustain overly 
sharp distinctions’.223 In Coleridge’s case, the situation is comparable. One finds similar 
semantic slippages throughout his Logic: Coleridge refers to a broad range of cognitive 
activities, such as abstracting, reflecting, judging, imagining, perceiving, and conceiving, 
sometimes in faculty-terms and sometimes in power-terms. But as I shall explain below, 
this is not down to conceptual confusion on Coleridge’s part, but rather derives from his 
use of the faculty/power distinction in two different ways. In some cases, this distinction 
is used to differentiate between the capacity for a specific kind of cognitive ability (such 
as abstraction), and the exercise of this ability (the act of abstracting). In other cases, it is 
employed to designate the capacity for some general kind of cognitive activity (e.g. when 
we consider the understanding as our faculty for all discursive cognitive activity), and the 
actualisation of this capacity through the exercise of a particular kind of cognitive ability 
(e.g. in the exercise of our discursive powers of reflection, conception, judgement, etc). 
In both cases, the distinction between a faculty as a potentiality or capacity for some kind 
of cognitive activity and a power as the actualisation of this capacity through the exercise 
of a specific cognitive ability is maintained.  
                                                 
222 Logic, 266n. That Coleridge treats this conception of constitution as applicable to the faculty of sense is 
evident in his reference to φthe constitution of the sense itself and the inherent properties of its constituent 
forms’ at 165 (cf. 153-5, 162). Cf. 252-4 on the φcomponent powers’ of the understanding. 
223 Longuenesse (1998), 7-8. 
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We can see how the faculty/power and potentiality/actualisation distinctions that 
were outlined above operate in Logic by briefly considering how these two closely related 
distinctions apply to Coleridge’s definitions of the φconstitution’ of the faculties of sense 
and understanding. For in Logic, Coleridge’s employment of the faculty-power distinction 
to differentiate between the potential and actualised aspects of our cognitive capacities is 
perhaps most clear and consistent in his general definitions of the faculties of sense and 
understanding, taken as general cognitive capacities which are constituted by a collection 
of different cognitive abilities. Viewed from such a perspective, sense and understanding 
are considered as capacities for all intuitive and discursive mental activities in general that 
are actualised through the exercise of a range of particular intuitive and discursive mental 
operations, with the intuitive kind being taken as proper or belonging to sense, and the 
discursive kind being taken as proper or belonging to understanding. Thus, as we saw 
above, Coleridge speaks of the faculty of sense in general as a capacity for intuitive and 
sensory activity which is exercised through the intuitive powers of sensible intuition (or 
apprehension) and imagination.224 Likewise, when Coleridge speaks of the faculty of 
understanding in its most general sense, he is referring to the understanding as a capacity 
for discursive cognitive activity which is exercised through a variety of discursive powers 
including reflection, judgement, abstraction, and conception (which together constitute 
the φsubstantiative power of the mind’).225 In sum, sense and understanding are said to be 
φcomponents’ or φconstituents’ of the human mind in the sense that, taken together, they 
are the two general cognitive capacities, actualised through a range of particular cognitive 
abilities, that constitute the fundamental set of mental activities (i.e. the basic sensory and 
intellectual functions) in which the human mind (in general, for all finite subjects) and its 
possible range of sensory experience and discursive cognition consists. To reiterate: such 
talk of the constitution or components of the mind by Coleridge should be taken to refer 
only to the mind’s characteristic activities, and not to its putative features as a material or 
immaterial substance, or some combination of both. This, on Coleridge’s account, is φthe 
alone rightful and alone intended sense’ of the term φconstitution’, φwhatever [the human 
mind] may be in other respects, whether a self-subsistent soul, or a function of the same, 
or a mere modification of matter, or a common result of two co-agents’.226 In the case of 
reason, however, this rule does not apply. 
                                                 
224 See e.g. Logic, 34-6, 153-4, 213-4, 221-4. 
225 See e.g. Logic, 33-7, 68-72, 205-6, 239-42, 255-6ff. 
226 Logic, 266n (cf. 38-41, 45, 139-43). For further discussion, see 3.4 below. 
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As noted at the beginning of this section, Coleridge makes a distinction between 
φreason as a presence to the human mind, not a particular faculty or component of the 
mind’ and sense and understanding φas its [the mind’s] two component faculties’.227 Since 
Coleridge’s views on the nature and functions of reason are discussed in detail in 3.3 and 
4.3-5, here I will consider only what it means for Coleridge to claim that although reason 
is a cognitive capacity that can be exercised by human subjects, it should not be confused 
with the φtwo component faculties’ of the human mind. According to Coleridge, we need 
to be φaware of the unindividual and transcendent character of the reason’.228 Put another 
way, we need to recognise reason as a cognitive capacity or power which is not grounded 
in φthe constitution of the subject’ but derives from some source that transcends all finite 
human minds. Coleridge often talks of the forms of sense and understanding as φwhat all 
human subjects possess in common by necessity of their constitution’, and φthe universal 
subjective, or that which is common to the race without distinction of individuals’.229 But 
while this subjective constitution is something that φsubsist[s] in all beings possessing the 
faculties of sense and intelligence, [λ] without relation to individuality’, in the sense that 
it transcends individual human minds, it is not, on Coleridge’s account, φunindividual and 
transcendent in the same way as reason.230 Reason isσat least potentiallyσpresent to the 
human mind, but it is also something which φsubsists’ independently of the human mind, 
whether in reference particular subjects, or φthe universal subjective’. Given that reason is 
independent of the cognitive constitution of the human subject in this way, it cannot be 
said to be a φconstituent’ or φcomponent faculty’ of the human mind. 
This claim obviously raises the question of what reason is grounded in, or derives 
from, if not the human mind and its cognitive constitution. Coleridge’s answer to such a 
question is evident from his claims about the different ways in which mind and its forms 
can be contemplated. Coleridge contends that in order to understand the nature of sense 
and understanding, we must consider φthe human mind collectively taken’, or φthat which 
is common to the race without distinction of individuals’ (i.e. the universal subjective).231 
But to understand the nature of reason, we need to φtake the mind itself; not this man’s 
mind, nor yours, individually, nor even the human mind generally, but mind absolutely’. In 
Coleridge’s terms, to talk of φmind absolutely’ is not simply to talk of all possible minds, or 
the constitution of all such subjects, in the most general sense: it is to talk of φthat Being 
                                                 
227 Logic, 69-70; cf. 43-4. See also Friend.I.155-8. 
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229 Logic, 145, 203n. 
230 Logic, 43n; cf. 203n. 
231 See e.g. Logic, 139-45ff, 172-3. 
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and Will which we express by the word τGodυ’, and to φelevate our conception [of God] 
to the absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind, the underived and eternal τI amυ’, considered as φthe 
principle of being and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality: the ground of existence, and 
the ground of the knowledge of that existence, absolutely one and identical’.232 Viewed in 
this way, God, as the Absolute, must be the ground of all finite subjects (including finite 
human minds) and all finite subjects. Given that, on Coleridge’s account, God is the only 
possible candidate for the Absolute, insofar as reason consists in or is designated as what 
we call φmind absolutely’ (as opposed to φthe human mind generally’), reason must have its 
ground or source in God, φthe absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind’. As Coleridge puts it in one 
of his mid-1820s manuscripts: φReason is from God, and God is reason, mens ipsissima [i.e. 
mind its very self]’.233 This is why Coleridge speaks of φthe unindividual and transcendent 
character of the reason as a presence to the human mind’, stating that if we contemplate 
mind in its different aspects, φIn subordination to [ƭƯƵƲ or reason], and as more properly 
constituting the human mind in its specific sense as the human mind, we f[i]nd the ƫόƣƯƲ 
(the understanding) and the [ƨƥƹƱία], the sense’.234 I give a further account of Coleridge’s 
threefold division of the cognitive capacities, and the implications of his Greek terms in 
3.1-3 and 4.1-3. To lay the ground for this account, we first need to look more closely at 
Coleridge’s interpretation of Kant’s claims about the φtranscendental’ and the a priori, and 
their relation to the cognitive faculties. This will be the main concern of Part 2.   
 
 
                                                 
232 Logic, 44, 85. 
233 SWF.I.1281. Cf. Friend.I.155-6ff; Logic, 83-5ff. 
234 Logic, 44. Cf. 70n, where Coleridge claims that we should consider φthe understanding (ƫόƣƯƲ) as one of 
the two faculties of the mind, the sense or intuitive faculty ([ƨƥƹƱία]) [as] being the other, [and] the reason 
(ƭƯƵƲ) as the universal power presiding over both’. For further discussion, see 4.1, 4.4 below. 
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2. Kantian & Coleridgean Conceptions of the Transcendental & the A Priori 
2.1 Kant & Coleridge on A Priori Cognitions, Transcendental Knowledge, & the 
Content of Transcendental Representations 
i. Kant’s Definitions of ‘A Priori’ & ‘Transcendental’ in Coleridge’s Logic 
In this part of the thesis my focus will be on explaining how Coleridge conceives of the 
transcendental method used in Kant’s analysis of cognition, and its relation to the a priori. 
A simple way to begin is by considering how Kant employs the terms φtranscendental’ 
and φa priori’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, and then seeing how far Coleridge follows such 
usage in his Logic (noting that its key sections often consist in translation or paraphrase of 
those passages where Kant works out his definitions of the critical philosophy’s core 
terms). In the introduction to the Critique Kant states φI call all cognition transcendental 
that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of 
objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori’.1 As Patricia Kitcher notes, what this kind 
of φtranscendental knowledge’ is concerned with is φhow we know objects’: φIts specific 
province comprises those features of cognition that can be traced to a priori origins’ and 
its claims are φestablished by transcendental proofs, which show that experience would 
be impossible but for the a priori origins of certain features of our cognition’.2 For Kant, 
such features of cognition are a priori if we can demonstrate them to be φindependent of 
all experience and even of all impressions of the senses’, and thereby φdistinguish[ed] 
from empirical ones, which have their sources a posteriori, namely in experience’; such 
demonstration is the object of Kantian φtranscendental proofs’.3 To achieve these ends, 
Kitcher argues, Kant tends to employ the term φa priori’ in three distinct but often 
mutually supporting senses: it can refer not only to (1) the origin of certain features of 
our cognition taken to have a special status, but also to (2) the logical form which a priori 
propositions concerning such features must take, and (3) the kind of knowledge in which 
the a priori, taken to have an origin that is independent of all sense-experience ((1)) and 
to involve claims or judgements that are universal and necessary ((2)), consists.4 If an 
inquiry is transcendental, then such φa priori cognitions’ are its field.5 As will be discussed 
further below, it should be noted that there is some dispute amongst Kantian scholars as 
to whether Kant should be interpreted as taking the a priori to be independent of sense-
                                                 
1 CPR, B25. 
2 Kitcher (1990), 15; cf. Milnes, (2008), 46ff. 
3 CPR, B2 (cf. B25, B74-5). 
4 See Kitcher (1990), 15-16. Kitcher gives priority to the logical form sense of a priori. I number them 
differently above simply for convenience of exposition. 
5 See CPR, B25-30, B74-92. 
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experience in the sense that (a) a priori cognitions or principles cannot originate in or be 
derived from ordinary sensory experience, or (b) a priori cognitions or principles can be 
known without reference or appeal to such experience, irrespective of claims concerning 
their origin.6 First, however, we need to consider why the problem of a priori origins is 
significant to Coleridge (and especially his claims about cognition in Logic).  
In the Logic sense (1) and (3) of Kant’s a priori play a significant role throughout: 
Apart from Coleridge’s various appropriations of Kant’s own statements on the a priori 
origins of the φformal’ features of sensible cognition,7 his fondness for the Leibnizian 
rejoinder to the Aristotelian dictum concerning the sensory origin of all cognition,8 is an 
indication of his concern with the kinds of cognitive content which Kant claims are 
φindependent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses’,9 and his belief 
that the φbirth-place’ of these cognitions is what accords them this special a priori status.10 
Thus, many of the principal parts of Logic are concerned with presenting Coleridge’s 
interpretation of Kant’s claims concerning the grounds and origins of a priori cognitions 
and principles.11 Although Coleridge also recognises sense (2) he evidently conceives of 
the universality and necessity of the a priori in a somewhat different and more limited 
way than Kant (as we will see in 4.3, this limitation is a consequence of Coleridge’s views 
concerning the origin of the invariant and a priori aspects of sense-experience).12 So for 
now I focus on sense (1) and the problem of a priori origins, for the question of what it 
means to claim that a given cognitive form or content has an a priori origin is central to 
Coleridge’s interpretation of the aims and methods of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, 
as well as to his account of the nature of a priori necessity and other aspects of modality 
(which Coleridge seeks to explain in the terms furnished by the philosophical procedure 
he calls φtranscendental analysis’).13 
Before considering further what Kant and Coleridge mean in claiming that 
certain features of our cognition have an a priori origin, however, we must examine more 
closely how Coleridge employs the terms φa priori’ and φtranscendental’ in Logic. For it 
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8 In Coleridge’s translation φthere is nothing in the understanding which was not previously in the sense ς 
except the understanding itself’ (Logic, 226-7). 
9 CPR, B2. 
10 Logic, 154.  
11 See esp. Logic, 181-224; cf. Prolegomena, §§1-23 (esp. §§2-3, 6-13). 
12 This is because Coleridge believes that non-sensible intuitions and cognitions are possible for beings 
with our cognitive capacities, and thus that the a priori features which Kant contends are universal and 
necessary for all our possible experience (which must be sensible) would not apply to them. See BL.I, 288-
9n, Logic, 154-5 (see also 146 on this φconditional necessity’). 
13 See esp. Logic, 139-43, 145-9, 211-4, 239-40ff. 
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needs to be kept in mind that although transcendental philosophy is concerned with a 
special kind of a priori knowledge (what Kant calls its carefully delimited φfield’ of φa priori 
cognitions’), not all a priori knowledge-claims are necessarily included within the scope of 
Kantian transcendental discourse.14 Thus, while there are various types of φa priori 
representations’, the kinds of a priori knowledge-claims that transcendental philosophy 
seeks to make concern only those that Kant classes as φtranscendental representations’.15 
Given that φrepresentation’ (Kant’s Vorstellung) is a notoriously slippery term, I will follow 
Kitcher throughout in taking it to refer to either our cognitive states or the content(s) of 
our cognitive states (and occasionally both together, depending on context). Thus, an a 
priori representation is a cognitive state with a priori content (i.e. what Kant calls a φpure’ 
representation in which we abstract from all the sensory or a posteriori content given in 
empirical representations); a transcendental representation is a cognitive state with a 
special kind of a priori content. Kant’s transcendental discourse is concerned solely with 
claims about this special class of a priori representation.16 As Kant puts it: φnot every a 
priori cognition must be called transcendental, but only that by means of which we 
cognise that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely 
a priori, or are possible (i.e. the possibility of cognition or its use a priori)’.17 If the content 
of some a priori representation does not concern φthe possibility of cognition or its use a 
priori’, then claims concerning this content cannot belong to transcendental discourse, 
regardless of whether such claims involve a priori knowledge of some kind (such as the 
axioms of geometry, as conceived by Kant). 
To give a brief example of how Kant illustrates his distinction between the 
different kinds of a priori content that can be presented in our cognitive states: A 
mathematician who constructs or contemplates a geometric figure in her imagination 
(rather than, say, on a sheet of paper), considering its features as given in the pure spatial 
manifold of sensibility without reference to any a posteriori content(s), can be said to be 
contemplating an a priori representation. According to Kant, however, φneither space nor 
any geometrical determination of it a priori is a transcendental representation’. Thus, 
representations containing a priori content concerning mathematical procedures or the 
axioms of mathematics taken to be exemplified by such procedures, for instance, must 
                                                 
14 See CPR, B81-2. 
15 See CPR, B82 (cf. B34-5).   
16 How Coleridge employs this Kantian representation terminology, particularly its distinctions between 
different kinds of a priori and a posteriori content, in Logic will be discussed further below (see 3.1-3). For 
Kitcher on this rendering of Vorstellung, see (1990), 66, nn. 12-14. 
17 CPR, B81-2. 
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not be classed as a part of transcendental knowledge, although (for both Kant and 
Coleridge) they are undoubtedly a kind of a priori cognition. Rather, φonly the cognition 
that these representations are not of empirical origin at all and the possibility that [such 
representations] can nevertheless be related a priori to objects of experience can be called 
transcendental’.18 In other words, in Kant and Coleridge’s view space, or the pure spatial 
manifold in which imaginary geometric figures may be constructed in thought, is an a 
priori representation. But only our knowledge concerning the nonempirical origins of this 
manifold and the ways in which it constrains the construction of such figures, or our 
cognition that space (conceived as an a priori representation) is related to objects a priori, 
can be classed as transcendental representations. In short, only claims concerning how 
spatiality or any other feature of our sensory experience is possible a priori, or should be 
taken to have an a priori origin independent of all such experience, can belong to Kantian 
transcendental discourse. Only the cognition that, and how, such features or contents of 
our cognitive states are possible a priori can furnish transcendental knowledge. 
 
ii. Coleridge on Transcendental Knowledge & the Analysis of the Faculties 
I will provide a more detailed account of Coleridge’s claims concerning transcendental 
representations and transcendental knowledge in sections 4.1-4. But it will be useful to 
introduce some of Coleridge’s statements on the transcendental here, to compare them 
with the Kantian definitions just outlined. Coleridge, like some contemporary Kantian 
scholars (particularly Kitcher and Waxman), favours a definition of the transcendental as 
concerned not only with the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience, but also 
with demonstrating the a priori origin of these conditions (identified with certain 
invariant features or contents of our sensory cognitive states, such as spatiality).19  His 
sense that a knowledge of such conditions of possibility cannot be empirically derived is 
evident from Coleridge’s following claims: φAll knowledge is excited or occasioned by 
experience, but all knowledge is not derived from experience, such, for instance, is the 
knowledge of the conditions that render experience itself possible’.20 As Coleridge goes 
on to point out, such nonempirical truths or conditions are distinct from whatever is a 
posteriori in our cognition and experience, and designated as φtranscendental’: 
 
                                                 
18 CPR, B81-2. 
19 See Kitcher, (1990), ch. 1-2; Waxman, (2013), ch. 1. 
20 Logic, 146. Cf. Kant, CPR, B1-2. 
 68 
Now to distinguish the truths that are necessarily presupposed in all experience as its condition 
and co-cause, from the facts or knowledge not only occasioned by, but actually derived from 
experience, whether it be the experience of the world without or the experience acquired by 
reflection on ourselves, [λ] the term τtranscendentalυ has been chosen.21 
       
What Coleridge means by φexperience acquired by reflection on ourselves’ here is the 
kind of cognition acquired through our reflection on the contents and operations of the 
mind. Those cognitions derived a posteriori from ordinary sense-experience belong to 
empirical psychology, which considers only the contingent features of cognition given a 
posteriori, and are therefore distinguished from those invariant features of cognition given 
a priori (and which are the field of what Coleridge terms φthe science of transcendental 
analysis’).22 The link between the transcendental and reflection on the contents and 
operations of the mind is made further evident in Coleridge’s subsequent statement of 
definition: φTranscendental knowledge is that by which we endeavour to climb above our 
experience into its sources by an analysis of our intellectual faculties’.23 As I shall show 
later (4.1-4), Coleridge takes the φtruths that are necessarily presupposed in all experience 
as its condition and co-cause’ to be a special kind of a priori form and content, and holds 
that this φanalysis of our intellectual faculties’ (the procedure Kant calls φtranscendental 
reflection’) is required to explain how these features of cognition are possible a priori and 
φindependent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses’.24 But for the 
purposes of this section, what matters is that Coleridge follows Kant in distinguishing 
transcendental knowledge of these a priori forms and contents (which itself consists in a 
special kind of a priori cognition) from such pure forms and contents themselves, as 
given our in a priori representations or cognitions. 
 Here Coleridge’s distinction between the use of the faculties employed in pure 
sciences (i.e. nonempirical disciplines) like mathematics and logic, and the analysis of  
these cognitive faculties and the operations whereby they present (or produce) those a 
priori forms and contents in which mathematical and logical knowledge consist is key to 
making sense of his view of the transcendental. According to Coleridge, the kind of 
knowledge with which pure or formal disciplines are concerned derives from our 
cognitive faculties. This is why he holds that φ[just a]s we cannot become mathematicians 
                                                 
21 Logic, 146-7. Cf. Coleridge’s statement at 76: φthe unity of apperception is presupposed in, and in order 
to, all consciousness. It is its condition (conditio sine qua non) or that which constitutes the possibility of 
consciousness a priori’. 
22 Coleridge makes this distinction clear at Logic, 139-43ff, 196-7 (cf. 213-4, 248). 
23 Logic, 147. 
24 See Logic, 146-7. Cf. Kant, CPR, B2, 25. 
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but by reasoning according to the laws and necessities of the primary imagination, so 
neither can we be logicians or discourse logically, but according to the inherent forms 
and necessary data of the understanding’.25 However, as he notes elsewhere, this must 
not be taken to mean that an analysis or knowledge of the operations of these faculties is 
required to prove the validity of mathematical or logical principles:   
 
The mathematician rests perfectly secure that his axioms and propositions are necessary and 
universal truths, without troubling himself with any analysis of the faculties by which he 
constructs his figures and demonstrates their relations.26 
 
Similarly, Coleridge observes that the claim that the principles of formal logic have an a 
priori origin in the human understanding φdoes not express, nor is it meant to imply, that 
their evidence is derived from the knowledge of this [faculty and its operations]’, for φThe 
principles and canons of common [or formal] logic are evident independently of the 
insight given by transcendental analysis [i.e. the analysis of our cognitive faculties]’.27 As 
with the Kantian definitions of the transcendental discussed above, the aim of 
Coleridge’s statements here is to suggest that while transcendental knowledge must 
involve a priori principles and knowledge-claims of some kind, it should also be kept 
distinct from other more general kinds of a priori representations and cognitions (e.g. the 
content of pure intuitions in mathematics or of pure concepts in formal logic). The a 
priori knowledge derived from the mind’s pure operations and representations is not the 
same as, and does not derive its proofs or validity from, transcendental knowledge of how 
such a priori cognitive forms and contents are possible a priori.28 To reiterate Kant’s 
formulation of the distinction Coleridge is drawing on here: φnot every a priori cognition 
must be called transcendental, but only that by means of which we cognize that and how 
certain representations [λ] are applied entirely a priori, or are possible (i.e. the possibility 
of cognition or its use a priori)’.29 In Coleridge’s view, only φan analysis of our intellectual 
faculties’ can yield such transcendental representations, the class of a priori cognition φthat 
                                                 
25 Logic, 266n. Coleridge also says here that it is an φessential postulate [λ] in the sciences of geometry and 
arithmetic, to contemplate the subject-matter from the point of the pure sense or intuitive faculty’. 
26 Logic, 140. 
27 Logic, 212n. Coleridge uses the term φcommon logic’ for what Kant calls φgeneral logic’, a discipline that 
is concerned only with the a priori rules of the understanding or φformal laws of all thought’, rather than the 
transcendental principles which make such rules and their application possible. 
28 On this distinction, see Logic, 211-4 (esp. 212n). 
29 CPR, B81-2. 
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is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects 
insofar as this is to be possible a priori’.30 
Clearly, much more needs to be said about how Coleridge interprets statements 
of this sort, and what he thinks it means for certain representations to be applied a priori 
(or to talk of modes of cognition as possible a priori). For now it will be enough to note 
that this Kantian distinction between different kinds of a priori representation or 
cognitive content(s) is always in the background of Coleridge’s claims concerning the 
aims and methodology of transcendental philosophy, and his statements on the nature 
and origins of those a priori features of cognition that this philosophy takes as its field of 
inquiry.31 To see why Coleridge adopts such distinctions, we must first consider his views 
on the nature and origins of the different kinds of content he thinks it is possible for us 
to have present to the mind, as contained in our cognitive states.32 In particular, I discuss 
(in 3.2) how Coleridge’s views here are informed by the distinctions he draws between 
(1) the a priori and a posteriori sources of cognitive content, and (2) the diverse kinds of a 
priori content in our cognitive states (i.e., the different kinds of what Kant would call φa 
priori representations’, when this term is taken to refer to a certain special kind of φpure’ 
cognitive state from which all empirical content has been abstracted). But before taking 
up (1) and (2), we will need more details on Coleridge’s account of the a priori to provide 
a broader conceptual context for the discussion of these problems. This will help lay the 
ground for my analysis of how Coleridge’s definition and characterisation of the a priori 
relates to Kant’s distinction between a priori cognitions in general and the particular kind 
of a priori cognitions which yield transcendental knowledge in 4.1-4. In the remainder of 
this section (2.1) I give a brief overview of Coleridge’s definitions of the a priori. In the 
sections that follow (2.2-3.4), I explore the underlying connections between Coleridge’s 
claims about the a priori origins of certain kinds of cognitive content(s) and his theory of 
the cognitive faculties (especially their pure acts and products).  
 
iii. Coleridge on the Criteria for Apriority & the Problem of A Priori Origins 
At various points in Logic Coleridge defines the a priori as φan act or product of the mind 
itself considered as distinct from the impressions from external objects’ or as those 
conditions and features of our cognition that have their origin ab intra (φfrom within’, or 
                                                 
30 See Coleridge, Logic, 147 (cf. 76); Kant, CPR, B25. 
31 See Logic, 140-9, 203-5, 212-4 (cf. CPR, B74-82). 
32 Coleridge talks of representations and their content as φpresent to the mind’ at Logic, 73, 233n. 
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φa mente ipsa [from the mind itself]’, as Coleridge puts it elsewhere).33 Put another way, if 
something ς whether some act or product of the mind or some sort of cognitive content 
deriving from such acts and products ς is characterised as a priori in this way, then φall 
means and materials a posteriori are excluded from [it]’: it must be conceived as being 
independent of whatever can be given empirically, or apprehended through ordinary 
sense-experience.34 This is why Coleridge claims that for some kind of cognitive content 
or knowledge to qualify as a priori, it must φhav[e] a higher evidence than that which the 
senses can afford, or which can belong to objects of the bodily sense considered as 
matters of fact’.35 Similarly, he identifies the a priori with φthe necessary, the permanent, 
the universal, or the truths having these attributes’, and also remarks that φtruths a priori, 
from which the facts of experience are contradistinguished, are characterised by a sense 
of necessity’ (which Coleridge contrasts with the φsense of contingency’ that accompanies 
empirically given facts).36 In sum: Coleridge claims that whatever is a priori must (i) be 
derived from within the mind, (ii) be given or known independently of sense-experience 
and (iii) be characterised by universality, necessity, and φpermanence’ (Coleridge’s term 
for what is immutable or invariant in our cognition).37 
 Now, while universality and necessity are fairly familiar features of the a priori, it 
will be useful to say a little more about Coleridge’s notion of φpermanence’ before going 
on to discuss his account of a priori origins further. As just noted, Coleridge employs the 
term φpermanence’ and its variants to refer to what is immutable or invariant in cognition 
(and in sense-experience). He also uses such terms to refer to those immutable things or 
principles which he takes to subsist independently of the human mind (e.g. God, and the 
Ideas, taken as intelligible or noumenal laws of nature), and to determine objects as they 
exist independently of human perception or cognition of them. Thus, Coleridge says that 
we can speak of φpermanence and universality [as] subjective or objective, i.e. relative or 
absolute’.38 As I explain in 4.3, this distinction between relative and absolute permanence 
must be understood in terms of Coleridge’s distinction between the subjectively real and 
the objectively real a priori. For now, it will be sufficient just to outline these two notions 
                                                 
33 Logic, 76; cf. 141-2, 145-6. See also CM.V.355. For further discussion of this Coleridgean reading of the 
(Kantian a priori), see 2.2-3 below. 
34 Logic, 212. 
35 Logic, 36; cf. 34, 139-41. 
36 Logic, 141; cf. 40 for Coleridge’s related account of the φperception of a truth, permanent, necessary, and 
raised above all accident and change [apprehended] in a geometrical contemplation’ (a priori truth, or pure 
cognitive content). Coleridge uses the term φfact’ in a broad sense to designate the diverse kinds of objects 
or cognitive contents given a posteriori through the senses (see e.g. 34ff, 44-5n). 
37 Coleridge also regards self-evidence as a characteristic of the a priori (see Logic, 140ff, 211-2). 
38 Logic, 173 (cf. 43n, 141n, 202n). 
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of permanence and their relation to (i) what is invariant in human cognition and (ii) what 
is immutable independently of human subjects. In the first instance, φpermanence’ refers 
to φthat which is universally and permanently subjective, that is, what all human subjects 
possess in common by necessity of their constitution’.39 In other words, those aspects of 
cognition which, given the way in which the human mind is constituted, are invariant or 
not subject to change, such as the spatiotemporal ordering of the sensory manifold that 
is grounded in the human forms of sensible intuition (space and time), or the discursivity 
of all cognitions acquired through the operations of the understanding. In this case, what 
is φpermanently subjective’ just is that which, given certain invariant principles of human 
cognition, must always be the same for all human subjects under all possible conditions. 
In the second instance, φpermanence’ refers to φtruth in its eternal and immutable source’ 
(i.e. God), and φimmaterial and permanent things’ (i.e. the Divine Ideas).40 This φabsolute’ 
kind of permanence is φthe subsistence of the universe, material and intellectual’, or those 
eternal and immutable principles or aspects of the world as it exists independently of all 
human subjects, but which (as I show in 4.3-5) Coleridge claims, contra Kant, are possible 
objects of human cognition, acquired through intellectual intuition or noesis.41 As we shall 
see, Coleridge’s views concerning the differences between relative and absolute necessity, 
universality, and permanence are closely related to his claims about the kinds of invariant 
principles which have their source in the human mind (e.g. the rules of mathematics and 
logic) and those which have their source in something beyond the human mind (e.g. the 
Ideas, taken as noumenal principles which govern all phenomenal objects). 
I shall return to Coleridge’s account of the a priori and its implications later (see 
2.2-3.4); in concluding this section (2.1), I focus just on Coleridge’s claim that the a priori 
status of the pure forms and contents of sensory cognition is something determined by 
the origin of such forms and contents. Taken on its own, Coleridge’s assertion that the 
term a priori is used to designate some φact or product of the mind itself considered as 
distinct from the impressions from external objects’, might be interpreted to mean that it 
is not the origin of such acts and products in φthe mind itself’ that accords them this a 
priori status, but rather how we consider these acts and products (i.e. operations and 
contents) of the mind. In this case, something is a priori not because it originates from 
within the mind, but because it is something which can be φconsidered as distinct from 
                                                 
39 Logic, 202n. For further discussion, see 3.2-4. 
40 Friend.I.105-6; cf. Logic, 83-5. For further discussion, see 3.3, 4.3. 
41 For Coleridge claim that we need not follow Kant in rejecting the possibility of intellectual intuition, see 
e.g. BL.I.288-9n; cf. Logic, 242-3ff. This is discussed further in 4.3-5 (see also 3.1-3). 
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the impressions from external objects’ (i.e. given or known independently of, or without 
reference or appeal to, the a posteriori content of experience).42 However, as Coleridge 
makes clear elsewhere (in responding to perceived misinterpretations of Kant), it is the 
origin of certain contents and operations of the mind that is paramount in their claims to 
a priori status: φKant has explained the sense, in which he uses the phrase τa prioriυ as 
determining a fontem sive natale solum, minime vero tempus, et occasiones, idearumσthe 
ubi oriuntur, not the quando [a φsource or birthplace’, but not in the least the time and 
occasions of ideasσthe φwhere they arise’ not the φwhen’]’.43 This interpretation, along with 
Coleridge’s claim that transcendental knowledge derives from φan analysis of our 
intellectual faculties’,44 is encouraged by passages like the following, in which Kant 
characterises transcendental philosophy as an inquiry into the origins of those principles 
of cognition (like categories or pure concepts) which cannot be derived from experience. 
Here Kant defines his transcendental φanalytic of concepts’ as: 
 
the hitherto rarely attempted dissection of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to 
investigate the possibility of concepts a priori by looking for them in the understanding alone, 
as their birthplace, and by analyzing the pure use of this faculty.45  
 
On Coleridge’s view, what Kant means by φanalysing the pure use of this faculty’ is that 
philosophical procedure whereby we seek to analyse the operations and contents of the 
understanding (i.e. its acts and products), φconsidered as distinct from the impressions 
from external objects’. As Kant’s statement above suggests, if the aim of such an analysis 
is to investigate the possibility a priori of certain contents of the understanding (its pure 
concepts), then it must be carried out by φlooking for them in the understanding alone, 
[taken] as their birthplace’. If we can show that certain aspects of cognition have their 
origin in the understanding, then we can thereby confirm their claim to a priori status. 
This is why Coleridge claims that Kant uses the term a priori to designate the φsource or 
birthplace’ of certain kinds of cognitive content (i.e. ideas or representations which do 
not derive a posteriori from sense-experience). Considered in this context, Coleridge’s 
characterisation of transcendental knowledge as φthat by which we endeavour to climb 
above our experience into its sources’ strongly suggests that he takes the principal aim of 
                                                 
42 See e.g. Logic, 76, 139-43ff, 210-4. 
43 CM.III.117-8. 
44 Logic, 147 (cf. 140, 209-10n, 213-4, 248). 
45 CPR, B90. Coleridge’s sense that Kant is the first philosopher to successfully attempt this φdissection of 
the faculty of understanding itself’ is reflected in his claim that Kant is φthe first scientific analyst of the 
logical faculty [i.e. the understanding]’ (Logic, 63, 268; cf. 33-4, 147-9). 
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transcendental philosophy to be providing proof φthat experience would be impossible 
but for the a priori origins of certain features of our cognition’.46  
To see why Coleridge holds the view on our cognition and its sources outlined 
above, we must first consider in further detail Coleridge claims about how the Kantian a 
priori and its relation to our cognitive faculties or capacities ought to be interpreted. This 
will help to lay the ground for my subsequent account of Coleridge’s distinction between 
the different kinds of a priori evidence or cognitive content (see 4.1-4), in the context of 
Coleridge’s interpretation of transcendental inquiry as a method of philosophical inquiry 
which enables us to show φthat experience would be impossible but for the a priori origins 
of certain features of our cognition’,47 or as Coleridge phrases it, φto climb above our 
experience into its sources by means of an analysis of our intellectual faculties’ (see 3.1-2, 
4.4-5).48 In the sections that follow (2.2-3.4), I discuss further Coleridge’s claim that what 
it means for some form or content (i.e. some act or product) of cognition to be a priori is 
that it derives from the human mind and its cognitive capacities.  
 
2.2 The Spectacles of the Mind: Coleridge on Interpreting the Kantian A Priori 
The precise meaning of the Kantian a priori, particularly its connection to φconditions of 
the possibility of experience’ and its role in our acquisition of transcendental knowledge 
of such conditions of our cognition,49 remains in dispute. One of the main points of 
controversy here is whether Kant’s a priori should be interpreted as logical only, or if it 
also has some sort of psychological dimension, with this raising the further question of 
whether such psychological elements are a deliberate part of Kant’s conception of 
apriority, or an unintended (and unwelcome) consequence of his definition of the a priori 
in the Critique.50 For the purposes of this section, I give a brief overview of the relevant 
issues. According to the widely endorsed logical reading, Kant uses the term φa priori’, 
particularly in his descriptions of our faculties or cognitive powers and the fundamental 
elements of sensory cognition, to refer only to a special kind of evidence (what he calls 
                                                 
46 See Kitcher, (1990), 15. As was noted earlier, Coleridge’s interpretation of Kant shares a number of 
features with Kitcher’s view. 
47 See Kitcher, (1990), 15.  
48 Logic, 147. 
49 Following Kitcher, I will throughout treat φexperience’ and φcognition’ (or φcognitive experience’) as 
closely equivalent terms for Kant and Coleridge. In other words, when Kant talks of φexperience’, what he 
usually has in mind is the experience of knowing (φour mode of cognition of objects’). While such a 
reading of Kant’s aims and terminology in the Critique might be disputed, it is nevertheless evident that our 
basic experience of knowing (primary modes of cognising) objects is Coleridge’s principal concern 
throughout Logic, even when he discusses the forms of cognition without any reference to its objects. 
50 For a recent interpretation of the Kantian a priori which emphasises such psychological elements, see 
Waxman, (2013), esp. 23-32.  
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our φa priori representations’) and the logical form of our philosophical discourse and 
knowledge-claims about such evidence (only senses (2) and (3) of the a priori, as outlined 
in 2.1). On the psychological or cognitive reading, which has come in for much criticism 
even in its more moderate forms, Kant’s φa priori’ is a term that also refers to the special 
origin of such evidence (certain invariant features of our cognitive experience) in the 
mind and its characteristic forms or modes of cognitive activity (sense (1) above). Here 
faculty (Vermögen) is taken as a term that, while it encompasses such notions of special 
evidence, refers specifically to these forms of cognitive activityσand sometimes also to 
the putative mental structures taken to be responsible for such activity and its a priori 
form.51 Given that Coleridge explicitly presents transcendental philosophy as φan analysis 
of our intellectual faculties’ tasked with φinvestigation into the constitution and 
constituent forms’ of such faculties, Logic seems to follow the psychological approach in 
its description of the φinherent forms or several functional powers’ of sensibility and 
understanding.52 As I show in the remainder of this chapter, however, Coleridge’s notion 
of the a priori, particularly in its relation to transcendental knowledge, must be filled out 
further before an informed assessment of the psychological elements in his 
interpretation of Kant can be offered.  
 Coleridge’s clearest endorsement of Kant’s attempt to develop a philosophical 
method which seeks to account for φthe possibility of cognition or its use a priori’53 in 
Logic is found in his account of the mental unity that supposedly must underlie all our 
cognitive activity in the chapter φOn the Logical Acts’. Here, drawing on the principal 
arguments of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Coleridge contends that some kind of 
basic mental unity must be presupposed as a condition of consciousness itself, in order 
for us to account for the possibility of any particular act of cognition, such as the 
construction of a geometrical figure or a judgement about the relations between 
perceptual objects. Following Kant, Coleridge wants to show that some such condition 
of mental unity is required to explain how it could be possible for a subject to make 
connections between or φsynthesise’ the contents of a series of different cognitive states, 
or indeed even to recognise that such a sequence of representations φbelongs’ to a single, 
unified subject and its unfolding sensory experience.54 Coleridge’s view of mental unity is 
not central to his claims on the a priori, so my focus here will be on his Kantian notion of 
                                                 
51 For an overview of the differences between the logical and psychological readings of Kant, see Beiser, 
(2002), 163-76 (cf. Waxman, (2013), ch. 1). 
52 Logic, 146-7, 213-4. 
53 CPR, B81-2. 
54 On Kant’s theory of mental unity, see Kitcher, (1990), ch. 3. 
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conditions of possibility, and on what Coleridge thinks it means for such conditions to 
be designated as a priori, or as something that can be known a priori. As we shall see, 
although Coleridge is not always explicit about the connection himself, what he has to 
say here concerning the a priori conditions of consciousness and synthetic cognitive 
activity is a key reference point for making sense of his later account of transcendental 
knowledge and the procedures whereby we come to acquire such knowledge. 
 Having given an overview of how the Kantian theory of functions of unity and 
synthesis as fundamental to all cognitive activity can be used to explain what supposedly 
occurs in the mind of someone contemplating geometrical figures in their imagination, 
Coleridge offers the following summary of this account of mental unity as a condition of 
the possibility of consciousness (and thus of all cognitive experience): 
 
This primary mental act, which we have called the synthetic unity or the unity of apperception, 
is presupposed in, and in order to, all consciousness. It is its condition (condition sine qua non) or 
that which constitutes the possibility of consciousness a priori, or, if we borrow our metaphor 
from space instead of time, ab intra [from within]. Both metaphors mean one and the same, viz. 
an act or product of the mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions of external 
objects.55 
 
A number of things should be noted here. Coleridge defines a φcondition’ as something 
that φconstitutes the possibility’ of something else, and asserts (as does Kant) that such 
conditions of possibility are to be established a priori. Thus, to specify the condition(s) of 
something, such as consciousness or our mode of cognition of objects, is to account for 
the possibility of this thing, and such specification involves a procedure (of acquiring or 
establishing knowledge) that is independent of any particular experience (i.e. it is derived 
a priori rather than a posteriori). That Coleridge has an independence criterion for apriority 
something like Kant’s view that the a priori must be φindependent of all experience and 
even of all impressions of the senses’56 is made particularly evident in his remark that the 
metaphorical terms φa priori’ and φab intra’ must be understood as meaning or referring to 
some φact or product of the mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions of 
external objects’. Put another way, these metaphors should be taken to refer to cognitive 
acts or cognitive contents considered in abstraction from all sensation (what Kant calls 
                                                 
55 Logic, 76 (see 71-6 for Coleridge on the role of mental unity in geometrical construction). 
56 CPR, B2 (cf. B25, B74-5). 
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pure as opposed to empirical representations).57 Thus, if we establish some condition or 
principle of our knowledge or experience a priori, we also establish that it involves the 
kind of cognitive content that cannot derive from sensory impressions and must derive 
instead from some nonempirical origin or source (as the term ab intra suggests, such a 
source must φlie in the mind a priori’58).  
 I discuss below why Coleridge emphasises the metaphorical character of terms 
such as φa priori’ and φab intra’, and how this view informs Coleridge’s statements on the 
correct interpretation of Kant’s definitions of the a priori and the transcendental (a 
significant point given that Coleridge has been criticised for interpreting the Kantian a 
priori as though it involved references to things that are literally temporally or causally 
prior to experience, or to forms of cognition that could be shown to have an actual, 
specifiable spatial location in some neurophysiological structure).59 But more needs to be 
said about how Coleridge characterises the a priori in Logic and other related texts before 
the purpose of such spatial and temporal metaphors in his analysis of cognition and its 
basic elements can be fully understood. For after giving the statement on mental unity as 
the condition that φconstitutes the possibility of consciousness a priori’ just quoted, 
Coleridge offers a gloss on the meaning of a priori which warrants careful attention. 
Indeed, his remark reads strikingly like an anticipation of Russell’s description of φKant’s 
categories [as] the coloured spectacles of the mind’,60 and could thus be interpreted as an 
indication that Coleridge wishes to emphasise the psychological rather than the logical 
aspects of his Kantian conception of apriority: 
 
We may illustrate the sense of this so frequent and so frequently misused term τa prioriυ by 
likening it to the stains in the old cathedral glass which predetermines the character of the rays 
which it transmits and reflects.61 
 
If we take this stained glass analogy as serving to illustrate Kant’s distinction between the 
forms of cognition that φlie a priori in the mind’ and determine or order the φmaterials’ of 
sense given a posteriori in experience,62 then Coleridge’s point is as follows: The acts of 
the mind itself (its a priori rules or forms) can be said to φpredetermine the character’ of 
those sensory impressions φwhich it transmits and reflects’ in a way analogous to the 
                                                 
57 See CPR, B33-5; B74-82. 
58 Kant’s phrase at CPR, B125 (for similar statements from Coleridge, see Logic, 44-5; 71, 184n). 
59 See Milnes, (2008), 46-8; Orsini, (1969), 76-8. 
60 This is taken from φThe Philosophical Importance of Mathematical Logic’ in (1992), 39. 
61 Logic, 76. 
62 See Logic, 111-2, 265; cf. Kant’s statements at CPR, B33-5, B74-5. 
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process whereby rays of light refracted through stained glass windows in a cathedral take 
on a certain colour. In view of Coleridge’s talk of a priori and ab intra as temporal and 
spatial metaphors just prior to this illustration, however, questions remain as to precisely 
how far Coleridge thinks such analogies can be pushed. In particular, there is the problem 
of whether such talk of what is a priori in the mind and its activity should be taken to 
refer to physical neural processes that somehow predetermine the character of all 
sensory experience (which would make any claim to apriority problematic), or to some 
other aspect or feature of our mode(s) of cognition.63 
 On Russell’s view, such predetermination by the a priori is taken as referring 
specifically to certain properties of the human mind and its modes of cognition, rather 
than, say, to a constraint on certain kinds of knowledge-claims or the necessary logical or 
conceptual form of certain kinds of evidence or discourse. Thus, it may be said that the 
Kantian formal idealism (partly) adopted by Coleridge employs such comparisons of 
apriority to the refraction of light by stained glass because this view 
 
assumes that the universality of a priori truths comes from their property of expressing 
properties of the mind: things [i.e. the objects of sensible experience] appear to be thus because 
the nature of the appearance depends on the subject in the same way that, if we have blue 
spectacles, everything appears to be blue.64 
 
Viewed in this way, Coleridge’s stained glass analogy can be interpreted as serving to 
make two similar claims about the nature of the a priori. (1) That, on Kant’s view, the a 
priori is a property of the mind, or an expression of its properties, and is therefore 
dependent on the nature of the subject (i.e. dependent on what Kant and Coleridge call 
the cognitive constitution of the subject). (2) That the Kantian a priori is a property of the 
mind that conditions (or is the necessary condition of) all possible experience for such 
subjects, in the same way that whatever is seen through blue spectacles must appear blue, 
or all light which passes through stained glass necessarily takes on a certain colour (with 
the a priori properties of the mind playing the role of the refracting medium and the a 
posteriori elements of sensory impressions playing the role of what is refracted). In this 
sense, what is a priori in the mind, and conceived as constituting the possibility of 
experience (particularly cognitive activity) a priori, is a condition of the possibility of 
experience in the same way that stained glass of a certain colour, when it functions as a 
                                                 
63 This problem is explored further in 3.4. 
64 Russell (1992), 39. 
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refracting medium, might be said to be a condition of the possibility of light of this 
colour being produced through such a process of refraction.  
To put it in Coleridge’s terms: if we think of experience (in this Kantian sense) as 
occasioned by φsomething acting on us from without’, then our apprehension of, for 
instance, spatiotemporal order or causal connections in our experience (of the sensory 
manifold) must be conditioned and produced by certain a priori φforms and functions’ 
which act on us φab intra’ or from within, governing the synthetic cognitive activities that 
process whatever φacts on us from without’ (i.e. sensory affections or impressions from 
external objects).65 To understand how such processing works we can think of it as 
something analogous to what occurs when light acting upon or interacting with coloured 
glass is refracted by this medium to produce a certain colour or pattern of light. What is 
a priori in the mind functions like a pair of Russellian coloured spectacles: whatever is 
perceived, or φtransmitted and reflected’, by means of such φspectacles of the mind’ is 
necessarily always conditioned and constituted by the colours or patterns whose form is 
φpredetermined’ a priori by the nature of the spectacles (i.e. by what Coleridge calls φthe 
subjective nature of the mind’ or φthe constitution of our own faculties’).66 So, for some 
aspect of our cognitive experience to qualify as an a priori property or φform’ of the mind, 
it must be shown to condition or determine the φmaterials supplied [λ] by the sense’ in a 
way analogous to how φthe stains in the old cathedral glass [λ] predetermine the 
character of the rays which it transmits and reflects’.67 As we shall see, for Coleridge, the 
principal purpose of transcendental philosophy is to show how the pure forms of sense 
and understanding condition all sense-experience, as well as being the transcendental 
principles of the possibility of all such experience: the a priori φrules or forms’ of human 
cognition that are required to explain how (sensory) cognition and its objects are possible 
for beings with our cognitive constitution (see 3.1-3, 4.3).68 The next few sections (2.3, cf. 
3.4), however, focus on Coleridge’s views concerning what it means to claim that certain 
forms and features of sense-experience and cognition have an a priori origin, particularly 
with reference to Coleridge’s conception of the a priori as something which derives from 
the mind and its natural or innate capacities.  
 
                                                 
65 See BL.I.293, Logic, 76, 132-3. 
66 For Coleridge’s references to cognitive constitution, see Logic 140-4, 146-7, 203n. On reading Kant’s a 
priori forms of cognition in terms of information processing theory, see Falkenstein, (1995), 5-11ff; cf. 
Kitcher, (1990), 21-30. 
67 Logic, 265, 76. 
68 For Coleridge on such rules, forms, or laws of cognition, see e.g. Logic, 34-7, 65-70, 211-4, 235-8. 
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2.3 Coleridge on the A Priori, the Transcendental, & Necessary Conditions 
i. The Problem of Pre-existence: Coleridge on A Priori Forms as Necessary Conditions 
To lay the ground for the above discussions, more needs to be said about Coleridge’s 
view of a priori forms or principles as necessary conditions which φpre-exist’ or make 
possible our experience (as well as certain kinds of nonempirical knowledge). So, before 
we consider Coleridge’s conception of a priori origins in further detail, it will be useful to 
look closely at another of his favourite analogies for explaining the nature of the a priori 
(and a priori knowledge in particular). This analogy is important because it invokes a 
notion of φpre-existence’ that initially seems to run counter to Coleridge’s assertion 
elsewhere that φthe a priori has no relation to Time’, so that we must φborrow our 
metaphor from space instead of time’ when attempting to explain the nature of the a 
priori and its relation to experience (and cognition)69: 
 
By knowledge, a priori, we do not mean, that we can know anything previously to experience, 
which would be a contradiction in terms; but that having once known it by occasion of 
experience (i.e. something acting upon us from without) we then know that it [i.e. the a priori 
knowledge or principle] must have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been 
impossible. By experience only I know, that I have eyes; but then my reason convinces me, 
that I must have had eyes in order to the experience.70 
 
If we compare this characterisation of the a priori to the φcathedral glass’ analogy 
discussed above, we can see that Coleridge is here employing the phrase φmust have pre-
existed’ in very narrow sense, and in a way which is intended to exclude all reference to 
temporal relations. In this context, φmust have pre-existed’ means only φmust be the 
necessary condition of’. Just as we would say that eyes or some kind of visual system are 
a necessary condition of the possibility of vision or visual experience, or that some kind 
of coloured glass is a necessary condition of the possibility of the process whereby light 
of the same colour is produced by refraction, we can also say that the a priori forms of 
cognition (pure intuitions and pure concepts) are necessary conditions of the possibility 
of experience (and that certain kinds of a priori principles, which are taken to be 
grounded in these forms of cognition, are necessary conditions of the possibility of 
certain kinds of knowledge, e.g. logical, mathematical, or natural-scientific).71 Thus 
Coleridge should be taken here to be making a claim about how a priori knowledgeσor, 
                                                 
69 CM.IV.355 (cf. III.218-9), Logic, 76. 
70 BL.I.293n. Coleridge uses similar analogies at Friend, I.179n, Logic, 146-7, SWF.I.692. 
71 See e.g. Logic, 44-5, 211-4, 215-24. 
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rather, those a priori principles and pure representations from which such a priori 
knowledge derives, and in which it consistsσis related to experience, and particularly 
about how we can prove that something which can only be known φby occasion of 
experience’ can also be said to have a nonempirical status (i.e. how do we show that 
certain elements of experience or knowledge are not derived from experience, if we grant 
that φAll knowledge is excited or occasioned by experience’?). In this case, the answer is 
that whatever is a necessary condition of experience cannot be taken to derive from such 
experience. Coleridge is not saying that a priori knowledge somehow causes our 
experience, but rather that the a priori principles which furnish such knowledge φmust 
[λ] be supposed to exist previous to experience’, as necessary conditions of the 
possibility of such experience.72 Our knowledge of such conditions is itself a priori, which 
is perhaps why Coleridge’s statements seem to suggest that this a priori knowledge is 
what φmust have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been impossible’. On 
Coleridge’s own account, however, to claim that something could somehow be known 
φpreviously to experience’ is φa contradiction in terms’. So, as is made clearer in many of 
his other statements on the a priori, he presumably means just that (i) knowledge of the 
nature of a priori principles is itself a kind of a priori knowledge, and (ii) by coming to 
know such principles φby occasion of experience’, we come to see that the principles 
themselves are what φmust have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been 
impossible’ (i.e. they are a priori conditions of the possibility of experience, but can 
nevertheless only come to be known through an analysis of experience).73  
That φpre-existence’ taken in this sense refers only to how we explain the 
possibility of some given thing (vision, coloured light, experience, etc) by identifying that 
which must precede it as the necessary condition of its possibility (eyes, stained glass, the 
forms of sense and understanding, etc) is evident from Coleridge’s subsequent 
explanatory sentence: φBy experience only I know, that I have eyes; but then my reason 
convinces me, that I must have had eyes in order to the experience’ (my emphasis). In this 
analogy, the aim is not to illustrate some ontological or physiological claim about what 
causes vision or experience, but rather to show how we reason when formulating an 
argument of the form φfor some given thing, Y [e.g. vision, experience] to be possible, 
some necessary condition, X [e.g. eyes, a priori forms of cognition] is required’.74 What is 
                                                 
72 These quotes about knowledge and experience come from Coleridge’s account of a priori forms and 
conditions at Logic, 146-7ff.  
73 See Logic, 146-9. 
74 Here I follow Stern’s outline of such claims in (1999), 6-11. 
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at issue here is not so much the particular content of a given knowledge-claim (φeyes 
must pre-exist the act of sight, in order for visual experience(s) to be possible’), but 
rather the structure of this claim, taken to exemplify a general form common to all such 
claims (φX must precede Y as its necessary condition, in order for Y to be possible’). 
Precedence or pre-existence is thus a question only of the order of explanation, of how 
φmy reason convinces me’, not of any temporal, ontological, or physical relations that 
may hold between the things about which we are reasoning.75 Thus, while it may seem 
somewhat contrary to his phrasing, Coleridge should be taken here to be making a claim, 
at the second level, about how we identify what constitutes the a priori status of certain 
sorts of principles (i.e. they must be a necessary condition of the possibility of something 
else, e.g. experience, or some kind of knowledge), rather than a claim about the nature or 
characteristics of a priori knowledge per se (e.g. the self-evidence or the necessity and 
universality of certain mathematical and logical propositions). Although our cognition of 
the a priori status of certain special kinds of epistemic principles (e.g. the categories) and 
cognitive contents (pure representations and cognitions), constitutes a kind of a priori 
knowledge, this knowledge itself is obviously not what constitutes the necessary 
conditions of the possibility of our experience. Rather, it is the case that we know the 
objects of such knowledge (the a priori forms or principles of our cognition) to have such 
an a priori status because we know that they are necessary conditions of the possibility of 
experience. This adds a fourth criterion for apriority to those that were outlined in 2.1: 
Whatever is a priori must (1) be derived from within the mind, (2) be given or known 
independently of sense-experience, (3) be characterised by universality, necessity, and 
φpermanence’ (Coleridge’s term for what is immutable or invariant in cognition), as well 
as (4) being a necessary condition of the possibility of experience, or for certain kinds of 
knowledge (logical, mathematical, metaphysical, and natural-scientific).76 It is only to 
refer to (4) that Coleridge ordinarily employs the term φpre-exist’ in contexts where he is 
discussing the nature of the a priori and the transcendental.77 
As we shall see, although this conception of pre-existence sometimes seems to 
blur the boundary between Coleridge’s general conception of a priori knowledge and his 
conception of the specific kind of a priori cognitions designated as φtranscendental 
knowledge’, it also helps to make clear Coleridge’s grounds for holding that 
transcendental knowledge must be a priori. Moreover, it will help to show that part of the 
                                                 
75 See BL.I.293; Logic, 146-7. 
76 Coleridge also sees self-evidence as a mark of the a priori (see e.g. Logic, 140ff, 211-2). 
77 See BL.I.293n, Friend.I.179n, Logic, 146-7, SWF.I.692. 
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confusion here stems from the fact that transcendental knowledge, as well as being a 
specific kind of a priori cognition, also consists in claims about the nature of the a priori 
and about those more general kinds of a priori knowledge which are distinct from the 
transcendental (i.e. transcendental knowledge involves a priori knowledge-claims that 
purport to be claims about a priori knowledge itself).78 Here apriority criterion (4) is a 
useful reference point. First, it should be noted that Coleridge, of course, does not take 
the view that anything which is a necessary condition of the possibility of something else 
must be attributed an a priori status. Eyes or a visual system may be a necessary condition 
of vision, but this does not accord them an a priori status. The relationship between eyes 
and the activity of vision is just something analogous to the relationship between a priori 
forms and experience, which helps us to understand the nature of the a priori (and 
particularly its role in sensory cognition). So, while Coleridge often uses physical or 
mechanical analogies to explain the nature of the a priori, he should never be taken to be 
suggesting that what is an a priori necessary condition of experience or of knowledge is 
also a kind of physical necessity, though it is in some ways analogous to the visual organs 
that are a physically necessary condition of vision.79 After all, for Coleridge, where we 
can establish some kind of physical or natural necessity (at least, in the realm of purely 
material or physiological causes and conditions), we can always do so empirically.80 The 
same, clearly, does not hold true of the a priori forms or conditions of sensory experience 
and cognition. I will return to this problem later in 4.3-4 where I discuss Coleridge’s 
views on the distinction between subjectively real a priori forms (Kantian pure forms of 
intuition and categories) that are necessary conditions of human cognition (and so have 
an epistemic necessity limited to the cognitions of finite human subjects) and objectively 
real a priori forms (Platonic Ideas) which are the ground or cause all objects which subsist 
independently of human cognition (and thus have a metaphysical or ontological necessity 
that extends beyond the bounds of human sensory cognition and its objects, and which 
Coleridge takes to be the immaterial causal powers that ground all material causes and 
conditions or natural necessity).81 In concluding this section, I want to focus on another 
aspect of apriority criterion (4): the distinction between the necessary conditions of the 
possibility of (sensory) experience and the necessary conditions of the possibility of 
                                                 
78 See e.g. Pippin, (1982), 101-2; cf. Kitcher, (1990), ch. 1-2; Waxman, (2013), ch. 1. 
79 See esp. Logic, 37, 139-43, 145-6, 232-3, 256ff. 
80 See e.g. Logic, 37-41, 44-5n. 
81 See e.g. Logic, 83-5, LS, 32-3. 
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certain kinds of knowledge (or of the cognitive content from which such knowledge is 
taken to derive). 
Here we can divide (4) into (4a) that which is a priori because it is a necessary 
condition of the possibility of experience, and (4b) that which is a priori because it is a 
necessary condition of the possibility of a certain kind of knowledge or of the cognitive 
contents from which such knowledge is taken to derive. On Coleridge’s view, the pure 
forms of sensible intuition (space and time) and the pure forms of conception and 
judgement (the categories) meet both (4a) and (4b): these a priori forms are necessary 
conditions of the possibility of sense-experience (4a), and thus must also be necessary 
conditions of the possibility of all other kinds of knowledge (4b), insofar as we accept 
the claim that φAll knowledge is excited or occasioned by experience’, so that no 
cognitions of any kind could be possible without some kind of experience. At a more 
particular level, pure sensible intuitions are necessary conditions of the possibility of 
mathematical knowledge, while the pure forms of conception and judgement are 
necessary conditions of logical knowledge.82 Conversely, there are certain a priori 
principles, particularly in mathematics and logic, which are necessary conditions for the 
possibility of certain kinds of knowledge, but which are not necessary conditions for the 
possibility of experience. For instance, the axioms of Euclidean geometry might be said 
to be necessary conditions of the possibility of a knowledge of Euclidean geometry, and 
the principles of non-contradiction and identity to be necessary conditions of the 
possibility of coherent statements or propositions (in an intensional logical theory, 
restricted to claims about the forms and conditions of epistemic judgements).83 Given 
that, in Coleridge’s view, such principles are necessary conditions for certain kinds of 
mathematical or logical knowledge, but are not also necessary conditions for the 
possibility of the cognitive contents (pure intuitions or pure conceptions) from which 
such knowledge is taken to derive, we can divide (4b) further into (4b1), φX is a necessary 
condition of the possibility of knowledge-type Y’, and (4b2), φX is a necessary condition 
of the possibility of knowledge-type Y, and a necessary condition of the possibility of the 
cognitive content from which knowledge-type Y is taken to derive’. While the axioms of 
Euclidean geometry and the principles of non-contradiction and identity meet only (4b1), 
the pure forms of sensible intuition and the pure forms of conception and judgement 
meet both (4b1) and (4b2), because they are not only conditions that make possible 
                                                 
82 That Coleridge holds this view is made clear at Logic, 211-4 (cf. 34-7, 44-5 and nn). For more detailed 
discussion of the textual evidence for these points, see 4.1-4. 
83 For this view of Kantian logic, see e.g. Mosser, (2008), ch. 1-2. 
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certain kinds of a priori knowledge, but are also what make possible the pure cognitive 
content from which these different kinds of knowledge are taken to derive.84  
 
ii. Coleridge on the Relationship between the A Priori & the Transcendental 
In my view, when Coleridge discusses the nature of the a priori, and of necessary 
conditions (particularly in his Logic), he is concerned primarily with the kinds of a priori 
forms or principles that meet apriority criteria (4a) and (4b2). I provide a more detailed 
account of the textual evidence for this aspect of Coleridge’s interpretation of the 
Kantian a priori in sections 3.1-4.4; for the remainder of this section, I focus only on how 
Coleridge’s claims about such necessary conditions and their apriority inform his account 
of the relationship between the a priori and the transcendental. As we will see, Coleridge 
employs the same eye analogy to explain the nature of the a priori and the nature of the 
transcendental not because he has confused the two, but because this analogy is intended 
to apply only to those a priori forms or principles which meet criteria (4a) and (4b2), and 
which can thus be designated as transcendental principles (i.e. φthe conditions that render 
experience itself possible’,85 and which are also required to account for the possibility of 
certain kinds of nonempirical or pure cognitive contents, and the a priori  knowledge 
taken to derive from this content). In such contexts, I will be arguing, Coleridge uses the 
term φtranscendental’, or the phrase φtranscendental to’, in the same way he uses the term 
φpre-exist’, or the phrase φmust have pre-existed’: To indicate, and to illustrate, the kind 
of relation which holds between a priori necessary conditions and the things (particularly 
sensory experience and certain kinds of a priori cognitive content) which these conditions 
φpre-exist’ or make possible. Because Coleridge takes the a priori to be φtranscendental to’ 
experience in this sense (i.e. it is a necessary condition of the possibility of experience), 
he is able to employ the same analogy to explain what he means by the terms φa priori’ 
and φtranscendental’. 
We can get a better sense of Coleridge’s position on this matter by comparing his 
usage of the eye analogy in contexts where he is discussing how we must conceive of the 
a priori with his usage of the same analogy in contexts where he is defining the terms 
φtranscendental’ and φtranscendental knowledge’. In the revised 1818 edition of The Friend 
Coleridge glosses the term φa priori’ as follows, explaining that if we can know something 
a priori, then it must be taken to derive (or follow) 
 
                                                 
84 Coleridge makes this distinction at Logic, 211-4, 225. 
85 Logic, 146-7. 
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from those necessities of the mind or forms of thinking, which, though first revealed to us by 
experience, must yet have pre-existed in order to make experience itself possible, even as the 
eye must exist previous to any particular act of seeing, though by sight only can we know that 
we have eyes.86 
 
As we saw in section 2.1, Coleridge uses the same analogy a few years later (c. 1819-22) 
in the Logic manuscript, in his account of the a priori conditions of the possibility of 
experience and the nature of the transcendental: 
 
All knowledge is excited or occasioned by experience, but all knowledge is not derived from 
experience, such, for instance, is the knowledge of the conditions that render experience itself 
possible, and which must therefore be supposed to exist previous to experience, in the same 
manner as the eyes must pre-exist to the act of seeing, though without that act of seeing we 
never should have learnt that we possessed eyes. Now to distinguish the truths that are 
necessarily presupposed in all experience as its condition and co-cause, from the facts or 
knowledge not only occasioned by, but actually derived from, experience [λ] the term 
τtranscendentalυ has been chosen.87 
 
To make sense of the parallels between the two passages just quoted, we need to look 
more closely at the series of claims that Coleridge puts forward in the second passage. 
First, Coleridge begins by pointing out that, although φAll knowledge is excited or 
occasioned by experience’, a distinction must be made between φthe facts or knowledge 
[λ] actually derived from, experience’, and the φknowledge [which] is not derived from 
experience’ (i.e. between a posteriori and a priori knowledge). Second, as an example of 
such nonempirically derived knowledge, Coleridge cites φthe knowledge of the conditions 
that render experience itself possible’. Third, Coleridge states that these conditions (as 
distinct from our a priori knowledge of them) φmust therefore be supposed to exist 
previous to experience, in the same manner as the eyes must pre-exist to the act of 
seeing’ (i.e. such conditions φpre-exist’ experience in the sense that they are necessary 
conditions of the possibility of experience, just as eyes are necessary conditions of the 
possibility of vision). Fourth, in the concluding clause of his eye analogy sentence, (i.e. 
φthough without that act of seeing we never should have learnt that we possessed eyes’), 
Coleridge reiterates his first point: the fact that we could never acquire a priori or 
nonempirical knowledge without experience is no proof that such knowledge (or all of 
                                                 
86 Friend.I.179n. 
87 Logic, 146-7. 
 87 
our knowledge) must be empirically derived, or that all our cognitive contents must 
therefore have an a posteriori origin. Finally, Coleridge notes that we can use the term 
φtranscendental’ to φdistinguish the truths that are necessarily presupposed in all 
experience as its condition and co-cause, from the facts or knowledge not only 
occasioned by, but actually derived from, experience’. As I will show below, however, 
Coleridge also uses φtranscendental’ in a broader sense, as a term to refer to whatever is 
taken to be a necessary condition of the possibility of something else. This broader usage 
is the principal reason for the close parallels between Coleridge’s different accounts of 
what is meant by the terms φa priori’ and φtranscendental’. By looking more carefully at the 
kind of claim Coleridge is using his eye analogy to illustrate, we can get a better sense of 
how he views the relationship between the a priori and the transcendental. 
 The key reference point for my claims here is a manuscript fragment, roughly 
contemporaneous with Coleridge’s account of the a priori in the 1818 Friend, in which 
Coleridge attempts to develop definitions of many of the terms which were to become 
central to his c. 1820s manuscript draft of Logic. In this text, which may be an incomplete 
version of the φglossary of terms’ that Coleridge refers to at various points in Logic, but 
which he apparently never incorporated into the existing manuscript transcription of the 
work,88 we find Coleridge searching for a term to designate some thing which is taken to 
be a necessary condition of something else:  
 
TRANSCENDENT signifies not any thing transcending experience, ([and is] therefore perhaps 
not a well-chosen term) but that which must be supposed in the mind precedent to experience, 
for the one sole purpose of rendering experience possibleσ(thus the eye is transcendent to 
Sightσtho’ without Light & Objects it [i.e. the eye] were useless, & could never have been 
discovered[)].89 
 
As we have already seen, by the time he came to compose Logic Coleridge had settled on 
the term φtranscendental’ for the kind of condition of possibility he describes here, using 
the same analogy to illustrate the nature of such conditions. Furthermore, in the later 
text, Coleridge clears up the confusion he is worried about here (of mistaking the 
transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience for something φtranscending 
experience’) by emphasising that whatever is φtranscendental to’ experience should be 
φdistinguish[ed] from pretended cognitions and assertions that transcend our intellectual 
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faculties or, what is equivalent, or which the human mind can be shown to possess no 
appropriate faculty and which assertions are therefore called τtranscendentυ’.90 But this 
earlier account of conditions of possibility is nevertheless important, partly for those 
elements that do not appear in Coleridge’s later definition of the term φtranscendental’ 
(especially his use of the phrase φprecedent in the mind’, which I discuss further below), 
and partly for the light it can shed on Coleridge’s reasons for using the eye analogy in 
those discussions of the a priori where he does not mention transcendental conditions or 
transcendental knowledge. Of particular importance here is the way in which Coleridge 
uses the phrase φthe eye is transcendent[al] to Sight’, to indicate that the eye is a necessary 
condition of the possibility of vision. For, in the above passage he employs the term 
φtranscendent[al]’ in much the same way that he uses φpre-exist’ elsewhere to refer to the 
nature a of condition of possibility and its relation to that which it φrenders possible’ (e.g. 
φthe eyes must pre-exist to the act of seeing’91). Given this, we may distinguish between a 
narrow usage of the term φtranscendental’ that refers only to φthe conditions that render 
experience itself possible’ (as in the passage from Logic quoted above), and a broader 
usage which refers more generally to the relation between a necessary condition and that 
which it renders possible (as in φthe eye is transcendent[al] to Sight’). If we place such 
different uses of the term φtranscendental’ in the context of Coleridge’s apriority criteria 
(4a) and (4b1), we can see that the narrow use of φtranscendental’ corresponds with (4a), 
as it refers only to a priori necessary conditions of the possibility of experience, while the 
broader use corresponds to (4b1), as it refers in a more general way to the kinds of a priori 
necessary conditions that, while they do not make experience itself possible, are required 
to account for the possibility of other things, especially certain kinds of cognitive content 
or knowledge. 
Having outlined Coleridge’s two different senses of φtranscendental’, we are in a 
better position now to examine the kinds of claims he is making about the a priori in the 
1818 Friend, and to consider how such claims relate to his definitions of transcendental 
knowledge in Logic. As I noted above, Coleridge states in The Friend that if we can know 
something a priori, then it must be taken to derive (or follow) 
 
from those necessities of the mind or forms of thinking, which, though first revealed to us by 
experience, must yet have pre-existed in order to make experience itself possible, even as the 
                                                 
90 Logic, 147; cf. 169. 
91 Logic, 146; cf. BL.I.293n, Friend.I.179n. 
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eye must exist previous to any particular act of seeing, though by sight only can we know that 
we have eyes.92 
 
Although it is not immediately clear, given Coleridge’s emphasis on how the a priori 
φnecessities of the mind or forms of thinking’ make experience possible, Coleridge is, in 
my view, making two separate claims here about the a priori (and a priori conditions of 
possibility, in particular). The more obvious claim, as we have seen, is that these a priori 
forms are the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience in the same way that 
we can speak of eyes as the necessary conditions of the possibility of vision. This meets 
Coleridge’s apriority criterion (4a) as outlined above. However, there is, at least 
implicitly, another claim being made here: Since Coleridge begins by stating that 
whatever constitutes a priori knowledge, or can be known a priori, must derive φfrom 
those necessities of the mind or forms of thinking [that] make experience itself possible’, 
he is also evidently claiming that the a priori principles of the possibility of experience are 
necessary conditions of the possibility of a priori knowledge. This meets Coleridge’s 
apriority criterion (4b1). Indeed, as I will show in 3.2-4.5, one of the principal aims of 
Coleridge’s version of transcendental philosophy is to show how the a priori forms or 
principles of cognition are required to account for the possibility of the kinds of pure 
cognitive content(s) from which the knowledge specified in (4b1) derives, and so can be 
shown to meet apriority criterion (4b2). In sum: on Coleridge’s account, it is not just that 
such principles are necessary conditions of the possibility of experience that secures their 
a priori status, but also the fact that these principles are the forms or conditions required 
to account for the possibility of all nonempirical knowledge; they are φtranscendental to’ 
or φpre-exist’ (i.e. make possible) both our experience, and the various a priori cognitions 
that are φexcited or occasioned by experience’.93  
What separates the a priori and the transcendental, then, is a matter of context: If 
we are concerned with how a priori forms or principles are related to the experience or to 
the kinds of (pure and empirical) cognitions that they make possible, we describe these 
forms or principles as φtranscendental to’ those things which they make possible (just as 
we would say φthe eye is transcendent[al] to Sight’). If we are concerned with a priori 
knowledge per se, rather than with the conditions required to account for the possibility 
of such knowledge, then a further distinction must be drawn between our a priori 
knowledge of things like mathematical and logical rules or principles and our a priori 
                                                 
92 Friend.I.179n. 
93 See BL.I.293; Logic, 146-7. 
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knowledge of things like φthe conditions that render experience itself possible’, or how 
φmathematical reasoning or all truths respecting measure, number, and motion [λ are] 
possible’.94 So, although whatever is a priori may be described in transcendental terms (i.e. 
as a necessary condition of the possibility of something elseσwhether sense-experience, 
knowledge, or a kind of cognitive contentσas in Coleridge’s eye analogy), only the latter 
kind of a priori knowledge belongs to the specific class of a priori cognition that, following 
Kant, is designated as φtranscendental knowledge’.  Coleridge can use the same analogy in 
his 1818 account of the a priori and his 1820s account of transcendental knowledge as a 
species of nonempirically derived or a priori knowledge because, in both instances, he is 
making transcendental claims (i.e. claims of the form φφfor some given thing, Y [e.g. 
vision, experience] to be possible, some necessary condition, X [e.g. eyes, a priori forms 
of cognition] is required’95) about a priori principles and their relation to (i) experience 
and (ii) nonempirical knowledge. I will provide a more detailed account of the kinds of 
arguments Coleridge makes about the forms or conditions required to account for the 
possibility of sense-experience, and of the different kinds of a priori representations and 
cognitions, later in 3.1-4.4. In concluding this section I want to return, briefly, to the 
question of whether, and to what extent, Coleridge’s interpretation of the Kantian a priori 
emphasises its (disputed) psychological elements. 
 
iii. The Psychological A Priori & Coleridge’s Twofold Conception of A Priori Representations 
As we saw in 2.1-2, Coleridge often describes the a priori in terms of its relation to the 
mind: he speaks of a priori principles as the φnecessities of the mind or forms of thinking’; 
says that by the terms φa priori’ and φab intra’ (φfrom within’) we mean φan act or product of 
the mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions from external objects’; and 
also claims that φK[ant] has repeatedly explained that a priori [λ] = a mente ipsa [from 
the mind itself]’.96 Coleridge also states that the a priori forms or principles of sense and 
understanding are φinherent in the constitution of’ these cognitive faculties, and that 
these forms φmust be supposed in the mind precedent to experience, for the one sole 
purpose of rendering experience possible’ (my emphasis).97 It is clear, then, that for 
Coleridge whatever is a priori must be taken to derive from or originate in φthe mind 
itself’. Indeed, as I discussed earlier in this section, Coleridge’s φcathedral glass’ analogy 
works in much the same way as Russell’s later φblue spectacles’ analogy, aiming to show 
                                                 
94 Coleridge makes these distinctions clear at Logic, 146-7ff, 211-4. 
95 This formulation is based partly on Stern, (1999), 6-11, esp. 8ff. 
96 See Friend, 179n, Logic, 76, CM.IV.355 (cf. III.218-9). 
97 See e.g. Logic, 146-7, 265-6n, SWF.I.692. 
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that φthe universality of a priori truths comes from their property of expressing properties 
of the mind’.98 We also established in 2.1 that Coleridge’s account of the a priori and the 
transcendental shares some features with the position held by the contemporary Kant 
scholars Kitcher and Waxman, who argue that when Kant claims that particular elements 
of our experience and cognition must have an a priori origin, what he means is that these 
elements must derive in some way from our cognitive capacities (rather than having an a 
posteriori origin in sense-experience).99 In sum, if holding that the a priori has the φproperty 
of expressing properties of the mind’, or derives from the mind and its capacities, is to 
hold a psychological conception of the a priori, then Coleridge’s account of the a priori 
clearly is psychological. At the very least, his theory of the a priori must be said to contain 
prominent psychological elements, and it should be recognised that Coleridge interprets 
Kant’s claims about the a priori as being primarily claims about the human mind and its 
cognitive capacities (considered as the modes or forms of human cognition). 
 Wayne Waxman’s overview of what he calls Kant’s φpsychological a priori’ is a 
useful reference point for elucidating Coleridge’s claims about how the a priori principles 
of the possibility of experience can be conceived as φpre-existent’ or φtranscendental to’ 
experience, because they are those conditions which necessarily precede all experience in 
the sense that they are what φrenders experience itself possible’.100 In discussing Kant’s 
conception of the φnecessary validity’ of all a priori representations, Waxman describes the 
Kantian a priori as that which φprecedes and makes possible’, or is the necessary condition 
of, some other thing in terms quite similar to Coleridge’s account of the Kantian a priori 
as that which φpre-exists’ experience:  
 
The necessary validity Kant attributed to the a priori representations of transcendental 
philosophy [λ] needs to be understood psychologically. Their necessary validity has always to 
be limited to their relation to other representations, to the exclusion of things in themselves, 
and then only to those representations that originate in the same mental faculty: a pure 
intuition of sensibility is necessary because it precedes and makes possible all other sensible 
intuitions (mathematical and empirical intuitions); a pure concept of the understanding is 
necessary [λ] because it precedes and makes possible all other concepts of objects 
(mathematical and empirical); and a principle of transcendental judgment is necessary because 
it precedes and makes possible experience itself.101 
                                                 
98 Russell (1992), 39. 
99 See Kitcher, (1990), ch. 1-2; Waxman, (2013), ch. 1. 
100 See Waxman, (2013), 23-32. 
101 Waxman, (2013), 31-2. 
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Waxman goes on to make clear that such necessary validity consists in being a necessary 
condition of something else, and to emphasise Kant’s view of such a priori conditions as 
being conceived of in terms of their origin in our cognitive capacities or faculties (i.e. as 
mental rather than purely logical forms, as principles or aspects of our cognition that 
have a nonempirical origin, rather than just as conditions that are known or established 
without appeal to experience): 
 
Being a necessary condition not just for some but for absolutely all representations of the same 
kind, empirical included, was, in Kant’s view, sufficient to prove a representation to be a priori. 
And since τkind,υ for him, is entirely a function of the representations’ faculty of originσ
sensibility, understanding, or judgmentσit follows that the necessity of a priori representations 
can reflect nothing other than the nature and workings of the psyche originally responsible for 
producing them.102 
 
As we saw earlier, Coleridge takes the view that what makes certain principles of our 
experience and cognition a priori is that they are necessary conditions for experience, or 
for certain kinds of knowledge. I discuss the details of this position further in 3.2-4.5; for 
now it is enough to note that when Coleridge refers to φthose necessities of the mind or 
forms of thinking [which] must yet have pre-existed [our experience] in order to make 
experience itself possible’, he also means the kind of a priori representations which are 
described in Waxman’s account of Kantian necessary validity, as just quoted. Although I 
have up to this point been arguing that Coleridge conceives of these φnecessities of the 
mind’ as a priori principles, we can see from the following passage that, for Coleridge, an 
a priori principle just is a Kantian a priori representation: 
 
If [φIDEAS (sensu Platonico) or supersensual realities’] be termed principles of reason, there 
would seem to be no impropriety if the forms belonging to understanding [the categories], on 
which the exercise of its functions is grounded, were called analogously the principles of the 
understanding, and in like manner if the universal forms of the intuitive faculty [space and 
time] were entitled the principles of sense, and, should this be thought a more natural or more 
readily intelligible expression than that of τpure conceptionsυ and τpure intuitionsυ, there can 
be no objection to the change capable of outweighing its convenience [λ].103 
 
                                                 
102 Waxman, (2013), 31-2. 
103 Logic, 238. 
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The a priori representations which Kant calls φpure conceptions’ and φpure intuitions’ are 
the very same a priori principles or forms that Coleridge has in mind when discussing the 
φconditions that render experience itself possible, and which must therefore be supposed 
to exist previous to experience’.104 As Coleridge goes on to point out here, when we talk 
of φthe principles of understanding’ or φthe principles of sense’, we must bear in mind 
that such principles should not be considered as something distinct from the a priori 
representations termed φpure conceptions’ and φpure intuitions’, because they can be 
characterised as both a kind of cognitive operation and a kind of cognitive content (i.e. as 
both what Coleridge calls φpure acts’ and φpure products’ of the mind): 
 
[T]here can be no objection to th[is] change [in representation terminology] capable of 
outweighing its convenienceσprovided only that it does not lead as unaware into the error of 
supposing a conception [or intuition] to be a something different in nature from conceiving [or 
intuiting], or [the activities of] conceiving [and intuiting] a something different from the mind 
that so conceives [and intuits].105 
 
Put another way, while we may make a terminological distinction between the cognitive 
activity of conceiving and the cognitive content produced, apprehended, constructed, etc 
through such activity, this distinction should not be taken to refer to some kind of literal 
separation of cognitive act and product that is actually present or apprehensible to us in 
our cognitive states. Rather, this is just a theoretical position that we take up in order to 
explain the relations between the different elements of our cognition, and thus our usage 
will vary with context: We refer to the principles of understanding and sense as either 
cognitive operations (i.e. the acts of conceiving and intuiting) or as cognitive contents 
(i.e. the products of these acts, conceptions and intuitions), depending on the particular 
aspect of our cognition or experience that we are, at that moment, attempting to explain. 
The act/product distinction, however, is purely theoretical. Coleridge makes this clear in 
some remarks on the use of the term φintuition’, in which he makes the same point as the 
passage above make about the uses of the term φconception’: 
 
W[e] therefore adopt [the term] τintuitionυ, from the Latin intuitus or intuitio, from intueor, to 
look on or at a subject, to have it present to the sight, and then by a wider usage, present to the 
senses generally, whether the outward or the inward senses, signif[ying] a simple beholding, 
                                                 
104 Logic, 146-7. 
105 Logic, 238. Although Coleridge is referring specifically to pure conceptions in this passage, it is clear 
(esp. from 151-4) that he takes the same to apply to pure intuitions. 
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both the act of beholding, and the simple product thence resulting, indistinguishably [my emphasis]. 
Indistinguishably, I say, for we cannot separate the one [the act] from the other [the product] 
without reference to some hypothesis or theory. Our consciousness contains no such 
distinction, [and consequently] we are aware of no such twinship or duality [of the act and the 
product of intuition].106 
 
As we will see (3.1-2, 4.1-4), Coleridge thinks that the best φtheory or hypothesis’ that we 
can adopt to explain such distinctions is Kant’s transcendental philosophy. It is because 
Coleridge interprets Kant’s claims about a priori representations within this act-product 
framework, that he takes Kant’s transcendental claims about our sensory cognition and 
its conditions and sources to be claims not just about how certain kinds of a priori 
representations are required to explain how various other kinds of pure and empirical 
representations are possibleσto give one of Waxman’s examples, φa pure intuition of 
sensibility is necessary because it precedes and makes possible all other sensible 
intuitions (mathematical and empirical intuitions)’.107 Rather, these claims must also be 
taken as claims about how certain kinds of pure or a priori cognitive operations, taken to 
derive from (or originate in) our sensory and intellectual cognitive capacities, are required 
to make possible certain kinds of cognitive content, as well as the sensory experience of 
which such cognitive contents constitute the basic elements. My aim in the next few 
sections (3.1-4.2) will be to explain Coleridge’s views concerning what it means to claim 
that the a priori forms or principles of cognition are φinnate’, or φin the mind precedent to 
experience’, and in particular his view that what it means for something (e.g. a form, 
operation, or content of cognition) to have an a priori origin is just that it is φinnate’ or φin 
the mind precedent to experience’ in this way. 
                                                 
106 Logic, 151. 
107 Waxman, (2013), 32. 
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3. The Elements of Experience: Coleridge’s Transcendental Theory of Cognition 
& the Transcendental Analysis of the Cognitive Powers 
3.1 Transcendental Analysis & the Threefold Division of the Cognitive Powers 
We saw above (1.5) that Coleridge describes Kant’s transcendental method as φa pre-
inquisition into the mind [considered] as part Organ, part Constituent of all Knowledge: 
an examination of the Scales, Weights, and Measures themselves, abstracted from the 
Objects to be weighed or measured by them’.1 Before discussing in further detail the 
diverse kinds of a priori cognitive content with which this φcritical inquisition into the 
intellectual faculties’ is concerned, we must consider why Coleridge characterises such a 
transcendental φinvestigation into the constitution and constituent forms’ of the faculties 
as φa pre-inquisition into the mind [my emphasis]’ which serves primarily to establish φa 
compleat Propædia of Philosophy’.2 On Coleridge’s view, transcendental inquiry serves 
the following propadeutic functions: (1) it defines the limits of sensible experience and 
sensory cognition, which allows for a further distinction between non-sensory and 
sensory cognitions and their content (i.e. a distinction between the respective objects or 
contents of intellectual and sensible intuitions); (2) it defines the epistemic criteria (or 
φlaws of thought’) and conditions to which all sensory cognition must be subject (i.e. the 
a priori rules of sense and understanding), and also establishes the principles of all non-
sensory cognition (i.e. the Ideas of reason); (3) it investigates and explains the nature of 
the cognitive faculties or powers whereby we acquire such cognitions (both sensory and 
non-sensory); finally, in virtue of (1)-(3) it explains (4) how sensory and non-sensory 
cognitive contents or objects and the diverse kinds of knowledge deriving from them are 
possible. This is why Coleridge describes transcendental knowledge as introductory to, 
or preparatory for, other kinds of knowledge: it consists in the kinds of arguments and 
principles that are required to explain how certain kinds of knowledge (e.g. mathematical, 
logical, noetic, or empirical cognitions) are possible. Such transcendental arguments and 
principles in turn allow us to define the respective limits and rules governing the 
different kinds of knowledge, and thus to determine the appropriate objects of the 
diverse inquiries (e.g. mathematics, logic, noetic, or physics and psychology3) which give 
rise to these different kinds of knowledge. In what follows, I consider some of the 
textual evidence for points (1)-(4), with a particular focus on Coleridge’s characterisation 
                                                 
1 CM.V.81. 
2 Logic, 146-7, 205; CM.V.81-2 (cf. CM.III.918-21). 
3 On this division of knowledge, see esp. Logic, 44-5n. See also Coleridge’s claims about the φsciences of 
experience’ (139-40ff) and empirical φnatural inquiries’ or φphysical researches’ (5-6, 38-9). 
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of transcendental inquiry as φa pre-inquisition into the mind’ or φcritical inquisition into 
the intellectual faculties’, and Coleridge’s threefold division of such inquiry into 
φtranscendental [λ] Æsthetic, Logic, and Noetic’.4 I give an account of Coleridge’s views 
concerning the general character of the cognitive forms, operations, and contents taken 
to originate in the human cognitive faculties in this part of the thesis (3.1-4). In the part 
that follows (4.1-5), I shall focus on Coleridge’s claims about the forms, operations, and 
contents taken to derive from specific cognitive capacities, and the sorts of philosophical 
methods that enable us to prove such derivation. 
 I will take as my starting point here some passages from a notebook entry that 
dates to around 10 years before Coleridge’s composition of Logic. This entry will help to 
bring out further the connections between Coleridge’s view of transcendental inquiry as 
performing a special propadeutic function (by providing a theoretical framework for 
explaining, and distinguishing between, certain kinds of knowledge) and his claim that 
such transcendental inquiry must consist in a φcritical inquisition into the intellectual 
faculties’ (a nonempirical investigation or pure analysis and noesis of the contents and 
operations of sense, understanding, and reason).5 Coleridge opens the entry under 
consideration here by outlining a conception of cognition and its objects that he claims is 
shared by a range of prominent early modern philosophers: 
 
What is the common principle of the Philosophical Systems of Descartes, (Lock?) Berkley, 
Hume, and Kant? That 
Our Senses in no way acquaint us with Things as they are in and of themselves: that the 
properties, which we attribute to Things without us, yea, that this very Outness [i.e. the apparent 
mind-externality of objects of perception and cognition], are not strictly properties of the 
things themselves, but either constituents or modifications of our own minds.6 
 
Coleridge then presents a brief account of the ways in which Cartesian and Berkeleian 
idealism attempt to account for the nature of the relationship between mind and world, 
and how these two theories attempt to explain the origins and properties of the objects 
of perception and cognition. These details, however, need not concern us here. What I 
want to focus on is Coleridge’s subsequent claim that φThe first step [λ] by which we 
can pass from psychology to metaphysics, is the examination of this common principle’ 
(i.e. the principle that φOur Senses in no way acquaint us with Things as they are in and 
                                                 
4 See CM.V.81, Logic, 205. 
5 For this claim, see e.g. CM.III.918-21, V.81-2; Logic, 146-9, 205-6 (cf. 169, 211-4). 
6 CN.III.3605 (c. Aug-Sep 1809). 
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of themselves’).7 What Coleridge means by φpass[ing] from psychology to metaphysics’ in 
this context is the theoretical shift from an account of the objects and processes of 
cognition, and the contents and operations of the mind, which is restricted to empirical 
and naturalistic terms (i.e. an account that appeals to a posteriori principles) to an account 
of the same that is framed in nonempirical terms (i.e. an account that appeals to a priori 
principles). Coleridge presents the move from a psychological to a metaphysical account 
of cognition and its objects in terms of the different theoretical perspectives one can take 
on the cognitive faculties, and particularly the role of the faculties in the constitution of 
experience and cognition (see 1.4-5).  
 He begins his φexamination’ of the principle that φOur Senses in no way acquaint 
us with Things as they are in and of themselves’ by stating some of the questions about 
the objects and processes of cognition which such a principle raises: 
 
Have we or have we not, a faculty of Perception? Do we perceive, or do we only deduce the 
existence of Things? Which is the proper expressionσThe perception of a Table? or the 
Perception, Table?8 
 
In other words, (i) what kinds of cognitive faculties or capacities do we possess, if it is 
possible to speak of such faculties at all? (ii) Do our faculties give us φdirect’ access to the 
objects of perception and cognition (i.e. do such faculties φacquaint us with Things as 
they are in and of themselves’), or do these faculties only present to our minds cognitive 
states and contents from which we infer the existence of mind-external objects? (iii) 
Given the problems raised by question (ii), should we speak of our perceptions as being 
perceptions of objects, i.e. as cognitive states that inform us directly of the existence of 
things like tables (φThe perception of a Table’)? Or should we speak of these perceptions 
as being φeither [the] constituents or modifications of our own minds’, i.e. as cognitive 
states that consist (at least in part) of the sensory impressions from which we can infer 
or deduce the existence of things like tables (φThe perception, Table’)? In short, as 
Coleridge puts it elsewhere in the same entry, is φall our Knowledge confined to 
Appearances’, or do our perceptions and cognitions acquaint us with, or provide us with 
knowledge of, φan external Reality, or self-Subsistence’? Is it the case φthat these [sensory] 
                                                 
7 CN.III.3605. 
8 CN.III.3605. 
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Impressions which we call Things, are truly only Ideas, or Representations, which change 
with the changes of the representative Faculties in the subject’?9 
 Later in Logic, Coleridge reformulates this problem as the question of whether 
objects of sensory experience and cognition can be proven to be φproperly and wholly 
objectiveσi.e. [demonstrated to] have a subsistence independent of the mind which 
contemplates them’.10 In both Logic and this earlier notebook entry, Coleridge claims that 
we cannot resolve this problem without a prior investigation of the cognitive faculties or 
powers, what he calls φa pre-inquisition into the mind’. In Logic Coleridge puts this point 
in subject-object relation terms: φthe knowledge of the constitution of the subject is a 
necessary precondition of any distinct knowledge respecting the object’.11 The notebook 
entry presents this point in terms of the relationship between our cognitive faculties and 
our experience, making clearer the sense in which Coleridge thinks a φpre-inquisition into 
the mind’ is a φprecondition of any distinct knowledge respecting the object’: 
 
Prior however to this dispute concerning the nature of our experience [i.e. the question φDo we 
perceive, or do we only deduce the existence of Things?’], we surely ought to examine the 
nature of the faculties by which we acquire experience, and reason concerning it [i.e. our 
experience and its objects or contents]. All metaphysical philosophy indeed is at last but an 
examination of our powers of knowledgeσand the different systems are best distinguished by 
their different accounts of these powersσin their obvious threefold division, [1.] our sensitive 
faculty, or the Senseσ2. our Understandingσ3. and our reason.12 
 
At this point in the entry, Coleridge sets out his intention to describe how the different 
systems of φmetaphysical philosophy’ attempt to explain the φnature of the faculties by 
which we acquire experience’ through the φexamination of our powers of knowledge’. 
However, Coleridge does not get much further than offering a critique of the Lockean 
theory of sensation, along with some definition of his own representation-terminology 
(which is clearly adapted from Kant) before the entry breaks off.13 But while the entry 
remains incomplete, Coleridge’s φthreefold division’ of the cognitive capacities, and his 
characterisation of φAll metaphysical philosophy’ as φat last but an examination of our 
powers of knowledge’, points forward to his later accounts of transcendental inquiry as a 
                                                 
9 CN.III.3605. 
10 Logic, 142. 
11 Logic, 145. 
12 CN.III.3605. 
13 See CN.III.3605, f119-117 (see LS, 100-114, esp. 113-4 for a later, and more complete, statement of 
Coleridge’s representation-terminology and some of his criticisms of Locke). 
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φcritical inquisition into the intellectual faculties’ that can be divided into φtranscendental 
[λ] Æsthetic, Logic, and Noetic’; this also anticipates his claims in Logic concerning the 
traditional tripartite division of the faculties into sense, understanding, and reason, and 
their corresponding pure cognitive contents (i.e. the evidence of sense, the evidence of 
understanding, and the evidence of reason).14 With this in mind, I want to turn now to a 
closer consideration of how Coleridge’s statements above on the φobvious threefold 
division’ of the faculties, and the ways in which φthe different systems [of philosophy] are 
best distinguished by their different accounts of these powers’, can be shown to inform 
Coleridge’s account of transcendental knowledge and its propadeutic function in Logic. 
In particular, I focus on Coleridge’s claims about the origins of pure or a priori cognitive 
content in our faculties, and on placing such claims in the context of his characterisation 
of transcendental inquiry as φa pre-inquisition into the mind [considered] as part Organ, 
part Constituent of all Knowledge’.15 
As we shall see (in 3.3), Coleridge contends that the φthreefold division’ of our 
cognitive capacities into reason, understanding, and sense is a traditional feature of the 
φexamination of our powers of knowledge’ that goes back to ancient Greek philosophy. 
It is tied to the viewσwhich Coleridge also presents as traditionalσthat certain kinds of 
nonempirical or a priori knowledge derive from the operations and contents of certain 
kinds of cognitive capacities. Coleridge introduces this view as φthe universally admitted 
and understood diversity of metaphysic [which he prefers to call, φthe science of noetics, 
more frequently, but less appropriately, entitled metaphysics’], logic and mathematics, 
and the convenience and exact correspondence of these to the three sources of the reason (ƭƯƵƲ), 
the understanding (ƫόƣƯƲ), and the sense (ƬάƨƧƳƧƲ)’.16 Coleridge claims that this tripartite 
division of our nonempirical knowledge and its sources is φpresented in a synoptic form’ 
by the following table of pure sciences (i.e. a priori fields of inquiry), where he also puts 
forward the more general distinction between φmetaphysical’ (a priori) and φphysical’ (a 
posteriori, especially sensory) evidence or cognitive content: 
 
Ƭƥƴά ƶƵƳƩƪά [metaphysics] 
AσNoetics = the evidence of reason[*] 
BσLogic = the evidence of the understanding 
CσMathematics = the evidence of sense 
                                                 
14 See CM.III.918-21, V.81-2; Logic, 34-7, 44-5, 205-6, 211-4, 236-8.  
15 CM.V.81. This point is also discussed further in 4.1-5 below. 
16 Logic, 70. Coleridge uses ƬάƨƧƳƧƲ in the same way as ƨƥƹƱία, to refer to the faculty of sense, or φthe 
intuitive power of the mind’ (see e.g. 34-6, 73-5ff, 245). See also 3.3 below. 
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ƶƵƳƩƪά [physics] 
DσEmpiric = evidence of the senses† 
Scholium. The senses = sense + sensation + impressions.17 
 
I explain further below what Coleridge means by φthe evidence’ of reason, understanding, 
and sense, and why he claims that we can trace this nonempirical cognitive content and 
the knowledge deriving from it back to its sources in our cognitive capacities  (see 4.1, 
4.3). As I will be arguing, Coleridge’s table of pure sciences must be considered in the 
context of (i) his distinction between the employment and the analysis or examination of 
our cognitive capacities (our φpowers of knowledge’), and (ii) Coleridge’s contention that 
a transcendental or φcritical inquisition into the intellectual faculties’ is required to explain 
fully how certain cognitive capacities contribute to our experience and cognition, and 
how these capacities make certain kinds of evidence (or cognitive content) possible. In 
Coleridge’s view, most philosophers take it for granted that the exercise or employment 
of the capacities traditionally designated as sense, understanding, and reason is what 
produces the various elements and contents that make up our cognition, and that this 
threefold division grounds the further distinctions between the nonempirical knowledge 
designated as mathematics, logic, and noetics.18 However, as we shall see, Coleridge also 
claims that the explanation of how the different kinds of a priori knowledge are possible, 
and of why they must be taken to derive from the operations and contents of certain 
cognitive capacities, has been successfully carried out, when attempted at all, by only a 
minority of philosophers. This is because, before the development of the transcendental 
method for φa pre-inquisition into the mind [considered] as part Organ, part Constituent 
of all Knowledge’ by Kant, no such explanation (proceeding through an analysis of our 
cognitive capacities or φpowers of knowledge’) would have been possible, at least on 
Coleridge’s account of the history of philosophy. In section 3.3 I will discuss Coleridge’s 
claims about the conception of the cognitive capacities held by (most) philosophers from 
the ancient to the early modern period, and on how Coleridge’s distinction between the 
employment and analysis of, or inquisition into, our cognitive capacities applies to this 
conception (and the faculty terminology in which it is expressed by those who hold it). 
In sections 3.4-4.5 I shall return to the question of how Coleridge’s interpretation of 
Kant’s transcendental inquiry into the elements of (sensible) cognition is informed by the 
                                                 
17 Logic, 44 and 44-5n. See also 33-6 for the scheme of faculties or powers summarised in this table. 
18 On this (according to Coleridge) traditional assumption esp. Logic, 34-7, 43-5, 69-70. 
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threefold division of the cognitive capacities and the employment/analysis distinction 
outlined above. Before taking up these problems, however, it will be useful to consider 
Coleridge’s table of the pure and empirical sciences in the context of his claims about the 
aims of transcendental inquiry, and in particular, in relation to Coleridge’s employment 
of the Kantian matter/form distinction. 
 
3.2 Transcendental Analysis & the Sources of Experience: Coleridge on the 
Formal & Material Elements of Cognition 
i. Coleridge on Transcendental Analysis: An Overview 
As was noted in sections 2.1-3, Coleridge’s endorsement of Kant’s conception of the 
transcendental is clear from the following claim in Logic, which appears in a passage that 
serves to introduce φthe terms which the most profound of modern logicians and the 
proper* inventor and founder of transcendental analysis has adopted’19: 
 
Transcendental knowledge is that by which we endeavour to climb above our experience into its 
sources by an analysis of our intellectual faculties, still, however, standing as it were on the 
shoulders of our experience in order to reach at truths which are above experience.20 
 
Accordingly, φthe science of transcendental analysis, [is] so called from the character of its 
aim and object, which is to rise from the knowledge or matter of consciousness to the faculty 
by which it is known or presented’.21 As Coleridge makes clear early in Logic, what he 
means by φtruths which are above experience’ is just the kind of knowledge or cognitive 
content which Kant claims must be taken to have an a priori origin because it could never 
be derived a posteriori from any sensory experience. Like Kant Coleridge believes that the 
methods of transcendental philosophy make it possible for us to distinguish between 
pure and empirical content in our representations (cognitive states) in this way, and that 
what this distinction turns on is the difference between the kind of φcontent of cognition’ 
which is φoriginally given a priori in ourselves’ and the kind that is given to us through our 
senses.22 Following this, Coleridge draws a further distinction between φmixed’ or 
empirical sciences (for which he uses the general term φphysics’) that have their sources 
in sensory experience (impressions from φthe objects of bodily sense’) and φpure’ or 
                                                 
19 148-9. In the footnote to this statement (indicated by the asterisk), Coleridge complains of those who 
claim that φKant stole the transcendental analysis’ on account of the superficial similarities between his 
philosophy and φa few scattered hints in some ancient or modern books’. 
20 Logic, 147. 
21 Logic, 248. 
22 See CPR, B81; Logic, 44-5, 70. 
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nonempirical sciences that have their sources in our intellectual faculties themselves (the 
φinherent forms and functions’ of our cognitive powers).23 Thus, empirical inquiries are 
concerned with evidence that is given a posteriori through the senses, while pure inquiries 
are concerned with evidence that is given a priori through some φact or product of the 
mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions from external objects’.24 In 
Coleridge’s view, then, the pure sciences concerned with such a priori representations are 
φcomprised in the term τmetaphysicsυ, as being above, or transcendental to, the physics’, 
because they are conceived φas having a higher evidence than that which the senses can 
afford’.25 Given that such higher evidence cannot be acquired empirically, the means to 
attaining transcendental knowledge must be a specialised pure φanalysis of our intellectual 
faculties’, whereby we arrive at the a priori sources of our experience (or so Coleridge 
claims).26 But as noted in 2.1-3, not all a priori evidence or cognitive content plays this 
role in transcendental philosophy. To see how Kant’s distinction between different kinds 
of a priori representations or cognitive content fits into Coleridge’s table of pure sciences, 
we must first take a closer look at Coleridge’s account of the diverse sources of different 
kinds of a priori and a posteriori evidence (or contents), which he frames in terms of the 
metaphysics/physics distinction just outlined. 
  
ii. Kant’s Matter/Form Distinction in Coleridge’s Logic 
A useful reference point here is Kant’s matter/form distinction, presented as follows in 
the opening passages of the Transcendental Aesthetic (I consider Kant’s claims here only 
with reference to Coleridge’s views on a priori origins): 
 
I call that in the appearance [i.e. the object of empirical intuition] which corresponds to 
sensation its matter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as 
ordered in certain relations I call the form of appearance. Since that within which the 
sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, 
                                                 
23 See Logic, 34-7, 44-5, 70, 146-7, 213-4. 
24 This is Coleridge’s definition of a priori at Logic, 76. For further discussion, see 2.1-3 above. 
25 Logic, 36 (my emphasis). Cf. 44 where φphysics’ is designated as an φEmpiric’ science concerned with φthe 
evidence of the senses’ (which are φ= sense + sensation + impressions’). Coleridge’s use of the term 
φtranscendental’ here can seem to imply that all a priori or metaphysical evidence yields transcendental 
knowledge. However, it is more likely that he is suggesting that these pure inquiries deal with the kinds of 
a priori principles that are required to explain the possibility of the empirical knowledge dealt with by the 
φnatural inquiries’ that Coleridge collectively terms φphysics’. It is in this sense that metaphysics is φabove, or 
transcendental to, the physics’ (see also 37-41). 
26 This, at any rate, is Coleridge and Kant’s view. See esp. Logic, 145-9 (cf. CPR, B74-82). 
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the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must all lie ready for it 
in the mind a priori, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation.27 
 
One way of looking at Coleridge’s separation of a priori and a posteriori evidence by origin 
is as a variation on Kant’s matter/form distinction. On the one hand, we have the 
metaphysical evidence φcontained’ in our faculties. This concerns the formal elements of 
cognition: the φinherent forms and functional powers’ that govern a cognitive capacity or 
the φpure products’ produced through the operation of this faculty which are given or 
φencountered in the mind a priori’.28 On the other, we have the physical or phenomenal 
evidence of the senses. This concerns the material elements of cognition: the empirically 
given φaffections’ upon which sense and understanding exercise their functions. So, the 
φevidence of sense’ refers to the form of pure intuition, φevidence of the senses’ to the 
matter of empirical or mixed intuition, the respective a priori and a posteriori elements of 
sensible intuition.29 The φevidence of understanding’ refers to the form of pure concepts, 
those a priori rules that make it possible for us to φgive and attribute substance and reality 
to phenomena and raise them from mere affections and appearances into objects 
communicable and capable of being anticipated and reasoned of’.30 Coleridge describes 
the relationship between the formal and material elements of cognition as follows: when 
the evidence (or matter) of the senses given a posteriori is φbrought under the [a priori] rules 
of the understanding [λ] and the [a priori] forms of sense [it] becomes experience’.31 
Coleridge’s conception of the formal and material elements of cognition is made further 
evident in his gloss on the distinction between the faculty of sense and the sensations: 
φthe sense or sentient faculty [λ] of course includes the sensations. When therefore we 
mean to abstract from the sensations we want a distinct term to express this intent, and 
we then call this faculty THE SENSE’.32 Thus, the evidence of sense is a priori because it is 
identifiable with the form and content which is contained or φencountered’ in this faculty 
and its pure representations when we φabstract from the sensations’, from the empirical 
content given a posteriori through the operations of this faculty (i.e. φthe evidence of the 
senses’). As he explains later, Coleridge holds that the a priori forms or rules of sense and 
understanding must be taken as φthe conditions that render experience itself possible’.33 
                                                 
27 CPR, B34-5 (cf. Coleridge’s statements at Logic, 111-2, 132-3, 139-43).  
28 Kant’s expression at B34-5; cf. Coleridge at Logic, 146-7, 213-4. 
29 Logic, 44 (cf. 12n, 111, 153-4ff). 
30 Logic, 239. 
31 Logic, 44n.  
32 Logic, 44, 154 (cf. Kant’s statements at CPR, B34-5ff). 
33 See Logic, 146-7. 
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What transcendental analysis seeks to demonstrate is that whatever may be given 
a posteriori, insofar as it is a possible object of sensory experience for beings with our 
cognitive constitution, is dependent on what is present in the mind a priori (the inherent 
forms or modes of our cognition) for its possibility and objectivity (for us). Further, 
whatever may be given a priori must in turn depend on (or be φgrounded in’) our 
subjective constitution itself.34 This is why Coleridge says that φthe aim and object’ of φthe 
science of transcendental analysis’ is φto rise from the knowledge or matter of consciousness 
to the faculty by which it is known or presented’.35 To rise from the content of some 
cognitive state to the faculty or cognitive power φby which it is known or presented’ 
involves showing (1) that such cognitive content, or certain of its fundamental features, 
must originate in the operations of this faculty, and thus (2) that the possibility of the 
former (being given) is in some way dependent on the nature and function of the latter.36 
To see how this goal relates to Coleridge’s views on a priori evidence and the various 
kinds of a priori cognitive content, we need to look a little more closely at his Kantian 
representation terminology, particularly insofar as it relates to what I have called the 
formal and material elements of our cognition and experience. As discussed further 
below, insofar as a priori evidence concerns the origin of certain kinds of representations 
and the ground(s) or condition(s) of the possibility of such pure cognitive states and 
their content, it may be taken to constitute or furnish what Kant calls φtranscendental 
representations’. But before looking at Coleridge’s account of transcendental knowledge-
claims about the sources and possibility of such a priori cognitive content in more detail, 
we must first consider why he distinguishes between various kinds of cognitive content 
according to their diverse origins. This will show the ways in which Coleridge’s emphasis 
on origins informs his distinctions between different kinds of a priori evidence, as well as 
his notions of what is formal and material in our cognition. 
In these earlier passages of Logic, Coleridge does not specify that transcendental 
representations constitute just one of the various possible kinds of a priori evidence or 
cognitive content. Rather, his principal purpose here is to emphasise that there are two 
                                                 
34 I discuss this claim further in 3.4, 4.3-4 below (cf. 2.1 above). Throughout I follow Pippin in holding 
that to refer to something (say, a form of mental activity) as φgrounding’ something else (say, a kind of 
representation or cognitive state) is just to say that the former is what is required to account for the latter 
(usually as the φground of its possibility’); see (1982), 9.   
35 Logic, 248. That Coleridge uses faculty as a term intended to refer specifically to some cognitive power, 
or capacity for a certain type of mental activity (such as intuiting, conceiving, or judging), is made clear at 
Logic, 9-12ff, 151-4ff, 239-40ff; cf. Kant’s remarks at CPR, B34-5. 
36 See Logic, 68-70, 145-7, 152-4, 211-4, 238-45. This is why Coleridge claims φthe knowledge of the 
constitution of the mental faculties forms the science of transcendental analysis’ (213), conceived as an 
φinvestigation into the constitution and constituent forms of [our mental faculties]’ (147). 
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basic classes of evidence or cognitive content that derive from two fundamentally 
different sources. That which has its origins a priori in the mind and gives our cognition 
its form, and that which has its origin a posteriori in something affecting or acting upon 
the mind from without and furnishes us with what Coleridge calls φthe contents or 
materials of [our] knowledge’ (i.e. the empirical sensory element or matter of cognition).37 
What serves to distinguish the formal from the material in our cognition, then, is their 
respective origin. This is why Coleridge claims that we should speak of the origins or 
sources of different kinds of representations or cognitive contents and what is a priori in 
them in terms of spatial metaphors or metaphors of φbirth-place’.38 What it means for the 
evidence (or content) given in different representations to have an a posteriori origin is just 
that it derives from those bodily sensations, impressions, and images that make up our 
sensory experience. What it means for such evidence to have an a priori origin is just that 
it derives from the acts and products of our intellectual faculties or cognitive powers, 
considered in abstraction from that which affects the mind from without by being given 
through the senses (as φimpressions from external objects’).39  
When we abstract from all empirically given material of cognition in this way, 
considering the acts or products of our faculties of sense and understanding without any 
reference to the a posteriori content of representations (especially sensible intuitions) given 
through the operations of these two cognitive capacities, we can acquire a transcendental 
conception of φpure sense’ and φpure understanding’.40 That is, Kant’s methods enable us 
to φobtain a notion’ of the φpure forms’ of our cognition and the a priori cognitive content 
(or pure products) arising from these forms.41 Transcendental analysis seeks hereby to 
prove not only that whatever can be given a posteriori as the material of cognition (in our 
sense-experience) must be conditioned or determined by a priori forms of cognition, but 
also that these a priori forms and the a priori evidence or cognitive content to which they 
give rise must originate in the φinherent forms and functions’ of our intellectual faculties. 
This is why, when considering our faculties from the transcendental perspective (as pure 
                                                 
37 Logic, 111. Coleridge adds that this φmaterial constitutes in fact what we mean by its [our knowledge, or 
rather some cognitive state or kind of cognitive content] relation or reference to the object’. 
38 In other words, the formal or a priori elements of our cognition must be traced back to the operation of 
certain cognitive powers (their origin in a particular faculty); they are not a kind of cognitive content that 
can be traced back in time to some originating sensory impression or idea (in the sense of an empirical 
representation), or that could ever be shown to be built up out of or derived from some collection of 
impressions or ideas (which could, in principle at least, be shown to have originated in, or been associated 
and connected with one another by, the subject at some particular moment, or sequence of times, in their 
experience). See e.g. Logic, 76, 139-47. See also 3.4, 4.1-2 below. 
39 See Logic, 76; cf. 215-24 (esp. 219-20). 
40 See Logic, 152-4, 227-8, 267. 
41 See Logic, 154; cf. 141-7, 211-4, 265-8. 
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cognitive powers without reference to their empirical aspects), we can talk of them as the 
φcondition and co-cause’ or φsources [of] our experience’.42  
 
iii. Kant’s Aesthetic & Logic: The Forms of Sense & Understanding in Coleridge’s Logic 
I will return to Coleridge’s account of the relationship between the formal and material 
elements of cognition in 3.3. For the moment, however, I focus on why Coleridge claims 
that transcendental analysis is concerned with determining what he calls the φsources’ of 
experience. According to Kant, φOur cognition arises from two fundamental sources in 
the mind’, the φtwo stems’ of φsensibility and understanding’. What Kant’s transcendental 
analysis of φthese two faculties or capacities’ aims to show is that these faculties φcontain 
a priori representations which constitute the condition under which objects are given to 
us’ (sensibility) and through which such objects are cognised or thought (understanding). 
It seeks to specify the rules that determine how objects must be given to us by means of 
intuition (φthe reception of representation’) and φthought in relation to that representation 
(as a mere determination of the mind)’ by means of concepts. This search operates on 
the assumption that φIntuitions and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our 
cognition’, which can φarise’ only through the φunification’ of the functions of our two 
fundamental cognitive φfaculties or capacities’. The elements of cognition furnished by 
sensibility and understanding are both φeither pure or empirical’; i.e. these elements can 
be considered either as a priori representations (or cognitive states43) abstracted from and 
taken to be independent of all sensation, or as a posteriori representations that φcontain’ 
sensation, the empirically given φmatter of sensible cognition’ which φpresupposes the 
actual presence of the object’. What Kant means by such a contrast between the φformal’ 
(a priori) and φmaterial’ (a posteriori) elements of cognition is further brought out by his 
claims that φpure intuition contains merely the form under which something is intuited, 
and pure concept only the form of thinking of an object in general’. While all our actual 
experience consists in both formal and material elements mixed together indiscriminately 
in the contents of our cognitive states (and cannot occur at all without some empirically 
given φmatter of sensible cognition’), transcendental philosophy provides us with a 
method for φisolating’ these pure a priori formal conditions. In fact, what it shows us is 
that some such set of conditions is necessary as the a priori principles of the possibility of 
any experience (and of the knowledge derived from such experience). But we must, Kant 
                                                 
42 Logic, 146-7. 
43 I follow Kitcher in occasionally rendering Kant’s Vorstellung as φcognitive state’ instead of the more 
traditional but rather less precise φrepresentation’; see (1990), 66. 
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asserts, be careful not to φmix up’ the φroles’ of sensibility and understanding in pursuit of 
such principles. Rather we must φseparate them carefully from each other and distinguish 
them’, and consequently must divide such transcendental or formal analyses of cognition 
into φthe science of the rules of sensibility in general, i.e., aesthetic [and] the science of 
the rules of understanding in general, i.e., logic’ (noting that such a system of aesthetic or 
logic may be regarded as transcendental only insofar as it is concerned with φour mode of 
cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori’).44 
In Logic Coleridge follows Kant’s division of his first Critique into an Aesthetic and 
Analytic (transcendental logic). He contends that φwe must subdivide [the transcendental 
analysis of cognition] into two kinds, each forming a distinct science’. The first branch is 
concerned with φthe universal forms of the pure sense and the knowledge [that] has been 
entitled τtranscendental aestheticυ,’ a term intended φto distinguish the faculty of sense 
itself abstractly from the sensations and from the modifications of the senses or organs 
of sense’.45 The second deals with φthe forms and functions of the understanding and the 
rules generalised from these’, and so φin analogy with the former is termed transcendental 
logic’.46 The aesthetic describes the a priori formal features of sensible intuition, those 
rules that determine the conditions under which objects are given to us (i.e. perceived as 
part of the spatiotemporally ordered manifold of sense). The analytic or logic describes 
the a priori formal features of sensible cognition, the rules that determine the conditions 
under which objects are thought.47 These φforms and functions’ together constitute what 
Coleridge calls the φprinciples of sense’ (i.e. space and time, as the pure forms of sensible 
intuition) and the φprinciples of understanding’ (i.e. Kant’s table of categories, as the pure 
forms of conception and judgement).48 On Coleridge’s view, these pure or a priori forms 
and contents should be taken to consist in 
 
[T]he constitutive forms, or constitutional acts and functions, of the SENSE and of the 
understanding, with the several products [or contents] of these [acts, forms, and functions], as far 
                                                 
44 All quotations from CPR, B25, B29-30, B74-6 (cf. Coleridge at Logic, 146-55). 
45 Logic, 146. 
46 ibid., 147-8. 
47 As Coleridge recognises at Logic, 263, Kant allows for the possibility of sensible intuitions which are not 
brought under the categories and so form little more than a φchaos’ of disorderly sense impressions, but 
does not think there could be any sensible cognition without an object being given through sensibility (i.e., 
the categories necessarily remain φempty’ without a manifold of sensory objects to which they could be 
applied: there can be no cognition without some relation to an object). See CPR, B151-2. 
48 Logic, 237-8. 
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as they are producible a priori: viz. the pure intuitions of the one [i.e. the sense] and the self-
derived notions and conceptions of the other [i.e. understanding].49 
 
As we have seen, Coleridge contends that transcendental knowledge must derive from 
φan analysis of the intellectual faculties’. This is why he claims that φthe knowledge of the 
constitution of the mental faculties forms the science of transcendental analysis’: it is an 
φinvestigation into the constitution and constituent forms’ of the cognitive powers or 
faculties, which is divided into φthe transcendental aesthetic, or analysis of the pure sense’ 
and φthe transcendental logic or analysis of the pure understanding’.50 It is such analyses 
of the faculties that allow us to determine their φconstitutive forms, or constitutional acts 
and functions’, and it is our claims about how such forms, acts, and functions together 
constitute φthe conditions that render experience itself possible’ that yield transcendental 
knowledge.51 The finer details of Coleridge’s account of φthe constitution and constituent 
forms’ of the cognitive faculties, and the conditions of the possibility of experience, will 
not concern us here (this is discussed more fully in 3.4 and 4.3-5). For the remainder of 
this section I focus on (1) how Coleridge’s act-product terminology relates to his notions 
of a priori form and content, and on (2) how Coleridge’s interpretation of transcendental 
analysis is related to his conception of the special kind of pure cognitive content that he 
terms φa priori evidence’.52 But first, a little more needs to be said about the ways in which 
Coleridge differs from Kant on questions regarding the sources of human cognition, and 
especially the role of reason in contributing to cognition, in the context of the account of 
transcendental analysis outlined above. 
 
iv. Transcendental Dialectic vs. Transcendental Noetic: Coleridge’s Departure from Kant 
As we have just seen, Kant claims that φOur cognition arises from two fundamental 
sources in the mind’, the φtwo stems’ of φsensibility and understanding’, with the corollary 
that φIntuitions and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition’.53 In 
Coleridge’s view, however, we must reject the first statement and modify the second: this 
is because (i) Coleridge holds that, in addition to sense and understanding, reason should 
be recognised as one of the φfundamental sources’ from which our cognition arises, and 
(ii) while Coleridge would agree that φIntuitions and concepts therefore constitute all the 
                                                 
49 Logic, 213. 
50 Logic, 213; cf. 146-9. 
51 See Logic, 146-7. 
52 Coleridge introduces this term at LS, 104; cf. Logic, 44-5, 211-4. See also, 3.3 and 4.1-2 below. 
53 See CPR, B25, B29-30, B74-6. 
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elements of our cognition’, he holds that along with sensible intuitions and concepts, our 
cognition also involves intellectual or spiritual intuitions (although only in certain special 
cases, rather than as regular features of our sense-experience and discursive cognition).54 
Thus, although Coleridge does not disagree with Kant that reason is a cognitive capacity 
that we employ when making inferences, or attempting to systematise our knowledge, he 
does think that Kant is wrong to deny the possibility of intellectual intuition, and to limit 
human reason to knowledge of sensible objects. Indeed, Coleridge goes so far as to claim 
that the constraints Kant imposes on reason’s epistemic grasp in the first Critique, as well 
as the philosophical errors that Kant attributes to human reason’s tendency to overreach 
and deceive itself in Transcendental Dialectic, should be reassigned to the understanding. 
Coleridge phrases this revision of the scope of the first Critique as follows: 
 
in Kant’s Critique of the Pure Reason there is more than one fundamental error; but the main 
fault lies in the Title page, which to the manifold advantage of the Work might be exchanged 
forσAn Inquisition respecting the constitution and limits of the Human Understanding.55 
 
What Coleridge means here is that, insofar as the arguments of Kant’s Critique are limited 
to claims about the conditions and limits of human sensory and discursive cognition (i.e. 
to the analysis of the rules or forms of sense and understanding), it is correct. Where φthe 
Title page’ goes wrong, however, is in implying that such an analysis of cognition has any 
application to reason. This is because, in Coleridge’s view, although the limits of sensory 
experience and discursive cognition are a consequence of φthe constitution or constituent 
forms’ of sense and understanding, as Kant contends, such limits have no bearing on the 
possibility of our cognition of non-sensible or intelligible objects (e.g. the Ideas). Rather, 
all that is proved by the limits of cognition determined by Kant’s transcendental aesthetic 
and logic is that sense and understanding are not appropriately constituted for cognising 
or apprehending such noumenal objects and principles.56 This is why Coleridge, contrary 
to Kant, thinks that a φtranscendental noetic’, or account of how the non-sensible objects 
of cognition intellectual intuited through the employment of reason are possible (proving 
in turn that speculative metaphysics or noetics is possible), is an achievable goal.  
 We can get a clearer sense of Coleridge’s position here by briefly considering the 
alternative solution to Kant’s Antinomies that he proposes in a footnote in Logic. Rather 
                                                 
54
 See e.g. Logic, 33-6, 43-5, 146-9, 236-8. This is discussed further in 3.3 and 4.1-5. 
55 CL.V.421. Cf. Logic, 139-40n, 205-6. 
56 See e.g. Logic, 154-5, 172-3. This point is discussed further in 4.4-5. 
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than accepting that speculative knowledge of the super-sensible realm, or of the answers 
to certain philosophical questions, is not a possible object of human cognition, Coleridge 
contends that such things could only be said to be unknowable in the sense that they φdo 
not fall under [the] cognisance’ of the human understanding (conceived as a capacity for 
discursive or conceptual knowledge, especially of sensible objects): 
 
When from two premises, both of which are affirmed with equal right by the understanding, 
the understanding itself by legitimate deductions can arrive at two contradictory conclusions, 
the only possible solution of the difficulty is found in assuming that the understanding has 
been applying its own forms, or those which it has borrowed from the sense, to objects which 
do not fall under its cognisance; as when, for instance, the understanding applies the forms of 
space and time, of quantity, quality, and relation, to the idea of the Supreme Being, or of things 
themselves as contradistinguished from the phenomena.57 
 
In short, Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic does not show that φcontradictory conclusions’ 
of this kind compel us to accept certain limitations to human knowledge, or to recognise 
that certain philosophical questions cannot be decisively answered (or have no validity or 
significance, given such limitations on our knowledge). Rather, it shows only that human 
understanding is not appropriately constituted to acquire anything other than a φnegative’ 
knowledge of non-sensible or noumenal objects, such as φthe idea of the Supreme Being, 
or of things themselves as contradistinguished from phenomena’: 
 
In these cases, I say that the understanding is indirectly and by negation the organ of the 
reason, and the exercise of logic for this purpose by the understanding to prove the inadequacy 
of the understanding [for the apprehension of non- or super-sensible objects, e.g. φthe eternal 
verities of Plato and Descartes’] constitutes the Platonic dialectic which the divine philosopher 
calls the wings by which philosophy first raises herself from the ground.58 
 
For Coleridge, this has the further consequence that the Ideas of reason are constitutive 
rather than merely regulative, so that what he calls φnoetics’ or φthe logic of ideas and first 
principles’ remains a realisable philosophical aim, even if we accept Kantian claims about 
the limits of sensory cognition. Curiously, then, while Coleridge departs from Kant when 
it comes to the Platonic conception of reason, which he shares with Descartes, Spinoza, 
                                                 
57 Logic, 139-40n. Cf. Friend.I.155-7ff; LS, 59-61. 
58 Logic, 140n. The interpolated reference to φeternal verities’ is from Friend.I.177n. For further discussion 
of Coleridge’s view on reason and the ideas, see 4.3-5. On the φnegative insight’ into the possibility of non-
sensible objects of cognition provided by transcendental analysis, see Logic, 154-5, 172-3. 
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and the Cambridge Platonists, as a special kind of cognitive capacity which enables us to 
acquire intuitive and certain knowledge of non- or super-sensible things, he nevertheless 
maintains that the account of human cognition offered by such early modern rationalists 
must be critically reassessed in light of Kantian transcendental analysis.59 As we shall see, 
this is partly because Coleridge thinks that Kant’s transcendental method can be applied 
to reason, provided that we bear in mind that reason is not subject to the limits to which 
Kant confines it in the first Critique. I will return to these issues in 3.4 and 4.1-5, where I 
discuss their relation to Coleridge’s conception of Ideas as the forms of reason.60 In what 
remains of this section, I focus only on Coleridge’s account of a priori forms and content 
insofar as it applies to his characterisation of the forms of sense and understanding. 
 
v. A Priori Form & Content: Coleridge’s Act-Product Terminology 
We are now better placed to see how terms like φform’ and φcontent’ apply in contexts 
where Coleridge is discussing the nature of the a priori. If Coleridge is speaking of some 
act or operation of the mind itself considered as distinct from sensory impressions from 
external objects, what he means is an a priori form. If he is speaking of some product of 
the mind itself (taken to be produced by such activity or grounded in such form), what 
Coleridge means is an a priori content. Thus, if we take space and time to be the acts, or 
the modes of activity, of (pure) sense, we can speak of them as a priori forms of sensible 
intuition. If we take the categories to be the acts, or the modes of activity, of (pure) 
understanding, we can speak of them as a priori forms of the understanding (and thus of 
all discursive cognition). The pure intuitions produced by, or grounded in, our forms of 
sense are, on this account, a kind of pure or a priori cognitive content. Likewise, the pure 
concepts produced by, or grounded in, the forms of understanding are a kind of pure or 
a priori cognitive content. If space and time are acts or forms of the mind, then pure 
intuitions are products of this mental activity or form. Likewise, if the categories are acts 
or forms of the mind, then pure concepts are products of this mental activity or form.61 
Interpreted in this way Coleridge’s act-product terminology also helps to dissipate some 
of the ambiguities in Kant’s employment of terms such as φrepresentation’, φintuition’, 
and φconcept’, which in some cases seem to refer both to the mental acts of representing, 
intuiting, and conceiving and to the cognitive contents (representations, intuitions, and 
                                                 
59 On this conception of reason, see e.g. Bedford (1979), 71-2ff. 
60 See e.g. LS, 61n: φReason, in the highest sense of the term [λ] is the Source of Ideas and conversely, an 
Idea is a self-affirming truth [λ], which the Reason presents to itself, as a from of itself (cf. Logic, 211-2, 
237-8 on Ideas as the φprinciples of reason’).  
61 Coleridge makes this clear at e.g. Logic, 233-8, 256ff, 263-5ff.  
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concepts) produced by, or given through, such mental operations or modes of cognitive 
activity.62 So, while Coleridge uses this Kantian representation-terminology in much the 
same way, when he talks of the φforms’, φfunctions’, or φacts’ of a given cognitive faculty, 
he should be taken to be referring only to the cognitive operations in which the exercise 
of the faculty is held to consist. Likewise, when he talks of the φproducts’, φcontents’, or 
φmaterials’ of a given cognitive faculty, Coleridge should be taken to be referring only to 
the cognitive contents that the operations of the faculty (conceived as a capacity, or as a 
mode of cognitive activity) are held to produce or present to the mind.63 
I will discuss how Coleridge conceives of the complex relations between form 
and content, in the context of his interpretation of the Kantian a priori, in sections 3.4- 
4.5.64 For now it is enough to note (i) that Coleridge thinks of a priori form as a kind of 
form that is grounded in, or originates from, an act or operation of φthe mind itself 
considered as distinct from the [sensory] impressions from external objects’, and (ii) that 
Coleridge thinks of a priori content as the kind of content that is the product of such acts 
or operations (also considered in abstraction from all sensory impressions or empirically 
given cognitive content). It should be noted, too, that while Coleridge takes a priori forms 
or acts to produce (or ground) a priori contents or products, he also thinks of such pure 
forms as the kinds of things that can themselves be contemplated as contents, or objects, 
of our cognitive states. This is why Coleridge employs terms like φform’ and φformal’ not 
only to characterise the a priori features of certain modes of cognitive activity, but also to 
describe the a priori features of certain kinds of cognitive content (with these forms or 
modes of cognitive activity taken as things that can also be considered as such content).65 
Put in slightly different terms, this means that, on Coleridge’s view, we can speak of pure 
intuitions and pure concepts as both (a) forms or acts and (b) contents or products of the 
mind, considering them in such different (but interconnected) guises depending on the 
context (see 2.3). 66 With this in mind, we can return to Coleridge’s account of the nature 
of the special kind of cognitive content that he calls φa priori evidence’.  
 Given that there has already been frequent allusion to Coleridge’s concept of a 
priori evidence in the above section, it will be useful, briefly, to say a little more about 
what in Coleridge’s view makes the content of our pure representations, and whatever 
                                                 
62 On this ambiguity in Kant’s representation-terminology, see Kitcher, (1990), 36ff (she uses the terms 
φprocess form’ and φproduct form’ to make the act/product distinction). 
63 See e.g. Logic, 73-6, 151-4ff, 211-4, 265-6n. 
64 See e.g. Logic, 132-3, 215-24. 
65 See e.g. Logic, 73-6, 132-3, 237-8. 
66 Coleridge’s most detailed account of how certain a priori forms (particularly mathematical rules) can be 
contemplated as a kind of pure cognitive content is at Logic, 73-5 (cf. 215-24). 
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knowledge we may derive from such content, a priori. For apart from the origin of all 
such content in sources that are supposedly φindependent of all experience and even of 
all impressions of the senses’, or whatever may be given empirically,67 there are some 
other important features of a priori evidence emphasised by Coleridge in Logic. I will 
outline these here, and then offer more a detailed account in sections 4.1-5, which will 
focus on how Coleridge’s account of a priori evidence relates to the special class of a priori 
knowledge Kant claims we can derive from transcendental representations.68 As noted in 
section 2.1 Coleridge follows Kant’s reworking of traditional notions of the a priori. He 
takes the term φa priori’ to refer to the logical form of propositions that can be proven 
independently of or without reference to experience (especially knowledge-claims or 
judgements taken to be universal and necessary), as well as to the nature and origins of 
certain invariant features of sensible cognition and experience that are taken to have a 
special status. Coleridge brings together these aspects of the a priori, taken as that which 
is universal, necessary, and invariant in all cognition and experience, by describing it as 
consisting in φpermanent relations’. In Coleridge’s terms, the a priori cognitive content 
with which logic deals are φthe permanent relations in conceptions’ (pure concepts), 
while geometry and algebra are respectively concerned with φthe permanent relations of 
space and time’ (pure intuitions). Here φpermanent relation’ stands for some a priori 
representation or cognition. What makes the a priori φpermanent’ in Coleridge’s sense is 
that this cognitive content has the logical form of propositions or knowledge-claims that 
purport to be universal and necessary: unlike a contingent fact or empirical claim, once 
properly established the a priori is not subject to any possible revisions.69 It is precisely 
such claims to φpermanence’ that distinguish the formal or a priori elements of our 
cognition from the material elements derived a posteriori. 
Along with the above emphasis on the a priori cognitive content given in pure 
representations as concerning φthe necessary, the permanent, the universal, or the truths 
having these attributes’,70 Coleridge emphasises a further aspect of the a priori: its relation 
to our notions of possibility and probability, particularly as conditions governing certain 
kinds of knowledge-claims or truths. Thus, in The Statesman’s Manual, Coleridge develops 
a concept of a priori knowledge as whatever may be known as φa fact probable in itself’, in 
the sense of a truth which φthe mind determines [from] its logical possibility’ alone. What 
                                                 
67 As discussed in 2.1, this is Kant’s view (see esp. CPR, B25), and is clearly endorsed by Coleridge in Logic 
(see esp. 145-7 and 212: φall means and materials a posteriori are excluded from the problem’). 
68 On this distinction, see Kant’s claims at CPR, B25, 81-2. See also 2.1-3 above. 
69 See 43, 146-7, 211-2, 219-20. 
70 Logic, 40. 
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he means by φlogical possibility’ here is the conditions that determine what can be 
φadmitted by Reason as possible, as involving no contradiction to the universal forms (or 
laws) of Thought, [or] no incompatibility in the terms of the proposition’. Coleridge then 
goes on to remark that all φdetermination on this head belongs exclusively to the science 
of Metaphysics’, and that insofar as anything may be thus determined independently of 
what is given a posteriori, its logical possibility or φprobability in itself’ is what φconstitutes 
its presumptive proof, or the evidence a priori’.71 As was noted earlier, φmetaphysics’ is 
Coleridge’s blanket term for the pure (nonempirical) sciences which are concerned with 
φa higher evidence than that which the senses can afford, or which can belong to objects 
of the bodily sense considered as matters of fact’72 (i.e. a priori evidence) and the 
knowledge we can derive from it. One of my principal aims throughout will be to show 
that Coleridge conceives of such φuniversal forms (or laws) of Thought’ and the cognitive 
content deriving from them as a priori, and takes transcendental analysis to provide us 
with the philosophical method for tracing such a priori forms and content back to their 
origin in φthe constitution and constituent forms of [φthe mental faculties’]’.73 In sections 
4.1-5, I consider how Coleridge distinguishes between transcendental representations 
and other kinds of a priori evidence in attempting to account for the origin of our pure 
representations, as well as between the a priori form(s) and content that has its source in 
our cognitive powers and that which originates from somewhere other than within the 
human mind. But to provide a broader conceptual context for this discussion, we first 
need to consider some of Coleridge’s claims about the cognitive powers, their content(s), 
and their relation to sensory experience and cognition in further detail. 
 
3.3 Coleridge on Ancient Greek Faculty Terminology: The Threefold Division of 
the Cognitive Powers, their Contents, & their relation to Experience 
i. Coleridge’s Kantian Reading of Ancient Greek Faculty Terminology 
To get a better sense of what Coleridge’s formal/material elements distinction (see 3.2) 
involves, we will need to turn to the more detailed statements on cognitive operations 
and contents which Coleridge claims are φpresented in a synoptic form’ in the table of 
pure sciences that was introduced above (in 3.1).74 This will also help to make clearer the 
                                                 
71 See LS, 104. Here we can see that Coleridge follows Kant definition of the a priori as that which can be 
φcognised from its mere possibility alone’ (see SWF.I.690, where Coleridge quotes this definition from 
Kant, MFNS, 16, and discusses the relation of the a priori to the faculties). 
72 Logic, 36. 
73 See Logic, 146-7, 212-4. 
74 Logic, 70. 
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historical and intellectual context in which Coleridge’s table, and its relation to his 
interpretation of transcendental philosophy, should be considered. In the introductory 
sections of Logic where the table of pure sciences is first introduced, Coleridge claims 
that the threefold division of our cognitive faculties or powers into φthe reason (ƭƯƵƲ), the 
understanding (ƫόƣƯƲ), and the sense ([ƨƥƹƱία])’ and their respective a priori contents can 
be φdated from the formation of the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, under the 
immediate successors of Alexander and principally in Egypt’.75 In particular, Coleridge 
has in mind here the Academicians Speusippus and Polemo, and the Peripatetic 
Theophrastus, as the ancient philosophers who established φthe full formation of th[is] 
terminology’ (all are either quoted or referred to at various points in Logic, in the context 
of terminological discussions of the faculties and their contents and operations).76 As 
Coleridge goes on to point out, while the Platonists and Aristotelians of this period 
φdiffered indeed materially’ on many points, they shared a conception of the nature of the 
intellectual capacity designated as φƫόƣƯƲ’, and its relation to the sensory capacity 
designated as φƨƥƹƱία’ and the φtranscendent’ intellectual power termed φƭƯƵƲ’.77 His 
historical account of the development of faculty terminology is significant for our 
purposes because it helps to show Coleridge’s sense of the continuities between his own 
Kantian representation terminology, the early modern faculty terminology with which he 
assumes his readers to be familiar, and the much earlier definitions of the faculties and 
their contents that Coleridge presents as being a standard feature of ancient Greek 
philosophical terminology. As we will see later (in 4.1-2), placing Coleridge’s table in this 
context will also help to show what Coleridge considers to be the major advances of 
Kantian transcendental philosophy, and which aspects of transcendental inquiry he 
thinks were partly anticipated by Kant’s ancient and early modern predecessors. In the 
next few passages, I focus only on the definitions of the faculties and characterisations of 
their contents which Coleridge summarises in his table of pure sciences. 
 According to Coleridge, the faculty terminology that came to be widely adopted 
following φthe formation of the Platonic and Aristotelian schools’ was intended not only 
                                                 
75 Logic, 32. The clause φprincipally in Egypt’ suggests that Coleridge could be thinking of Alexandrian 
philosophers like Ammonias Saccas, Plotinus, and Porphyry. However, his reference to φthe immediate 
successors of Alexander’ makes this chronologically improbable. Moreover, while Coleridge mentions 
these philosophers (particularly Plotinus) elsewhere, at this point of the Logic MS, the only member of a 
Platonic or Aristotelian school he mentions is Speusippus, which makes chronological (if not geographical) 
sense. This suggests that either φimmediate’ or φEgypt’ is a transcription error. 
76 Logic, 32. For mentions of Speusippus (c. 408 ς 339/8 BC), see 33 (on ƫόƣƯƲ and ƭƯƵƲ), 146 (on 
sensation); for Polemo (d. 270/269 BC), see 146, 148 (on ƨƥƹƱία or αƩƳƨƧƳƩƲ and ƫόƣƯƲ); for Theophrastus 
(c. 371 ς c. 287 BC), see 204 (on ƭƯƵƲ). 
77 See Logic, 33-4. 
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to facilitate a clearer distinction between different kinds of cognitive faculties or powers 
and their contents, but also to indicate the different ways of considering these faculties 
and the relations between them. To illustrate this point, Coleridge presents an overview 
of the sense in which the term φƫόƣƯƲ’ was employed at the time, in order to signify three 
different ways of thinking about the mind and its capacities. In each case Coleridge 
provides English equivalents to indicate how these different uses of φƫόƣƯƲ’ would be 
expressed in more contemporary faculty terminology: 
 
At this time the substantive ƫόƣƯƲ, we have said, acquired a new sense, and was employed to 
express the intelligential faculty itself and this in a threefold relation: first it signified the logical 
faculty, the reasoning power, in short the understanding including the judgment, in distinction 
from the ƭƯƵƲ or reason.78 
 
As Coleridge will go on to explain, this φthreefold relation’ serves to designate a range of 
different mental abilities and the various disciplines associated with these cognitive 
functions. In this passage ƫόƣƯƲ or the understanding is described as φthe logical faculty’ 
or φreasoning power’ which consists in the capacity to judge because judgement is the 
basic cognitive function from which logical knowledge derives (this has the corollary that 
logical theory must be a theory of the rules governing epistemic judgements, and must 
consist in rules derived from φthe laws and constitution of the understanding itself’).79 In 
this context, ƫόƣƯƲ is distinguished from φthe ƭƯƵƲ or reason’ to show that while it is our 
φreasoning power’, by which Coleridge means a capacity for discursive cognitive activities 
like making epistemic judgements or analysing propositions, it is a faculty that performs 
a class of cognitive functions very different from those of reason itself (i.e. the acts of 
ƫόƣƯƲ produce a different kind of cognitive content to the acts of ƭƯƵƲ, so that insofar as 
the activity designated as φreasoning’ involves the employment of ƫόƣƯƲ or 
understanding, it should be considered as something distinct from the activities that 
involve the employment of ƭƯƵƲ or reason, such as noesis or intellectual intuition).80 The 
reason for such a distinction, grounded in the view that different cognitive faculties 
produce or contain different kinds of cognitive content, becomes further apparent when 
                                                 
78 Logic, 33-4. 
79 See e.g. Logic, 5-6, 37, 51-2, 213-4. According to Pippin (1982) φKant’s [λ] view of logic is entirely 
intensional. For him, clearly, logic was a logic of judgments, not propositions, a logic of the relations 
between concepts or between judgments, not an extensional logic, capable for example of formally 
defining truth functional relations between propositions’ (94). Coleridge follows Kant in taking judgment 
as the focus of his logical theory, so I take the same point to apply to Coleridge’s position.  
80 On this distinction, see e.g. Logic, 33-4, 68-70, 237-8. 
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Coleridge turns to the second aspect of the φthreefold relation’ in terms of which the 
ƫόƣƯƲ and its functions can be considered: 
  
Secondly it [i.e. ƫόƣƯƲ] signified the understanding, as the discursive faculty, or that which 
employed itself on the conceptions of the mind and the general terms representing them, in 
distinction from the intuition, or intuitive power of the mind, as employed on the forms of 
perception in time and space, that is number and figure: but in both instances, with abstraction 
from all that is furnished from without, of all that does not belong to the mind of its own 
right. Here the ƫόƣƯƲ is distinguished from ƨƥƹƱία, as the understanding from the sense, and of 
course distinguished as from its equal and collateral.81 
 
In this passage ƫόƣƯƲ is distinguished both in terms of the kind of cognitive functions it 
performs (i.e. the way it is employed or exercised) and the kind of cognitive content that 
it is φemployed on’ (i.e. the representations or cognitive states that are apprehended 
through the exercise of this faculty). Thus, what separates ƫόƣƯƲ from ƨƥƹƱία is its 
discursive functions, as an intellectual faculty the exercise of which produces φa 
knowledge by means of conceptions’, and its conceptual contents, φas the source of 
discursive knowledge’.82 What separates the ƨƥƹƱία from ƫόƣƯƲ is its intuitive functions, as 
a sensory faculty the exercise of which produces temporal and spatial intuitions (and the 
arithmetical and geometrical knowledge deriving from these intuitions), and its intuitively 
given sensory contents, as φthe birth-place of intuitions’ or φsource and faculty of intuitions 
and perceptions’ and φthe source of intuitive knowledge’.83 From a terminological 
standpoint, what ƫόƣƯƲ and ƨƥƹƱία share is that they serve to designate our discursive 
intellectual faculty and our intuitive sensory faculty considered in φabstraction from all 
that is furnished from without [i.e. sense φimpressions from external objects’], of all that 
does not belong to the mind of its own right’.84 In other words, these terms were 
employed by ancient philosophers to indicate the pure operations and contents of these 
faculties that are taken to have an a priori origin. This is what it means for these 
                                                 
81 Logic, 34.  
82 These are Coleridge’s definitions of φdiscursive’ at Logic, 247-8. 
83 See Logic, 68, 154, 247 for these definitions. In this context, Coleridge uses φintuitive knowledge’ to 
designate the kind of cognitions that derive from intuitively given cognitive content, but which can also 
involve discursive processes and conceptual content. For instance, Coleridge holds that our geometrical 
knowledge is intuitive in the sense that it is (i) self-evident and (ii) grounded in spatial intuitions, but is 
discursively acquired insofar as it requires the application of mathematical concepts (see 221-4).  
84 See Logic, 12n, 76-7, 132-3, 263-6 for this notion of what is φfurnished from without’. 
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operations and contents to φbelong to the mind of its own right’.85 Coleridge adds that 
φthe ƫόƣƯƲ is distinguished from ƨƥƹƱία, as the understanding from the sense’ to show 
that these early Greek definitions of the faculties and their operations and contents can 
be understood in the same terms as early modern faculty terminology. Indeed, his own 
use of evidently Kantian faculty terminology in describing the conceptions of ƨƥƹƱία, 
and its spatial and temporal intuitions or φforms of perception’, held by ancient Platonic 
and Aristotelian philosophers further underlines Coleridge’s sense of this continuity in 
faculty terminology and its theoretical purposes across the centuries.86  
 What Coleridge means here by characterising ƫόƣƯƲ and ƨƥƹƱία, or sense and 
understanding as φequal and collateral’, and as faculties the operations and contents of 
which can be considered φwith abstraction from all that is furnished from without’, is 
explained in more detail in his subsequent account of the third aspect of the φthreefold 
relation’ of ƫόƣƯƲ. In these passages Coleridge returns again to the reasons for making a 
sharp distinction between ƫόƣƯƲ and ƭƯƵƲ: 
 
Thirdly the ƫόƣƯƲ was used in a somewhat larger sense, as the mind or intellective power ab 
stractedly from the ƭƯƵƲ or pure reason, as the supposed identity of the intellectio [intellect] and 
the intelligibile [intelligible]; from the reason, I say, as at once the light of the mind and its 
highest object, and no less in abstraction from the sensations and impressions, as far as the 
conditions, causes, and materials of these were found in the body or though its medium.87 
 
Here Coleridge is again emphasising the view that while ƫόƣƯƲ and ƭƯƵƲ both perform 
intellectual (rather than sensory) functions, they must be considered as distinct 
φintellective power[s]’. Coleridge expands on this point in the next sentence, remarking 
that while ƭƯƵƲ, ƫόƣƯƲ, and ƨƥƹƱία and their pure operations and contents can be 
considered φin abstraction from the sensations and impressions’, there is still a distinction 
to be drawn between the nonempirical knowledge deriving from ƫόƣƯƲ, and ƨƥƹƱία and 
that which derives from ƭƯƵƲ, taken as φthe light of the mind and its highest object’: 
 
                                                 
85 See also Logic, 39-41, 42-4, 76-7. At 40-1 Coleridge claims that Pythagoras was the first philosopher who 
φinquired what the subjective [i.e. the mind] could effect by its own powers, by reflection on its own acts 
and the products of those acts, for and within its own sphere’, and thereby discovered φa truth, permanent, 
necessary, raised above all accident and change, [which] had flashed upon him in a geometrical 
contemplation’ (i.e. Pythagoras discovered the a priori/a posteriori distinction). 
86 For Coleridge’s earliest claims about how this conception of the φOriginal Faculties & Tendencies of the 
Mind’ goes back to ancient Greek philosophy, see CL.II.679ff (Mar 1802). Cf. Logic, 233n. 
87 Logic, 34. 
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The knowledge derived from the latter sources [i.e. φthe sensations and impressions’], was 
considered as fluctuating below the formal sciences [i.e. logic and mathematics]; in our present 
use of words, it was merely empirical [λ], but which, when reduced under the forms or 
inherent rules of the understanding, was capable of being elevated into experience and of 
becoming the substitute, and often the indispensable substitute, of the permanent truths of 
pure reason, that is, in all those numberless cases [λ] where we must accept the probable in all 
its degrees, in lieu of the certain.88 
 
Coleridge’s claim here is that the ancient philosophers under consideration drew a 
distinction between two different kinds of non-contingent truth and two different kinds 
of objective (i.e. intersubjectively valid) knowledge, depending on whether these derived 
from ƫόƣƯƲ and ƨƥƹƱία or from ƭƯƵƲ. He is not only contrasting contingent or φmerely 
empirical’ knowledge with formal (i.e. logical and mathematical) knowledge, but also 
making a further distinction between such formal knowledge (taken to derive from the 
forms or φinherent rules’ of sense and understanding) and φthe permanent truths of the 
pure reason’. He is also alluding to the role of the φinherent rules of the understanding’ in 
rendering empirical knowledge objective or intersubjectively valid.  
What it means, in this context, for empirically given sensory cognitive content 
(i.e. φthe sensations and impressions, as far as the conditions, causes, and materials of 
these were found in the body or though its medium’) to be φcapable of being elevated 
into experience [λ] when reduced under the forms or inherent rules of the 
understanding’ is that subjecting such contents to these non-contingent rules is what 
enables it to become an objective cognition. Coleridge summarises this claim in the 
footnote to his table of pure and empirical sciences which states that the φevidence of the 
senses’ only φbecomes experience’ when it is φbrought under the rules of the 
understanding [λ] and the forms of sense (= intuitus puri)’.89 Since the forms of sense and 
understanding are φwhat all human subjects possess in common by necessity of their 
constitution’, this is a process that yields φImages [i.e. appearances] which all men having 
                                                 
88 Logic, 34. It should be noted that for Coleridge φthe forms of perception in space and time’ constitute the 
a priori content of the faculty of sense (the φevidence of sense’), while φthe sensations and impressions’ 
constitute the a posteriori content or data of the bodily senses (the φevidence of the senses’). Coleridge 
claims that the employment of such terminology φto distinguish the faculty of sense itself abstractedly from 
the sensations and from the modifications of the senses or organs of sense’ may be traced to φPolemo, the 
successor of Speusippus, who succeeded Plato, the great founder of the Academic School’ (see 146; cf. 34, 
45, 154 for distinction between φevidence of sense’ and φevidence of the senses’). 
89 Logic, 44n. This all looks rather Kantian, of course. However, Coleridge’s position in these passages 
appears to be that many ancient philosophers held a similar view of the nature of experience, and 
especially objective cognition (but cf. 148-9n, where Coleridge makes clear his view that, regardless of the 
φfew scattered hints in some ancient or modern books’, it is Kant who φfirst saw and communicated the 
truths [of the transcendental analysis of cognition] in their full extent’). 
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their right faculties under the same given circumstances are capable of receiving’: those 
φappearances that belong to mankind generally and constitute the common world of the 
senses and which under the name phaenomena we distinguish from appearances that result 
from accidents and peculiarities of the individual subject’.90 It is this φcommon world of 
the senses’ which constitutes φexperience’ in Coleridge’s sense of the term. We can know 
that such sensible cognition is intersubjectively valid because we know that the a posteriori 
content from which it derives is conditioned by non-contingent rules or principles that 
are φuniversally and permanently subjective, that is, what all human subjects possess in 
common by necessity of their constitution’ (so that, φunder the same given 
circumstances’, φall men having their right faculties’ would have the same experience, or 
objectively valid empirical cognition).91 Now, Coleridge does not mention Kant in any of 
the various passages quoted above, presenting this conception of experience as objective 
empirical cognition as being standard among ancient Greek philosophers (at least in the 
Platonic and Aristotelian schools from the third century BCE onwards), so I take him to 
hold the view that this account of what constitutes objective or intersubjectively valid 
sensory cognition was common long before Kant’s first Critique, but that Kant was the 
first philosopher to develop a theory of subjectivity which could explain (a) how such 
cognition is possible, and (b) why we are justified in taking the objects or appearances in 
which empirical cognition consists to be intersubjectively valid.92 As I will explain below, 
Coleridge considers the knowledge deriving from such empirical cognition (of sensible 
objects) to be probable rather than certain because the non-contingent rules or principles 
which ground its claims to objectivity apply only to the cognition of human subjects, and 
so do not govern objects of cognition themselves, insofar as such objects are taken to 
φhave a subsistence independent of the mind that contemplates them’.93 
 
ii. Coleridge on Probable vs. Certain Knowledge & the ‘permanent truths of pure reason’ 
Although Coleridge is not very clear here about what it means for objective empirical 
cognition to be φcapable of [λ] becoming the substitute, of the permanent truths of pure 
reason’, it seems that he is referring to using one kind of objective or intersubjectively 
valid knowledge (φthe probable’) in place of another (φthe certain’), in a context where 
(our) probable knowledge of sensible objects is taken to be conditioned by one kind of 
                                                 
90 Logic, 130, 141, 203n. 
91 Logic, 203n; cf. 43n reference to φtruths which subsist in all beings possessing the faculties of sense and 
intelligence, independent of all will and without relation to individuality’ (see also 4.3 below). 
92 See esp. Logic, 146-9, 205-6n; cf. CM.III.918-21, V.81-2. 
93 Logic, 142 (this is Coleridge’s definition of what makes an object φproperly and wholly objective’). 
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non-contingent truth or principle, and our certain knowledge of such objects to be 
determined by another φhigher’ sort of non-contingent truth or principle. According to 
Coleridge, as we saw in 2.1, φthe necessary, the permanent, the universal [i.e. the a priori 
aspects of cognition], or the truths having these attributes’ derive from the pure or a 
priori operations and contents of reason, understanding, and sense; in turn, it is from the 
a priori forms of these three basic cognitive capacities that we φderive the rules and 
principles by which our observations and reflections are to be corrected’.94 For our 
observations of sensible objects and our reflections on the operations and contents of 
our minds to yield intersubjectively valid knowledge (which can be either probable or 
certain), they must be φcorrected’ by or φreduced under’ the a priori φforms or inherent 
rules’ of our cognitive capacities. Because Coleridge holds that the a priori forms of sense 
and understanding are φprinciples of knowing’ which φall human subjects possess in 
common by necessity of their constitution’, he claims that knowledge of sensible objects 
that is grounded in these principles can only be probable, given that these forms cannot 
be said to subsist in or determine any objects that φhave a subsistence independent of the 
mind that contemplates them’ (i.e. the principles of knowing condition our knowledge of 
things-as-they-appear, but do not apply to things-as-they-are, independently of our 
perceptions and cognitions of them). Such knowledge is probable in the sense that we 
hold it to be true of things-as-they-appear, given the ways in which the a priori forms of 
sense and understanding that are common to all human subjects condition the realm of 
appearances (the common world of the senses), and therefore regard it as a reliable guide 
to what such objects may be like independently of their perception or cognition by 
human subjects. Because human subjects possessing the same cognitive capacities will, 
under the same circumstances, have the same experiences of sensible objects, we can say 
that these common experiences yield reliable knowledge of what such objects are probably 
like, independently of human subjects and their cognitive states (Coleridge talks of such 
empirical cognition as yielding φa probability which, sufficing for all practical purposes, 
may be called an empirical certainty’).95 In Coleridge’s view, however, we cannot be said 
to have certain knowledge of the objects of empirical cognition unless we have a means 
of ascertaining what such objects are actually like, independently of our experiences of 
them. This is where the φpermanent truths of the pure reason’ (i.e. Ideas, in the Platonic 
sense) come in.96 
                                                 
94 Logic, 40. 
95 See Logic, 141. 
96 Logic, 34-6, 42-4, 146-9, 236-8. 
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Coleridge holds that φthe unindividual and transcendent character of the reason 
[taken] as a presence to the human mind, not a particular faculty or component part of 
the mind’ means that we must distinguish reason from sense and understanding, taken as 
φthe two component faculties’ or φconstituents’ of the human mind.97 A corollary of this 
view is that the a priori forms of sense and understanding are subjectively real, or 
φuniversal, necessary, and permanent’ (non-contingent) only for finite human subjects, 
whereas the a priori forms of reason are objectively real, or universal, necessary, and 
permanent (non-contingent) not only for human subjects, but also for all those objects 
taken to subsist independently of such finite minds and the objects or contents of their 
cognitive states. Put another way, subjectively real a priori forms can determine only what 
appears to human subjects, while objectively real a priori forms determine what actually 
exists independently of such subjects and their common (i.e. intersubjectively valid) 
experience(s). To use Coleridge’s terms, the a priori forms of sense and understanding are 
φprinciples of knowing’ that govern φapparent reality’ (human experience of the 
phenomenal world of the senses), while the a priori forms of reason (φthe permanent 
truths of the pure reason’ or φDivine Ideas’) are φprinciples of knowing and being’ that 
govern φsubstantial reality’ (the noumenal world of Ideas that is grounded in the absolute 
mind of God, and thus exists independently of finite human minds, but can be known 
by such minds through intellectual intuition or noesis).98 While the former class of non-
contingent truths or principles yields knowledge (of sensible objects) that is reliable (φthe 
probable in all its degrees’), and which may be employed as φthe substitute [λ] of the 
permanent truths of the pure reason’, only the latter class of non-contingent truths or 
principles yields knowledge (of both sensible and non-sensible or intelligible objects) that 
can be regarded as φproperly and wholly objective’, and therefore as certain (because it is 
true independently of human cognition and its limitations).99 In sum: whatever qualifies 
as objective or intersubjectively valid knowledge from the finite human standpoint is not, 
on Coleridge’s account, a truly objective kind of knowledge. This is why Coleridge avers 
that φfrom the formation of the Platonic and Aristotelian schools’ philosophers have 
sought to distinguish ƫόƣƯƲ and ƨƥƹƱία, taken as φthe two component faculties’ of the 
                                                 
97 Logic, 69-70. 
98 For Coleridge on φprinciples of knowing’ and φprinciples of being’ see Logic, 79-87; for his theory of 
apparent (phenomenal or sensible) and substantial (noumenal or intelligible) reality, see 127-31. 
99 See Logic, 34, 142, 146-7. Obviously, Coleridge does not deny that a priori mathematical and logical 
principles yield certain knowledge; his point is just that the certainty or self-evidence of such principles 
φhas no subsistence but in the faculty of a finite mind’ and so cannot be said to hold for objects that are 
taken to have their subsistence independently of such minds (thus, if natural objects have some kind of 
mind-independent existence, such a priori principles cannot yield certain knowledge about them). This view 
is made clear by Coleridge at Logic, 43n, 203n; LS, 32-3; OM, 276. See section 4.3 below. 
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human mind, φfrom the ƭƯƵƲ or pure reason [taken] as [λ] at once the light of the mind 
and its highest object’.100 For it is only by recognising and investigating the φunindividual 
and transcendent character’ of the Ideas or principles of reason that we can explain fully 
the nature of the relationship between mind and world, and the possibility of (noetic) 
knowledge that is φproperly and wholly objective’ (here, clearly, Coleridge differs sharply 
from Kant concerning the scope and limits of human knowledge and its possible objects, 
particularly with reference to the apprehension of non-sensible objects).101  
Coleridge’s sense of the fundamental difference between intersubjectively valid 
knowledge acquired from the standpoint of finite human minds and the truly objective 
knowledge acquired from the standpoint of the absolute mind of God (which is partially 
accessible to finite human subjects through the Ideas) can be seen from the following 
footnote. This comment is appended to his claim that φthe appearances [which] form the 
content and materials of experience [λ are] as necessarily accompanied by a sense of a 
*contingency, as the truths [and principles] a priori, from which the facts of experience are 
contradistinguished, are characterised by a sense of necessity’ (i.e. by our awareness of 
their non-contingent status)’:  
 
*I scarcely need inform the reader that this [conception of contingency] is to be interpreted 
relatively to the human understanding. By the Supreme Mind doubtless every object is 
contemplated with the same insight to its necessity as the properties of [a] circle or the 
functions of an algebraic term are by the human mathematician.102 
 
In light of the above discussion of Coleridge’s claims about φthe probable in all its 
degrees’ and φthe certain’, with reference to our knowledge of sensible objects, this note 
has two important implications: (i) a certain knowledge of the sensible objects that are 
known only as appearances in empirical cognition is possible (and would consist in an 
insight into the necessity of their properties), and (ii) such certain knowledge of sensible 
objects is analogous to our knowledge of the self-evident and certain truth of algebraic 
and geometrical propositions.103 While the φuniversally subjective’ a priori forms or 
principles of sense and understanding which condition all sense-experience ground our 
intersubjectively valid knowledge of sensible objects (as appearances), this knowledge 
allows us only to φarrive at a probability which, sufficing for all practical purposes, may 
                                                 
100 Logic, 32, 34. 
101 Logic, 69-70, 139-40n, 236-8 (cf. 205-6, for Coleridge on the limits of Kant’s approach).  
102 Logic, 141. 
103 See Logic, 34-6, 43-4, 211-4, 236-8. 
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be called an empirical certainty’ (i.e. empirical cognition yielding knowledge that is 
reliable or highly probable, but which cannot be shown to be necessarily or certainly 
true). However, the φproperly and wholly objective’ a priori forms or principles of reason, 
the Ideas which can be accessed by finite human minds through intellectual or spiritual 
intuition, enable us, by partaking of the Divine Intellect or Supreme Mind (i.e. God), to 
contemplate such sensible objects in their intelligible or noumenal aspect, φwith the same 
insight to [their] necessity as the properties of [a] circle or the functions of an algebraic 
term are [contemplated] by the human mathematician’.104 
I return to Coleridge’s distinction between subjectively real and objectively real a 
priori forms later, in 4.3-5. In those sections I shall focus on explaining how Coleridge’s 
claims about the fundamental differences between the human mind’s φcomponent 
faculties’ of sense and understanding and the φunindividual and transcendent’ reason (i.e. 
God’s absolute mind, in which finite human subjects partake through the employment 
reason) relate to his threefold division of cognitive capacities and the diverse kinds of 
pure or nonempirical knowledge which have their φsources’ in these capacities. As we 
shall see, this is a core feature of Coleridge’s interpretation and expansion of Kantian 
transcendental philosophy and its analysis of the elements of human cognition. In the 
remainder of this part of the thesis, I focus on placing the conception of the cognitive 
capacities and their respective contributions to cognition outlined above (and presented 
as traditional by Coleridge) in the broader conceptual context of Coleridge’s claims about 
φthe constitution of the subject’.105 In particular, I will discuss (i) Coleridge’s distinction 
between the employment and the analysis of our cognitive faculties, and (ii) his overview 
of transcendental knowledge, and the aims and objects of transcendental inquiry into the 
sources and elements of our cognition (especially with reference to how such an inquiry 
seeks to describe the φconstituent forms’ of sense and understanding). 
 
3.4 The Transcendental, the A Priori, & the Constitution of the Faculties 
i. Coleridge on A Priori Cognitions & Cognitive Constitution: An Overview 
We have seen (3.1-3) how Coleridge distinguishes between the different kinds of a priori 
evidence or cognitive content according to the different faculties from which these kinds 
of cognitive content are taken to derive (e.g. pure intuitions from sense, pure concepts 
                                                 
104 Logic, 141n. For Coleridge on Ideas, see also, 43-4, 233n, 237-8. His most detailed account of Ideas and 
the kind of knowledge deriving from them is OM, 214-90 (φOn the Divine Ideas’). 
105 Coleridge uses this term at Logic, 145 (cf. 202n). 
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from understanding, intellectual intuitions and Ideas from reason).106 We have also seen 
that Coleridge makes a distinction between the kind of a priori cognitive content that is 
taken to derive from sense and understanding, considered as those faculties or cognitive 
powers that φconstitut[e] the mind in its specific sense as the human mind’,107 and the kind 
of a priori cognitive content that is taken to derive from reason, considered as φthe 
universal power presiding over both [sense and understanding]’ or φmind absolutely’ (i.e. 
God considered as φthe absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind [λ w]herein we find the principle 
of being, and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality’).108 We are thus now in a position to 
consider how Coleridge distinguishes between a priori cognitive content (what Kant calls 
φpure representations’) in general and the particular class of a priori cognitions designated 
as φtranscendental knowledge’, as well as to give some account of the kinds of features 
Coleridge thinks a cognitive state with a priori content (a pure representation) needs to 
possess in order to qualify as a transcendental representation. This will also help to lay 
the ground for my subsequent discussion of how Coleridge’s conception of what he calls 
φthe constitution of the subject’ informs his account of transcendental knowledge and its 
objects. As I will explain later (see 4.2), Coleridge takes the most significant advance in 
the field of theorising about the a priori and the nature of pure cognitive content to have 
been Kant’s shift from φa mere classification of ideas’, in accordance with their origins in 
sense-experience or reflection (as offered by e.g. Descartes and Locke), to φa true analysis 
of the understanding’, or φinvestigation into the constitution and constituent forms of the 
understanding’, that seeks to show not only that there is a kind of cognitive content that 
does not derive from sensory experience (i.e. a priori evidence), but also to explain how 
such cognitive content, or rather, the presentation of such cognitive content to the mind, 
is possible.109 In this section I begin by briefly restating Coleridge’s distinction between 
the formal (a priori) and material (a posteriori) elements of cognition. I then discuss some 
of the analogies that Coleridge uses to explain the differences between formal, empirical, 
and transcendental knowledge of such elements, particularly in relation to his account of 
the φconstituent forms’ of cognition (i.e. the forms of sense and understanding). 
 We saw in section 1.4 that Coleridge contends that pure common logic should be 
concerned with only φthe formal [elements of cognition], let the subject matter be what it 
may, drawn from outward experiences [i.e. from objects of the senses] or from inward 
                                                 
106 See e.g. Logic, 34-7, 66-70, 211-4. For further discussion, see 4.1-2 below. 
107 See Logic, 44, 70n. 
108 See Logic, 44, 69-70 and nn, 85. 
109 See Logic, 210, 145, 147; cf. 146-9, 205-6n. 
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consciousness and reflection’. As he states it, φthe pure common logic appeals wholly to 
φprinciples a priori, i.e. [λ] principles derived from the construction of the machine [i.e. 
the human mind] itself, not from its uses [i.e. from the application or employment of 
such principles in empirical cognition])’.110 This claim needs to be put in the context of 
Coleridge’s table of pure and empirical sciences and his φ[over]view of the powers [i.e. 
cognitive faculties] from which the[se] sciences derive their name or character’.111 
Coleridge’s distinction between a priori contents and principles of the understanding and 
φcontingent occasions of its application’, or the φempirical conditions under which the 
exercise of the understanding takes place’, is first introduced in this table, as is the 
mechanical analogy which Coleridge employs when explaining what he means by the 
constitution or construction of the cognitive faculties. As noted in 3.2, at this point in 
Logic, Coleridge frames the distinction between pure and empirical cognitive content in 
terms of an opposition between metaphysical evidence that has its origin in our cognitive 
faculties (i.e. the a priori contents and principles of reason, sense, and understanding) and 
physical evidence that has its origin in φobjects of the bodily sense, considered as matters 
of fact’.112 This corresponds broadly with Coleridge’s distinction between formal (a priori) 
and material (a posteriori) elements of cognition, which is also often expressed in terms of 
the following opposition between mind and nature: 
 
As, then, the sum of the objective was entitled nature, as comprising all the phenomena by 
which existence other than our own is made known to us, so was the sum of the subjective 
comprehended in the name of mind or intelligence [Coleridge’s emphasis]. 
 
[I]t has been required of me that I should consider the mind in and for itself, separately from 
the objects of the senses and sensations. All that belongs to the former we have for our 
present purposes agreed to comprise under the name of the τsubjectiveυ or intelligence, and all 
the latter under the term τobjectiveυ or nature.113 
 
Coleridge defines the term φphenomena’ as referring to those φappearances that belong to 
mankind generally and constitute the common world of the senses[,] and which [λ] we 
distinguish from appearances that result from accidents and peculiarities of the individual 
                                                 
110 Logic, 139-40. 
111 See Logic, 34-7, 44-5n. 
112 See Logic, 34-7, 44-5n. 
113 See Logic, 37-8, 42-3. 
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subject’.114 He brings these descriptions of the natural and phenomenal realms together 
in the following definition of φNature, in its passive and material meaning’ as φ= natura 
natura, [a term which] signifies the sum of all the phaenomena by which the existence of 
any thing is made known to us’.115 From this division between the realms of the mental 
(the subjective) and the physical or material (the objective), Coleridge draws a distinction 
between formal and empirical knowledge, and between formal sciences and sciences of 
experience (i.e. empirical natural science or φnatural enquiries’).116 My aim here is to show 
how Coleridge’s distinction between formal and empirical knowledge is related to his 
account of the constitution (or construction) of the cognitive faculties. 
 
ii. Coleridge’s Conception of ‘Constituent Forms’: the Mechanist Analogy 
Incidentally, Coleridge’s table of pure and empirical sciences in Logic is followed by a 
passage in which Coleridge introduces the analogy of mechanical construction that he 
will later employ in attempting to elucidate the differences between formal, empirical, 
and transcendental knowledge. Here Coleridge states that when the logician considers 
φthe evidence of the understanding’ (pure concepts), she is concerned with the kind of 
cognitive content that derives from φthe laws of the understanding, or the rules that 
result from the constitution of the understanding itself considered abstractly from its 
objects, even as the mechanist would examine an engine previously to its use, or an 
astronomer a quadrant or telescope’.117 To make clearer the nature of the analogy he has 
in mind here (between the human mind and mechanical instruments), Coleridge provides 
the following gloss on what he means by the constitution of the understanding:  
 
It is the same whether we say the constitution of the understanding or the constituent forms of 
the understanding, the understanding being considered as the band or copula of these [forms]. 
Thus a steam engine, of course, comprises all the component parts; but these parts, considered 
in themselves as individual things, do not involve or constitute the idea of the steam engine: it 
is the steam engine = the parts + the copula of the parts.118 
 
                                                 
114 Logic, 130.  
115 SWF.I.688, in a φGlossary of Terms’ which may have formed part of the materials Coleridge used in 
composing and compiling his Logic MS. Here Coleridge also defines φNatura naturata’ as φ= the sum or 
aggregate by which its [i.e. passive or material nature’s] existence is made known to us’; cf. Logic, 45n for a 
similar reference to φnature as the aggregate of objects (natura naturata). 
116 See Logic, 41 for Coleridge equation of φnatural enquiries’ with φphysics’, his general term for empirical 
inquiries into phenomenal nature (which includes the mind, insofar as certain of its features can be 
described or explained in naturalistic terms, as Coleridge allows for at e.g. Logic, 37). 
117 Logic, 45. 
118 Logic, 45. 
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For now, all that need be noted here is that Coleridge conceives of the constitution of 
the understanding (and sense) in purely functional terms. The aim of his steam engine 
analogy is not to suggest that cognitive faculties or capacities are composed of a set of 
moving parts like a machine. Rather, Coleridge is claiming that just as we can think of 
any machine or mechanical instrument purely in terms of the collective functioning of 
the individual parts which constitute it, we can think of a cognitive faculty or capacity 
purely in terms of the collective functioning of the individual cognitive operations and 
activities in which the exercise of this faculty or capacity is taken to consist.119 What it 
means to say that a steam engine is φthe copula of [its] parts’ or that the understanding is 
φthe band or copula’ of its constituent forms is that our conception of the collective 
functioning of its interconnected parts or forms as a unified whole is what constitutes, or 
determines, our conception of any given machine or cognitive faculty. So, in this view, to 
think of a steam engine is to think of the engine’s φcomponent parts’ working together, 
not as φindividual things’, but as the unified entity that is a steam engine (i.e. this is what 
φconstitute[s] our idea of the steam engine’). Likewise, to think of the understanding and 
its constitution is to think of the understanding’s constituent forms or φseveral functional 
powers’ working together, not as individual mental acts or rules of cognition, but as the 
unified set of discursive cognitive operations that is our capacity for discursive cognition 
(i.e. this is what φconstitut[es] what we mean by [the concept, or term] understanding’, 
conceived as our φdiscursive faculty’).120 In both cases, to talk of the constitution of 
something (whether a machine or a mind) is not just to speak of its various components 
as an aggregate of individual parts which, taken together, constitute this thing, but to 
speak of how these parts function together as a unified whole. Coleridge makes a further 
distinction here, between a mechanical whole, which is the φcommon result of its 
constituent parts’, and a φproductive unity’ or a whole φthat is of necessity antecedent to 
its parts’.121 Machines like the steam engine and mechanical instrument like the sextant 
(and their parts) are a φmechanical’ whole of the former kind, the mind and its various 
capacities are an φorganic’ whole or unity of the latter kind.122  However, what matters for 
our present purposes is just that Coleridge conceives of constitution purely in terms of 
how the components or forms taken to constitute such wholes function together, without 
reference to questions concerning how such components or forms physically fit together 
                                                 
119 See esp. Logic, 155, 265n.  
120 Logic, 265-6n. See also 212 for Coleridge’s reference to φthe constitutive forms, or constitutional acts and 
functions, of the SENSE and of the understanding’.  
121 See 231-2 and n. 
122 For Coleridge on this functional unity of the mind, see Logic, 232n, 255-6ff.  
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(e.g. in the case of the various mechanical components of a steam engine, or the various 
physiological structures of a human brain).  
Put another way, constitution is a matter of how we conceive of the functional 
relations between any given set of interconnected components, having no reference to 
the make-up of any of these individual components themselves. In the case of a steam 
engine, its components may be made up of a range of different kinds of materials, but 
the physical characteristics of these parts should have no bearing on our conception of 
the engine’s constitution, in Coleridge’s purely functional sense of this term: all that is 
considered is how these parts operate, and particularly how the various parts function 
together as the whole which we recognise as a steam engine. In the case of a cognitive 
faculty like the understanding, its constituent forms may be caused byσor identifiable 
asσcertain neurophysiological structures (or some kind of immaterial substance), but 
the material (or immaterial) characteristics of any given form must have no bearing on 
our conception of the understanding’s constitution, insofar as the constituent forms of 
the understanding are considered in purely functional terms, as the cognitive activities 
and operations that together constitute what we recognise as our capacity for discursive 
cognition. As Coleridge puts this point in a note on cognitive constitution, the nature of 
such discursive forms and operations must be conceived of:  
 
in the alone and rightful sense of inherent in the constitution of the understanding, or as 
constituting what we mean by the understanding, whatever it may be in other respects, whether 
a self-subsistent soul, or a function of the same, or a mere modification of matter, or a 
common result of two co-agents as the tune from a musical instrument.123 
 
So just as what we mean by φsteam engine’ (i.e. what constitutes our idea of the steam 
engine) is a specific kind of machine with a particular set of mechanical functions which 
are conceived to operate together in a certain way, regardless of whether this machine 
and its parts are composed of metal or heat-resistant chocolate, what φwe mean by the 
understanding’ is a specific kind of cognitive capacity with a particular set of discursive 
functions which are conceived to operate together in a certain way, without reference to 
what the understanding φmay be in other respects’, whether its constituent forms are the 
result of some neurophysiological structure, or the functions of some kind of immaterial 
substance.124 In 4.3-5 below, I consider Coleridge’s claim that φthe knowledge of the 
                                                 
123 Logic, 266n. 
124 See also Logic, 6, 37, 132-3. 
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constitution of the mental faculties forms the science of transcendental analysis’ in the 
context of his functional conception of cognitive constitution. For the remainder of this 
section I focus on the relationship between this Coleridgean conception of constitution 
and Coleridge’s account of the difference between formal and transcendental knowledge 
(i.e. between the knowledge of a priori cognitive form and content and the knowledge of 
the cognitive capacities that make such form and content possible), and particularly his 
claims on the kinds of a priori cognitive content (pure representations) from which these 
two different classes of a priori cognitions are taken to derive. 
 
iii. Formal, Transcendental, & Empirical Aspects of Mind: Coleridge’s Sextant Analogy 
Having given an outline of Coleridge’s conception of constitution, we can now consider 
how it informs his attempts to differentiate between diverse kinds or classes of cognitive 
content based on differences in the features and origins of such contents, particularly 
with reference to the various kinds of cognitive operations and conditions that Coleridge 
takes to give rise to or produce different kinds of cognitive content. We will also now be 
able to see why Coleridge connects certain kinds of cognitive content with certain kinds 
of epistemic procedures, with these connections in turn providing a basis for Coleridge’s 
distinctions between certain kinds of knowledge. I will take such connections as the 
starting point for elucidating the purposes of Coleridge’s functional analogies between 
the component parts of mechanical instruments and the constituent forms of human 
cognitive activity. In particular, I consider why Coleridge thinks such analogies are useful 
in spite of his strong criticism of mechanistic materialist accounts of cognition.125 As was 
noted earlier, Coleridge suggests there is an analogy between a logician’s analysis of φthe 
laws of the understanding, or the rules that result from the constitution of the 
understanding itself considered abstractly from its objects’ and the procedures whereby 
φthe mechanist would examine an engine previously to its use, or an astronomer a 
quadrant or telescope’.126 He returns to this analogy in those passages of Logic where he 
first introduces his distinction between empirical, formal, and transcendental knowledge, 
employing the mental-mechanical comparison to illustrate the nature of the contrast he 
draws here between φprinciples derived from the construction of the machine itself [i.e. 
the understanding]’ and principles derived from φits uses’ or the φcontingent occasions of 
its application’ (i.e. between its pure and its empirical aspects): 
 
                                                 
125 See e.g. Logic, 37, 132-3, 265-6n. 
126 Logic, 45. 
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By way of illustration we will take a sextant or other optical instrument. Now we may consider 
this [i.e. the sextant] in three different ways, viz. with regard to the objects and particular 
images which it presents, or, abstracting from these, with regard to the way in which it presents 
these images, however different in themselves, and which is in common to them all, or lastly 
with regard to the construction and constituent parts of the sextant itself.127 
 
As Coleridge goes on to explain, these φthree different ways’ of considering the data and 
mechanisms of φa sextant or other optical instrument’ may be thought of as analogous to 
three different ways of considering our cognitive content(s) and the operations and 
conditions taken to produce this content. To consider the mind φwith regard to the 
objects and particular images which it presents’ is to consider the empirically given or a 
posteriori elements of our cognition and its contents. To consider the mind φwith regard to 
the way in which it presents these images [i.e. the contents of empirical cognitive states] 
however different in themselves, and which is in common to them all’ is to consider 
those universal, necessary, and invariant elements of our cognitive states that are taken to 
be given a priori within the mind itself (ab intra or a mente ipsa). Finally, to consider the 
mind φwith regard to the construction and constituent parts [of the human mind] itself’ is 
to consider how the cognitive faculties or capacities taken to φconstitute the mind in its 
specific sense as the human mind’ (i.e. sense and understanding) function in such a way as 
to make possible all a posteriori and a priori cognitive content (conditioning a posteriori 
content and grounding or originating a priori content). These three different ways of 
considering the mind and its contents and operations yield Coleridge’s φthree divisions of 
knowledge’: the empirical, the formal, and the transcendental.128 
 However, before giving a detailed explanation of how his analogy between the 
human mind and a sextant yields these three divisions of knowledge, Coleridge offers a 
brief explanation of the differences between the empirical, formal, and transcendental 
perspectives on (or accounts of) the contents and operations of the mind, with reference 
to his conception of constitution. Here Coleridge wants to emphasise that we can arrive 
at a knowledge of certain aspects of the mind’s activity without having given an account 
of the operations, or constituent forms and functions, of its various cognitive capacities 
(i.e. what Coleridge calls φan analysis of the faculties’):  
  
                                                 
127 Logic, 140. 
128 See Logic, 139-43; cf. 38-41, 42-4, 76-7, 145-9. 
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But before we apply this instance [i.e. the mind-sextant analogy] it must be premised that in the 
mind the way in which the instrument acts of necessity, to a certain extent is demonstrable 
without the knowledge of the construction or constitution of the instrument, its exercise being 
inseparably accompanied with a sense of its necessity inherent in itself, and this necessity it is that 
forms the essence of a knowledge a priori. We do not say it has always done so and so, and 
therefore we have no doubt that it will continue so to do; neither the analogy of the past nor 
the anticipation of the future enters at all into the contemplation.129 
 
Again, it should be kept in mind here that Coleridge is not suggesting that there is any 
direct analogy between the mechanical parts of a sextant and the constituent forms, or 
functional powers, of sense and understanding. Rather, the analogy is between how we 
understand the functioning of these (on Coleridge’s view) two very different kinds of 
φinstrument’. Coleridge’s aim here is to suggest that just as we can know that, assuming 
the instrument is in working order, a sextant will always function in the same way given 
the functional relations between its constituent parts, even if we have no knowledge of 
these parts themselves, we can know that, assuming our mind is in working order, our 
cognitive faculties of sense and understanding, will always function in the same way 
given the functional relations between their constituent forms. The reason we can know 
this, on Coleridge’s view, is because our exercise of such instruments (whether a sextant 
or a cognitive faculty) is φinseparably accompanied with a sense of its necessity inherent in 
itself’: by employing the instrument we become aware that it works in a particular way, 
even if we cannot give any account of the constituent parts or operations which cause 
the instrument to function in this way. In doing so, we also come to recognise that its 
particular way of working is something that is determined solely by the nature of the 
instrument, in virtue of some functional φnecessity inherent in itself’.130 It is in this way that 
Coleridge conceives of the a priori aspects of cognition. To consider the a priori aspects of 
cognition that are taken to derive from the mind (φa mente ipsa’), and to be independent of 
the contingent conditions of any particular experience, is to follow a similar procedure to 
that in which φthe mechanist would examine an engine previously to its use, or an 
astronomer a quadrant or telescope’: considering those aspects of a given instrument’s 
functioning that derive from this instrument’s construction or constitution, and are thus 
                                                 
129 Logic, 140. 
130 Logic, 140; cf. 45, 213-4, 266n. 
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independent of the contingencies of any particular observation that might be made with 
the instrument (i.e. the data furnished a posteriori by this instrument).131  
Coleridge’s point in the passage just quoted is that the way in which the mind 
φacts of necessity’ can partly be determined with reference to the contents presented 
through the exercise of certain cognitive faculties, even if we have not yet determined 
how the operations or φseveral functional powers’ of these faculties produce such 
content. This is because we can tell that the exercise of any given cognitive faculty and its 
operations is φinseparably accompanied with a sense of its necessity inherent in itself’, by 
which Coleridge means that when we exercise the faculties of sense or understanding, 
there are always certain invariant features that accompany the operations of these 
faculties, and which must characterise whatever content is given or produced through 
such operations. This view informs Coleridge’s earlier claim that φprinciples a priori’ are 
φprinciples derived from the construction of [the mind] itself’.132 As we saw above, 
Coleridge contends that φthe alone rightful and alone intended sense of inherent in the 
constitution of the understanding’ refers only to the cognitive functions and operations 
that together φconstitute what we mean by the understanding’, having no relation to what 
such faculties φmay be in other respects’ (this also applies to what we mean by the term 
φsense’).133 Since Coleridge takes this φnecessity inherent in [the mind] itself’ to derive 
from the construction or constitution of our cognitive faculties, and to be that in which a 
priori principles (of cognition) must consist, he contends that φthis necessity it is that 
forms the essence of a knowledge a priori’. Because whatever is invariant, or universal 
and necessary, in our cognitive states is something that derives from (the operations of) 
the cognitive faculties taken to be productive of such states, insofar as the a priori is taken 
to consist in whatever is universal and necessary in our cognition, the same sort of 
necessity, φwhich inheres in the forms and functions of the understanding [and the sense] 
and the rules generalised from these’, must be identified as that which φforms the essence 
of a knowledge a priori’, or grounds all a priori principles.134 What Coleridge’s sextant 
analogy aims to suggest here, then, is that φthe essence of a knowledge a priori’ should be 
conceived as something like the invariant features of the optical data presented by a 
sextant, as that which follows necessarily from the construction of this instrument 
(considered in Coleridge’s purely functional terms), and must therefore be distinguished 
                                                 
131 See Logic, 45-6, 73-6, 140-1ff. 
132 Logic, 139. 
133 Logic, 266n; cf. 153-4. 
134 See Logic, 139-41, 146-7. 
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from the contingent features of such data which are caused by other factors (such as the 
conditions under which some individual observation occurs). 
 Coleridge’s subsequent claim that φWe do not say it [i.e. the mind] has always 
done so and so, and therefore we have no doubt that it will continue to do so’, coupled 
with his remark that φneither the analogy of the past nor the anticipation of the future 
enters at all into the contemplation [of the a priori elements of cognition]’, is intended to 
reiterate the point outlined above. Coleridge is implicitly contrasting those invariant 
features of cognition and experience which he claims must derive from the constituent 
forms or inherent functions of our cognitive faculties with the kinds of contingent 
features that may reappear in different experiences, and which can form the basis for 
empirical generalisations about the operations of the mind. This is why, in the preceding 
passages, he asserts that we must φabstract from all empirical conditions under which the 
exercise under which the exercise of the understanding takes place’ when engaged in the 
consideration of the a priori aspects of cognition. For these a posteriori features of our 
cognitive states φrespect the understanding, circumstantially, under certain contingent 
occasions of its application, or of [the sensible] objects, to which and by which the 
application [of this faculty] was determined’, and therefore reveal nothing concerning the 
invariant and non-contingent aspects of the understanding and its operations.135 We 
might be able to make certain generalisations about the understanding and its activity, 
based on our repeated observations φdrawn from outward experiences or from inward 
consciousness and reflection’, but insofar as these observations refer to contingent and 
empirically given conditions or objects of cognition, they cannot yield any knowledge of 
φthe way in which the [understanding] acts of necessity’. To acquire any knowledge of 
why the exercise of the understanding is φinseparably accompanied by a sense of its 
necessity inherent in itself’, we must consider the cognitive content given through the 
exercise of this cognitive faculty φwith regard to the construction and constituent parts 
[or forms] of the [understanding] itself’. While Coleridge does consider knowledge of the 
a priori aspects of cognition to be the kind of knowledge which can be derived from 
generalisations based on the analysis of certain features of our cognitive contents and 
operations, he makes a sharp distinction between the epistemic procedures involved in 
making generalisations about the necessary features of cognition and those employed in 
making generalisations about the contingent features of cognition. The former kind 
concern only the φnecessity inherent in’, or following from, the constitution of a given 
                                                 
135 See Logic, 139. 
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cognitive faculty, while the latter kind may concern any empirical condition or object 
affecting this faculty, or any φcontingent occasion of its application’.136 To employ the 
terms of Coleridge’s sextant analogy: generalisations about contingent features of any 
given instrument’s data concern φthe objects and particular images which it presents’, 
while generalisations about necessary features of this instrument’s data concern only φthe 
way in which it [acts of necessity in] present[ing] these images, however different in 
themselves, and which [way of presenting] is in common to them all’.137 
As noted above, Coleridge also allows for a knowledge of this necessity which is 
independent of any such consideration of the understanding (or sense) and its 
operations. For, on this Coleridgean account, we need not know why particular aspects of 
our cognition are universal and necessary to recognise that they do in fact exhibit such 
features. Indeed, if all exercise of the understanding is φinseparably accompanied with a 
sense of its necessity inherent in itself’, then it cannot be the case that our apprehension of 
φthis necessity [λ] that forms the essence of a knowledge a priori’ is in some way 
dependent upon a prior knowledge of the constitution of the understanding (since only 
certain ways of exercising the understanding, i.e. only the act of transcendental reflection, 
can yield such knowledge).138 To make sense of Coleridge’s view that φthe way in which 
[the mind] acts of necessity, to a certain extent is determinable without the knowledge of 
[the mind’s] construction or constitution’, we need to look at the examples he gives of 
the kinds of a priori knowledge and principles that may be derived (from pure cognitive 
content) independently of any claims referring to the constitution or constituent forms 
of the cognitive faculties (which produce this content): 
 
Proofs of this we have in every position [or proposition] of geometry and arithmetic as well as 
in pure logic. The mathematician rests perfectly secure that his axioms and propositions are 
necessary and universal truths, without troubling himself with any analysis of the faculties by 
which he constructs his figures and demonstrates their relations.139 
 
This remark should be put in the context of Coleridge’s claim that φ[just a]s we cannot 
become mathematicians but by reasoning according to the laws and necessities of the 
primary imagination, so neither can we be logicians or discourse logically, but according 
                                                 
136 See Logic, 139-40. For Coleridge’s comments about the various kinds of generalisations based on an 
analysis of our cognitive operations, see e.g. 12-14, 65-70, 73-6ff, 141-5ff.  
137 See Logic, 140. This corresponds to Coleridge’s distinction between the necessity of the constitution of 
our faculties and the contingency of the possible uses or exercise of these faculties. 
138 Logic, 139-40. Transcendental reflection is discussed further in 4.1-2 below. 
139 Logic, 140. 
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to the inherent forms and necessary data of the understanding or reflective faculty’ (he 
also says that just as the a priori forms and contents of logic must be φcontemplated from 
the point of reflection’, those of mathematics must be φcontemplate[d] from the point of 
the pure sense or intuitive faculty’).140 When Coleridge states that the exercise of a 
cognitive faculty is φinseparably accompanied with a sense of its necessity inherent in itself’ 
it is these φlaws and necessities’ or φinherent forms and necessary data’ of our intuitive 
and discursive cognitive faculties to which he refers. This is why Coleridge contends that 
such necessity (in the functioning of the human mind) is what φforms the essence of a 
knowledge a priori’: he takes the φlaws and necessities’ of our cognitive faculties to be the 
ground or origin of the a priori principles of formal sciences like logic and mathematics. 
The point of statements such as φthe way in which [the mind] acts of necessity [is] to a 
certain extent determinable without the knowledge of [the mind’s] construction or 
constitution’ is to emphasise that there is a distinction between our knowledge of the a 
priori forms and contents which derive from the way in which the mind φacts of necessity’ 
(the pure principles and subject-matter of logic and mathematics) and our a priori 
knowledge of the pure cognitive acts and products (the φinherent forms and necessary 
data’ of our cognitive faculties) that are taken to be the ground or origin of such a priori 
forms and contents (i.e. to be what make such forms and contents possible). Coleridge’s 
aim here is to demonstrate that, even if we accept the claim that all a priori principles and 
pure cognitive contents must derive from or be grounded in our cognitive faculties and 
the forms and functions of such faculties, we must maintain a clear distinction between 
the a priori cognitions that consist in the knowledge yielded by analysis of our cognitive 
faculties, and those a priori cognitions consisting in a knowledge that is independent of 
such analysis of the faculties.141 Coleridge’s claims about how transcendental philosophy 
enables us to acquire the former kind of a priori cognitions concerning cognitive faculties 
and their contents will be the principal subject of the next part of the thesis. 
 
 
                                                 
140 Logic, 266n. 
141 See Logic, 141-3, 146-9. 
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4. ‘The Weights & Measures of the Human Mind’: Coleridge on the Threefold 
Division of Transcendental Inquiry & The Nature of the A Priori 
4.1 Transcendental Reflection & the Sources of A Priori Evidence: Coleridge’s 
Table of Pure Sciences & The Threefold Division of the Faculties 
Like Kant, Coleridge thinks it possible to isolate and analyse certain basic elements of 
our cognition or experience (and the evidence given in diverse kinds of representations 
or cognitive states) through the procedure Kant calls φtranscendental reflection’. Kant 
contends that if we seek to explain φthe relation of given representations to our various 
sources of cognition’ from the transcendental perspective,  
 
The first question prior to all further treatment of our representation is this: In which cognitive 
faculty do they [our representations or cognitive states] belong together? Is it the understanding 
or is it the senses before which they are connected or compared?1  
 
What such a procedure entails is suggested by Kant’s definition of φreflection’σtaken as 
the cognitive process on which all acts of judgement and comparison dependσas φa 
distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong’. As Kant’s 
subsequent gloss on his definition makes evident, this procedure intends to establish that 
different kinds of pure representations (i.e. a priori cognitive contents) can be shown to 
φbelong to’ or derive from different cognitive powers: 
 
The action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the 
cognitive power in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are 
to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition, I call 
transcendental reflection.2  
 
In other words, what it means for some representation, some kind of cognitive state or 
its contents, to belong to or be situated in a particular cognitive power is that the latter is 
responsible for the former (in Kantian terms, this cognitive power or faculty is what 
makes the representation in question φpossible a priori’).3 As was discussed earlier in 2.1-3, 
what makes such reflection on the content of our cognitive states transcendental is that it is 
                                                 
1 CPR, B316 (see also CPR, B33-5, 74-82); cf. Coleridge’s similar statements at Logic, 151-4, 266n, and esp. 
234: φit is only by means of this reflection, by which we represent the mind as a whole consisting of all its 
thoughts as its parts, that we can form any conception of the mind at all’.   
2 Kant’s definition at CPR, B317; cf. Coleridge’s statements at Logic, 153-4, 169, 246-7, 265-6n. 
3 See Logic, 146-9. Cf. Kant’s claims at CPR, B25, 34-5, 81-2ff. For further discussion of these points, see 
also 2.1-2, 3.2-3 above. 
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concerned with φour mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a 
priori’.4 This is why Coleridge claims in Logic that when we seek φfully to understand the 
nature of [our representations] transcendentally’, φneither the thing nor the knowledge [i.e. 
the object of a representation or cognition] is the subject of investigation, but the faculty 
by which the thing is known’.5 I explain below how Coleridge follows Kant in 
emphasising that such a method must involve an important distinction between a priori 
knowledge derived from, or φpresent to the mind’ as, pure or nonempirical cognitive 
content (such as the principles of mathematics or formal logic) and a priori knowledge-
claims concerning the nonempirical origin of such content (the propositions of 
transcendental philosophy). For as we will see, Coleridge’s distinction between different 
kinds of a priori evidence is partly an application of Kant’s claim that φnot every a priori 
cognition must be called transcendental, but only that by means of which we cognize 
that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely a priori, 
or are possible (i.e., the possibility of cognition or its use a priori)’.6 This will also require 
a further account of the kinds of content in our representations or cognitive states that 
Coleridge thinks can be taken to constitute a priori evidence, particularly the kind that 
furnishes the basis of transcendental knowledge. With this in mind, we can turn now to 
Coleridge’s table of the pure (a priori) and mixed (empirical) sciences, which outlines the 
different kinds of a priori and a posteriori evidence or cognitive content in accordance with 
their different sources. 
 Coleridge’s table, which serves to introduce the distinction between metaphysical 
and physical evidence outlined above (see 3.2), is arranged as follows: 
 
Ƭƥƴά ƶƵƳƩƪά [metaphysics] 
AσNoetics = the evidence of reason[*] 
BσLogic = the evidence of the understanding 
CσMathematics = the evidence of sense 
    
ƶƵƳƩƪά [physics] 
DσEmpiric = evidence of the senses† 
Scholium. The senses = sense + sensation + impressions.7 
 
                                                 
4 CPR, B25 (cf. B2, B74-5). 
5 Logic, 153; cf. 169: φtranscendental exposition [λ] rests in the ascertainment of the faculty the existence 
of which we know only by means of reflection, i.e. by an exercise of one of the functions of the faculty’. 
6 CPR, B81-2. 
7 Logic, 44 and 44-5n. See also 33-6 for the scheme of faculties or powers summarised in this table. 
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Coleridge’s footnotes to the table state his views on the method and content of noetics 
(speculative metaphysics) and φEmpiric’ or φthe sciences of experience’ (empirical natural 
sciences).8 Given that we are concerned here only with Coleridge’s claim that certain 
kinds of cognitive content must have their source or origin in certain cognitive faculties, 
for the moment I focus just on the evidence-faculty correspondences laid out in the 
above table, and particularly on how these correspondences inform Coleridge’s 
distinction between the different kinds of a priori evidence or content. I will return to the 
problem of how Coleridge characterises the pure cognitions deriving from diverse kinds 
of a priori evidence later (4.3), after discussing what this table of pure sciences can tell us 
about Coleridge’s conception of transcendental representations and the special kind of a 
priori content that he, following Kant, takes them to contain. 
In my view, Coleridge’s scheme of pure sciences in Logic is premised on what I 
described above as a (transcendental) comparison of and distinction between our various 
representations and the cognitive powers or faculties φin which they are situated’ (i.e. in 
which they originate a priori, and to which the a priori content of these representations 
can be traced back9). Thus, while Coleridge recognises one general source of a posteriori 
evidence (sensory experience, taken as the combined activities of the bodily senses and 
our cognitive powers), he contends that we must distinguish between three different 
sources of a priori evidence. Namely, the faculties of reason, understanding, and sense, 
each of which corresponds to a particular pure science and its field of a priori inquiry. 
Consequently, we have Noetics (or φtruths of reason applied’, by which Coleridge means 
the speculative principles or laws of ontology, theology, and ethics), which concerns 
itself with φthe evidence of reason’; Logicσincluding both the formal and transcendental 
branchesσwhich concerns itself with φthe evidence of understanding’; and Mathematics, 
which is concerned with φthe evidence of sense’.10 This is why Coleridge speaks so 
confidently of φthe universally admitted and understood diversity of metaphysic [or φthe 
science of noetics, more frequently, but less appropriately, entitled metaphysics’], logic 
and mathematics, and the convenience and exact correspondence of these to the three sources of 
the reason (ƭƯƵƲ), the understanding (ƫόƣƯƲ), and the sense (ƬάƨƧƳƧƲ)’.11 In short, what it 
means for a faculty to be the source of a pure science is that it is the cognitive power 
                                                 
8 For these Coleridgean definitions, see also Logic, 38-41, 43-4, 134-7, 139-43. 
9 See Kant’s claims at CPR, B74-82 (which Coleridge follows at e.g. Logic, 145-7, 152-4, 211-4). 
10 Logic, 44. Cf. 90. φThe mathematic [λ], which has for its subject the forms of the pure sense and the 
products of the active imagination, is not only the first pure science but supplies to all other sciences the 
most perfect model and exemplar’.  
11 Logic, 70. Coleridge uses ƬάƨƧƳƧƲ in the same way as ƨƥƹƱία, to refer to the faculty of sense, or φthe 
intuitive power of the mind’ (see e.g. 34-6, 73-5ff, 245). See also 3.3 above. 
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taken to be responsible for (i.e. the ground or origin of) the kind of pure representations 
or a priori cognitive content(s) with which a particular nonempirical mode of inquiry is 
concerned. This is why Coleridge claims to be presenting φa view of the [cognitive] 
powers from which the [pure] sciences derive their name and character’, when he gives 
his account of the faculties of reason, understanding, and sense and the different kinds 
of cognitive content (or evidence) which is presented to the mind through the acts or 
operations of each faculty.12 
On this reading, Coleridge takes a priori evidence to concern the operations of a 
particular faculty (its acts) and the cognitive content given a priori through these 
operations (its pure products). Thus, evidence of reason concerns intellectual or spiritual 
intuitions and their content, evidence of understanding concerns pure conceptions and 
their content, and evidence of sense pure intuitions and their content. Accordingly, he 
contends that we may φdefine reason as the power of ideas, the understanding [as] the 
faculty of conceptions, and the sense [as] the source and faculty of intuitions and 
perceptions’.13 It should be noted, however, that Coleridge’s table of pure sciences serves 
only to designate certain of our cognitive powers as the φsource and faculty’ of certain 
kinds of evidence or cognitive content. While Coleridge’s scheme does emphasise the 
φexact correspondence’ of particular faculties to particular fields of a priori cognition, it 
must not be taken to suggest that Coleridge thinks we exercise only this single particular 
faculty when engaged in the φformal science’ or nonempirical inquiry designated as 
corresponding to it. Rather, Coleridge claims that our three basic cognitive powers, the 
faculties of reason, sense, and understanding must work in unison, with the former taken 
as φthe universal power presiding over both [the latter two]’.14 He does, however, 
sometimes emphasise that we should isolate or attend only to the activities or products 
of a single cognitive power, as is required for the different branches of transcendental 
analysis, or in considering the field of a priori evidence dealt with by a particular pure 
science.15 In such cases, a claim about the correspondence between a given cognitive 
faculty and its evidence should be taken to concern only the origin of a certain kind of 
cognitive content in the operations or acts of this faculty or power. Thus, such a claim 
has no bearing on how, for instance, formal logic or mathematics is carried out or how 
                                                 
12 Logic, 35. 
13 Logic, 68. Coleridge uses φidea’ here in a Neoplatonic sense, as an intelligible or noumenal principle taken 
to be apprehensible through nonsensible (spiritual or intellectual) intuition (see Logic, 236-8). 
14 Logic, 70n. Coleridge holds that the combined activities of sense, understanding, and reason must be 
involved in every act of cognition, even if it is the case that certain kinds of cognitive contents and 
operations derive only from certain cognitive faculties (see e.g. Logic, 68-70, 256-61). 
15 See esp. Logic, 211-4 (cf. 66-70, 236-8). 
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these disciplines derive and prove their principles. Coleridge means just that (1) formal 
or pure sciences deal with a kind of nonempirical evidence or cognitive content that 
must have its origin a priori in a corresponding cognitive power, and (2) it is possible for 
us to distinguish between different kinds of a priori evidence according to the different 
origins of the diverse pure representations (cognitive states and their contents) whereby 
such a priori cognitive content is presented to the mind. As Coleridge makes clear later in 
Logic, (1) and (2) depend on the further claim that (3) by thus accounting for the origins 
of certain kinds of cognitive content, we are thereby able to explain the ground of their 
possibility (as a feature of our cognitive experience).16 
With this framework based on Coleridge’s table of pure sciences now in place, 
we can proceed to a consideration of how Coleridge’s claims on φthe convenience and exact 
correspondence of [noetics, logic, and mathematics] to the three sources of the reason (ƭƯƵƲ), 
the understanding (ƫόƣƯƲ), and the sense (ƬάƨƧƳƧƲ [or ƨƥƹƱία])’ relates to Kant’s account 
of transcendental representations and their contents.17 My aims here will be as follows: 
(1) to show that Coleridge’s table of pure sciences is predicated on the two principal 
claims of transcendental philosophy, as he understands it: i.e. (i) that experience and the 
various cognitive activities in which it consists would not be possible φbut for the a priori 
origins of certain features of our cognition’,18 and (ii) that we can show a priori φthat and 
how’ these features originate in, and are made possible by, certain cognitive faculties or 
powers; (2) to show what, on Coleridge’s view, separates transcendental representations 
and transcendental knowledge from other kinds of pure a priori representations and 
cognitions, such as pure sensible or pure intellectual intuitions and pure concepts, and 
the different kinds of cognitions taken to derive from the content given in or by means 
of these a priori representations; and (3) to show that the problems raised in points (1) 
and (2) must be considered in the context of Coleridge’s distinction between the use or 
employment and the analysis of our cognitive faculties, conceived of as a distinction 
between (a) the a priori evidence given, apprehended, or constructed, etc. by means of a 
particular faculty (its pure forms and contents, or φconstitutional acts and functions’ and 
φpure products’19) and (b) an investigation into how the presentation of such a priori 
evidence to the mind is possible a priori (which must proceed, Coleridge asserts, by 
means of a transcendental analysis of the pure contents and operations of the cognitive 
                                                 
16 See e.g. Logic, 211ff (esp. 212n), 247-8, 265-6n. 
17 Logic, 70. 
18 Kitcher (1990), 16; cf. Coleridge’s claims at Logic, 76, 146-7 (see also 2.1 above). 
19 Coleridge’s terms for a priori forms and contents at Logic, 212-3 (see 2.1, 3.2 above). 
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faculty or capacity in question).20 I will also show how this distinction relates to the 
distinction, hinted at in point (2) above, between the cognitive contents taken to 
originate in our faculties and the different kinds of knowledge that can be derived from 
such contents. This will help to clarify what it means to hold, as Coleridge does, that 
while transcendental, mathematical, and logical knowledge all derive from the same 
general class of a priori evidence (pure representations and their contents), each kind of 
knowledge consists in a different sort of a priori cognition (i.e. each discipline involves 
distinct kinds of a priori knowledge claims).21 The principal focus here will be on how 
transcendental representations give rise to knowledge of the a priori origins and a priori 
possibility of certain features of our cognition.  
 
4.2 The Classification of Content & The Analysis of the Faculties: Two 
Perspectives on Coleridge’s Table of Pure Sciences 
i. Coleridge’s Table of Pure Sciences & the Employment/Analysis Distinction 
It will be useful to begin the discussion of (1)-(3), as outlined above, by recapitulating the 
main points of Kant’s account of transcendental representations and the procedure of 
transcendental reflection whereby, he claims, we can acquire this particular kind of a 
priori cognitive content; we can then consider how Kant’s views inform Coleridge’s 
claims about transcendental knowledge and the analysis of the cognitive faculties, and in 
particular how Coleridge’s conception of transcendental representations and their a priori 
content relates to his table of the pure sciences. As we have seen, Kant uses the example 
of space, taken as the pure form of outer intuition, to illustrate his distinction between 
transcendental knowledge and other kinds of a priori cognition, and to show what kind of 
content must be contained in a representation in order for it to qualify as a 
transcendental representation (see 2.1). When Kant says that φneither space nor any 
geometrical determination of it a priori is a transcendental representation’, he means that 
neither the contents of a pure outer intuition, nor the geometrical procedures exercised 
upon such a priori content (e.g. the construction of a triangle in the pure spatial 
manifold), taken on their own could be considered as a priori representations or 
cognitions with a transcendental status. This is because the contents of transcendental 
representations must concern only the a priori origins of some feature of cognition (such 
as spatiality) or the a priori possibility of cognition. As Kant puts it, φonly the cognition 
that these representations [i.e. our pure sensible intuitions and pure conceptions] are not 
                                                 
20 Coleridge sets out this distinction at Logic, 139-43ff (esp. 140) and 211-4 (esp. 212n). 
21 Coleridge makes this point clear at 211-4 (cf. 225ff, 265-6n). 
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of empirical origin at all and the possibility that they can nevertheless be related a priori to 
objects of experience can be called transcendental’.22 According to Kant, the means to 
acquiring such transcendental representations is φtranscendental reflection’, a 
philosophical procedure which he defines as φThe action through which I make the 
comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are 
situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one 
another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition’.23 This enables us to 
determine (i) that the contents of pure sensibility and pure understanding have an a priori 
origin, and (ii) that the cognitive activities of pure intuiting (i.e. apprehending the pure 
spatial and pure temporal manifolds) and pure understanding (i.e. the acts of a priori 
discursive cognition, such as making synthetic a priori judgements and employing pure 
concepts) constitute what Kant terms an φa priori employment’ of our cognitive faculties, 
which in turn allows us to demonstrate (iii) what grounds the a priori contents and 
principles of pure sciences like mathematics or logic (i.e. how they are possible a priori).24 
What I will try to show below is how Coleridge’s table of pure sciences relies upon the 
principles Kant claims can be established through transcendental reflection. 
 We saw above (4.1) that Coleridge’s table of pure sciences is intended to provide 
φa view of the [cognitive] powers from which the sciences [of noetics, logic, and 
mathematics] derive their name or character’, by which he means that each of the pure 
sciences is concerned with a specific kind of a priori evidence, which is in turn taken to 
originate in or derive from a specific kind of cognitive power. This is why he refers to 
the cognitive powers to which these three pure sciences are taken to φcorrespond’ as their 
φthree sources’. That is, Coleridge claims that noetics concerns φthe evidence of reason’ 
(pure intellectual or spiritual intuitions that have their source in reason); that logic 
concerns φthe evidence of the understanding’ (pure concepts that have their source in the 
understanding); and that mathematics concerns φthe evidence of sense’ (pure intuitions 
that have their source in the sense), because he holds that each of these pure sciences or 
nonempirical inquiries and the kind of a priori evidence (i.e. class of pure representations) 
with which it is concerned is made possible through the exercise of a specific cognitive 
                                                 
22 CPR, B81-2. 
23 CPR, B317; cf. Coleridge’s statements at Logic, 153-4, 169, 246-7, 265-6n. 
24 By the a priori uses of cognition or the a priori employment of our cognitive faculties, I take Kant to 
mean some mode of cognition or cognitive procedure which involves, or produces, cognitive content or 
knowledge that (i) does not derive from sense-experience, or (ii) can be given or known (i.e. established) 
without appeal to such experience. For Coleridge’s use of a similar concept see Logic, 140ff, 193n, 211-4, 
215-24. On Kant’s notion of a priori employment, see Hatfield (1990), 84-7.   
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faculty or power.25 However, as noted earlier (in 2.1), Coleridge also makes a distinction 
between the employment of a faculty that is involved in any given pure science and the 
analysis of this faculty (i.e. the investigation of its pure contents and operations); this 
distinction is encapsulated in his remark that φThe mathematician rests perfectly secure 
that his axioms and propositions are necessary and universal [i.e. a priori] truths, without 
troubling himself with any analysis of the faculties by which he constructs his figure and 
demonstrates their relations’.26 By such claims, Coleridge means that the a priori evidence 
(pure representations) and a priori rules (pure principles) with which mathematics and 
logic (and also noetics) are concerned give rise to a kind of knowledge that is proven or 
established independently of any claims about the role of our cognitive faculties in the 
acquisition or apprehension of such evidence and rules (considered as possible contents 
of a pure representation). As Coleridge puts this point, φthe principles [of logic and 
mathematics] are evident independently of the insight given by transcendental analysis’: 
the norms of thought that are established by mathematics and logic do not depend on 
any prior knowledge of, or claims about, our cognitive faculties for their proof, validity, 
or normative status.27 What I want to argue here is that when Coleridge’s table of the 
pure sciences is placed in the context of this employment/analysis distinction, it can be 
interpreted as presenting the results of a transcendental analysis of the faculties, rather 
than as simply cataloguing the diverse kinds of a priori evidence in accordance with their 
respective origins. 
 The first thing to note here is that Coleridge’s employment/analysis distinction 
suggests two different possible ways of interpreting his table of pure sciences. On the 
one hand, the table can be read as a systematisation of the following set of philosophical 
assumptions (which Coleridge takes to be traditional): (i) there are two basic kinds of 
cognitive content: that which derives from the acts and products of φthe mind itself’ 
(pure or a priori content), and that which derives from φthe impressions from external 
objects’, φthe objects of the senses and sensations’ (empirical or a posteriori content); (ii) 
we can distinguish between three different kinds of pure representations according to 
their respective origins in the cognitive faculties or powers of sense, understanding, and 
reason; and (iii) these three different kinds of pure cognitive content (i.e. a priori 
evidence) each give rise to, or constitute the field of inquiry for, a corresponding pure 
science which considers the evidence presented to the mind through the exercise of its 
                                                 
25 See Logic, 34-7, 44-5. 
26 Logic, 140 (cf. 212n). 
27 Logic, 212 (cf. 247-8, 265-6n). 
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related power (i.e. the cognitive capacity φfrom which [a] science derive[s its] name or 
character’): thus, φMathematics = the evidence of sense’, φLogic = the evidence of the 
understanding’, and φNoetics = the evidence of reason’.28 On this reading, Coleridge’s 
table serves primarily to summarise what we know simply through the employment of 
our different cognitive capacities (i.e. that the exercise of a specific faculty, e.g. sense, 
yields a specific kind of a priori evidence, e.g. pure intuitions). In sum, to paraphrase 
Coleridge, this version of the table sets out those assumptions about the a priori origin 
and status of certain kinds of cognitive content in which we rest perfectly secure without 
troubling ourselves with an analysis of the faculties by which such pure content is given, 
apprehended, constructed, etc. It offers a classification of the different kinds of a priori 
evidence (in accordance with their respective origins), but makes no claim to have 
proven or demonstrated the grounds of such a classification, by means of an analysis of 
the pure contents and operations of the cognitive faculties. Rather, the table is the 
expression of a set of traditional assumptions: φthe universally admitted and understood 
diversity of [noetic], logic and mathematics, and the convenience and exact correspondence of 
these [pure sciences] to the three sources of the reason (ƭƯƵƲ), the understanding (ƫόƣƯƲ), 
and the sense (ƬάƨƧƳƧƲ [or ƨƥƹƱία])’, a view that Coleridge says can be traced back to the 
first Platonic and Aristotelian schools.29 
 On the other hand, Coleridge’s table can be read as a summary of the results of a 
transcendental theory of pure cognitive content and its origins which claims to prove the 
following: (a) that certain kinds of cognitive capacities are required for the presentation 
of certain kinds of cognitive content to the mind to be possible; and (b) that the 
consideration of the pure operations and contents (a priori acts and products) of these 
cognitive capacities from a transcendental perspective allows us to show how the pure 
science taken to correspond to each capacity is possible (or, to show how the different 
kinds of knowledge yielded by these nonempirical inquiries ς mathematics, logic, and 
noetics ς are possible). On this reading, the table serves primarily to summarise what can 
be known by means of a transcendental analysis or investigation of the forms and 
functions of our cognitive capacities. For example, that the faculty of sense, especially 
outer sense, is required for pure spatial intuitions to be possible, or that a pure analysis of 
                                                 
28 Coleridge’s formulations of (i)-(iii) are taken from Logic, 34-7, 39-41, 42-4, 73-6. See 32-4, 40-1, for 
Coleridge’s claim that (i)-(iii) are traditionally held views (at 40-1 Coleridge claims that the distinction 
between pure and empirical cognitive content originated with Pythagoras; at 32-4 he claims that the 
tripartite division of cognitive capacities and their contents was formalised by the time of Plotinus). 
29 Logic, 70. Coleridge’s phrasing here suggests that he regards this tripartite distinction as self-evident, or at 
least as resting on the dual authority of philosophical tradition and universal assent.  
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sense is able to show how the pure spatial intuitions from which geometrical knowledge 
derives are possible, and thus how geometrical knowledge itself is possible (and likewise 
with logical knowledge, which derives from pure concepts and their content, or noetic 
knowledge, which derives from pure intellectual intuitions or Ideas and their content).30 
In this case, Coleridge’s table of pure sciences is intended to show that φthe convenience and 
exact correspondence of [noetic, logic, and mathematics] to the three sources of the reason 
(ƭƯƵƲ), the understanding (ƫόƣƯƲ), and the sense ([ƨƥƹƱία])’ can be proven by a 
transcendental theory of cognition which shows not only that the different kinds of pure 
representations with which each of these nonempirical disciplines is concerned have an a 
priori origin in a corresponding cognitive capacity, but also that it is the pure contents 
and operations of these capacities which make such disciplines, and the different kinds 
of a priori knowledge to which they give rise, possible.31  
 
ii. From Classification to Analysis: Coleridge’s History of Faculty-Theory  
I have suggested above that Coleridge’s table of pure sciences should be considered in 
the context of his distinction between the employment of our faculties (which gives rise 
to, or makes apprehensible, constructible, etc., certain kinds of a priori evidence) and the 
analysis of our faculties (which shows how the presentation of such pure cognitive 
content and the a priori knowledge deriving from it is possible).32 With this distinction in 
mind, we can separate the two different interpretations of Coleridge’s table just outlined 
into an attempt to classify the different kinds of a priori evidence or pure representations 
and their sources on the one hand, and an attempt to explain how such a classification 
and the divisions of cognitive content it proposes must be theoretically grounded on the 
other. This is a useful approach to take, given that Coleridge tends to divide the history 
of philosophy (and especially theories of cognition) before and after Kant along fairly 
similar lines. According to Coleridge, while many of Kant’s ancient and early modern 
predecessors developed classifications of the different kinds of pure cognitive content, 
and linked these classifications to corresponding schemes of cognitive faculties, prior to 
the emergence of Kantian transcendental philosophy, no thinker had presented a 
complete theoretical account of the contribution made by the different cognitive 
faculties in the production and apprehension of a priori evidence. To use Coleridge’s 
terms, before Kant we had only the φmere classification’ of the different kinds of pure 
                                                 
30 See Logic, 43-4, 211-4, 236-8. 
31 See e.g. Logic, 211-4 (logic and mathematics), 225 (mathematics), 256-7 (logic). 
32 See Logic, 140, 212n, 265-6n. 
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representation, not the φtrue analysis’ of the cognitive faculties from a transcendental 
perspective, explaining how such a priori cognitive content is possible.33 While some 
philosophers recognised the need for an analysis of cognition that could show how the 
faculties produce and condition certain aspects or elements of sensible knowledge and 
experience, it was (the Critical period) Kant φwho first saw and communicated the[se] 
truths in their full extent, and with systematic comprehension’.34 
To give some examples of such anticipations of Kant’s transcendental method: 
Coleridge credits Pythagoras with having discovered the distinction between a priori and 
a posteriori knowledge (φThe perception of a truth, permanent, necessary, raised above all 
accident and all change [λ] flashed upon him in a geometrical contemplation’), and with 
having established that a priori cognitive content must derive from the mind’s φown acts 
and the products of those acts’.35 He also contends that the tripartite division of the 
cognitive faculties or powers into φthe reason (ƭƯƵƲ), the understanding (ƫόƣƯƲ), and the 
sense ([ƨƥƹƱία])’ and their respective a priori contents had been fully established by the 
time of φthe formation of the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, under the immediate 
successors of Alexander’.36 Coleridge suggests in his marginalia that certain aspects of the 
works of Plotinus and Proclus can be interpreted as anticipating Kant’s much later 
intuitionist account of mathematical cognition.37 The φcategories of Aristotle, with the 
fragments attributed on very suspicious authority to Archytas and the Pythagorean 
school’ are noted as φapproaches to [λ] the transcendental logic’.38 In the early modern 
period, Coleridge lists Bacon and Edward Herbert as having produced works that may 
be considered φas anticipations or an implication of’ transcendental philosophy, which 
φcommenc[ed] in a sort of tentative broadcast way’ the analysis of cognition and the 
faculties φbrought to a systematic Completion by Immanuel KANT in his Critik der 
rein[en] Vernunft’.39 Coleridge is not explicit about the details of these φanticipations’ and 
                                                 
33 Logic, 210; see also, 146-9, 205-6n, 211-4, 247-8, 268.  
34 Logic, 148-9n; cf. 205-6n. However, see also CL.IV.851ff; CM.IV.156; Logic, 243-4 for Coleridge’s claim 
that Kant’s precritical Inaugural Dissertation (1770) φcontain[s] the Germs’ of his transcendental philosophy 
(Coleridge is referring in particular to Kant’s theory of sensibility in this text).  
35 See Logic, 40-1. Here Coleridge clearly contrasts φthe phenomena transmitted by the outward sense’ (a 
posteriori cognitive contents) with φthe necessary, the permanent, the universal, or the truths having these 
attributes’ (a priori cognitive contents). See also, 132-3, 139-43. 
36 Logic, 33-4ff. For further discussion of this claim, see 3.3 above. 
37 Logic, 32-3. For Coleridge’s suggestion that Plotinus’s theory of φcreative contemplation’ anticipates 
certain aspects of Kant’s account of mathematical cognition, see 73-6, 245; for Coleridge’s suggestions 
concerning how Proclus anticipates Kant’s theory of sensible intuition, see CM.IV.156-8.  
38 Logic, 205-6n; cf. 5, where Coleridge claims that Aristotle was the first philosopher to recognise that for 
the rules of logic to have an a priori status (i.e. as the universal and necessary laws of thought), they must be 
φdrawn from the laws and constitution of the understanding itself’. 
39 Logic, 205-6n, CM.III.919, V.81-2. 
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φimplications’. In Herbert’s case, he may have in mind the way in which the theory of 
knowledge presented in De Veritate (1624) is developed in the context of an account of 
the mental faculties and their objects.40 In Bacon’s case, Coleridge seems to regard the 
Baconian claim that there are φinnate idols [λ] inherent in the nature of the intellect 
itself, which is found to be much more prone to error than the senses’ in Novum Organum 
(1620)41 as anticipating certain aspects of the Kantian theory of φTranscendental Illusion’ 
(human reason’s inherent tendency to self-deceit). In particular, Coleridge seems to hold 
that Bacon developed in outline the theory of the epistemic criteria that are grounded in 
the nature of the human intellectσespecially the understanding and its operationsσthat 
was later worked out in full by Kant, within the transcendental framework of the first 
Critique (Coleridge may interpret Herbert’s claims about the inherent limits of discursive 
cognition and the faculties responsible for it in a similar way).42 
Aside from Bacon and Herbert, Coleridge also designates Locke as one of the 
early modern philosophers who came closest to discovering Kant’s transcendental 
analysis of cognition and the faculties. He suggests that before Kant, Locke was the only 
philosopher to have noticed the significance of a distinction between analytic and 
synthetic judgements, in φthe third chapter of the fourth book’ of the Essay: 
 
In this chapter [probably IV.iii.22] our great essayist expressly distinguishes two sources of the 
mind’s judgments, and two sorts of knowledge as resulting therefromσthe first being the 
agreement or disagreement of the idea with itself, that is, analytic judgments, and the other the 
combination of two ideas into one subject, that is, synthetic judgments. And he adds that with 
regard to the latter the power of the mind, acting on its own resources, is very limitedσbut 
without particularising what the limits [of synthetic judgments] are, or what the knowledges 
contained within them 43 
 
Coleridge goes on to suggest that, had Locke φproceeded to this enquiry, he must have 
been led to the transcendental logic, that is, a true analysis of the understanding and not 
                                                 
40 For Coleridge’s knowledge of Herbert, see CL.II.682-3ff. For Herbert account of the faculties, see e.g. 
(1937 [1624]), 90-107, 232-88. For an endorsement of Coleridge’s assessment of Herbert as an anticipator 
of Kant, see Bedford (1979), 259-60. 
41 Bacon, (2000 [1620]), 18ff. For Coleridge’s comments on similar passages, see Friend.I.491 and esp. Logic, 
39-40, where Coleridge states φthe very understanding itself, even independent of the causes that always in 
each individual possessor render it more or less turbid or uneven, does in the language of our immortal 
Verulam τipsa sua natura radios ex figura et sectione propria immutatυ’ (i.e. φ[as an uneven mirror,] by its 
very nature distorts the rays according to its own figure and section). He is quoting a variation of Bacon’s 
Distributio operis (1740), I.15. 
42 For Kant on Transcendental Illusion, see CPR, B354-66; cf. Coleridge at Logic, 139-40n. 
43 Logic, 209. As with Bacon and Herbert, Coleridge does not provide any direct quotes. 
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a mere classification of the ideas [i.e. φin Mr. Locke’s sense of the term as including all 
the immediate objects of the mind’].44 Leaving aside the problems posed by the analytic/ 
synthetic distinction, I want to focus here on Coleridge’s sense that Kant provided new 
insights into the φsources of the mind’s judgments, and [the] sorts of knowledge [λ] 
resulting therefrom’, and especially Coleridge’s claims that Kant φbrought to a systematic 
Completion’ the work of his philosophical predecessors in the field of analysing φthe 
power[s] of the mind, acting on its own resources’.45 
Coleridge considers the ancient and early modern philosophers listed above to be 
engaged, in different ways, in an φinquir[y into] what the [mind] could effect by its own 
powers, by reflection on its own acts and the products of those acts, for and within its 
own sphere’.46 It is this shared aim that marks them out as anticipators of Kant’s 
transcendental approach. What sets Kant’s Critical philosophy apart from the work of 
his predecessors, in Coleridge’s view, is that it develops the first systematic explanation 
of how a priori cognitive content and the knowledge deriving from it is possible, and the 
first theoretically well-grounded proof that certain features and principles of our 
cognition must originate φab intra’ or φa mente ipsa’ (i.e. φfrom within the mind itself’).47 
This is why Coleridge emphasises that Kant should be recognised as φthe proper inventor 
and founder of transcendental analysis’, the φaim and object [of] which [science] is to rise 
from the knowledge or matter of consciousness to the faculty by which it is known or 
presented’ (which proceeds φby strict investigation of the human faculties’ or φthe pre-
ponderative inquisition of the Weights & Measures of the Human Mind’).48 It must be 
noted here, however, that Coleridge also tends to highlight what he takes to be 
similarities between Kantian transcendental philosophy and some strands of ancient 
Platonic philosophy as much as he emphasises Kant’s supposed advances over such 
thinkers as Proclus and Plotinus in certain areas (primarily in the theory of sensory 
cognition and faculty-analysis).49 Thus, to get a better sense of what Coleridge considers 
most novel ς and most important ς in Kant’s transcendental analysis, we need to look 
                                                 
44 Logic, 210 (Coleridge adds this definition of φidea’, employed in a similar sense to the Kantian term 
φrepresentation’, at 210n; see also 233n). 
45 Coleridge holds that all acts of discursive cognition must consist in an epistemic judgement (see e.g. 
Logic, 239-40ff, 265-7; he interprets Kant as having the same view), so his claims about the φsources of the 
mind’s judgments’ should be considered in this context. 
46 Logic, 41. Coleridge uses the term φthe subjective’ instead of φthe mind’ here, but that the takes these 
terms to be equivalent is evident from his definition of φthe sum of all the subjective [as] comprehended in the name 
of mind or intelligence’ (Coleridge’s emphasis), or φthe mind in and for itself, [considered] separately from 
the objects of the senses and sensations’ (Logic, 37, 42). 
47 For this definition of the a priori, see Logic, 76 (cf. 39-41); CM.IV.355. See also 2.1-3 above. 
48 See Logic, 148-9, 248 (cf. 268); CN.III.3934 (c. Jun-Jul 1810), V.5080 (c. Dec 1823). 
49 On Kant, Proclus, and Plotinus, see esp. CM.IV.156-8 (cf. Logic, 73-5ff, 245). 
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more closely at how Coleridge contrasts Kant’s methods with those of the early modern 
philosophers whom he criticises as offering φa mere classification of the ideas’.50 As I will 
show, Locke and the Cambridge Platonists are Coleridge’s key reference points here. 
If we return for a moment to Coleridge’s table of the pure sciences, we can see 
that, on Coleridge’s account, philosophers before Kant would take the table to present a 
classification of the different faculties and their contents (although some, e.g. Locke, 
would of course reject the tenability of such a scheme of a priori evidence and its origins 
in the cognitive capacities or powers of the mind51); whereas Kant and those who follow 
his transcendental approach would take the table to present the results of an analysis of 
the faculties and their φinherent forms and functions’ which shows how these pure 
representations, and the knowledge deriving from them, is possible (and also that such 
cognitive content must have an a priori origin and status).52 Coleridge often uses Locke’s 
Essay to illustrate this difference. For instance, in a footnote to some remarks on how 
φthe critical inquisition into the intellectual faculties’ was not fully developed φpreviously 
to the appearance of the Critique on the Pure Reason’, Coleridge presents the following 
contrast between the methods of Locke and Kant: 
 
Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding is an enquiry respecting the (by him so called) ideas, 
that is, notions, conceptions, as the immediate objects of the faculty, and not an inquiry into 
the constitution of the faculty itself [λ] but as a distinct branch of speculation [such a 
transcendental inquiry or φinvestigation into the constitution and constituent forms’ of the 
faculties] did not exist before the publication of the Critique on the Pure Reason.53 
 
What Coleridge means here is that Locke’s Essay gives an account of the contents and 
operations of the understanding (i.e. those pure and empirical representations involved 
in discursive cognition), but does not explain what makes the contents and operations of 
this faculty possible, or consider the question of what is required to account for the 
possibility of such cognitive content. Coleridge says elsewhere that φas Locke teaches that 
the Understanding is but a Term signifying the Mind in a particular state of action, he 
means that the mind furnishes itself; and so he himself expresses the Thought[, by] 
                                                 
50 See Logic, 209-10 (cf. 205-6n). 
51 This, at least, is how Coleridge interprets Locke’s position in the Essay (see e.g. Logic, 183-4). However, 
on Coleridge’s view, insofar as Lockean φideas of reflection’ can be said to exist at all, they must be some 
kind of a priori form or content, deriving from or accessible through reflection on the acts and products of 
the mind (see e.g. Logic, 12-14, 37-41, 139-49, 232-5). 
52 See e.g. Logic, 146-9, 211-4, 239-48. 
53 Logic, 205n. The interpolated quote in square brackets is taken from Coleridge’s definitions of 
transcendental analysis and its aims at Logic, 146-9 (esp. 147-8). 
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defining Ideas of Reflection [as] φthose, which the mind gets by reflecting on its own 
operations within itself.’’54 So, given that Coleridge also claims that the operations of the 
mind can themselves be considered as a kind of cognitive content, his point here is not 
that Locke fails to offer any account of the operations of the understanding; rather, it is 
that Locke does not offer any adequate explanation of the kinds of representations that 
φthe mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself’.55 This is because, on 
Coleridge’s view, Locke’s Essay considers ideas of reflection only as the contents or 
φobjects of the faculty’, without proceeding to an φinvestigation into the constitution and 
constituent forms of the understanding’, which serves to explain not only that the ideas 
of reflection must have an a priori origin, but also how such representations and the 
knowledge deriving from them is possible a priori.56 Put in different terms, Locke takes it 
for granted that φthe mind furnishes itself’ and that we can distinguish between cognitive 
content deriving from (i) the operations of the mind and from (ii) the objects which 
affect the mind from without (via the senses), and therefore offers only a φmere 
classification’ of these different kinds of ideas or representations. What Locke fails to 
provide is the kind of theoretical framework which shows, by means of an φanalysis of 
our intellectual faculties’, how φthe constitutive forms, or constitutional acts and functions’ 
of these faculties condition and make possible their objects or contents.57 While Lockean 
reflection allows us to classify different kinds of cognitive content, Kant’s transcendental 
reflection enables φthe formation of right notions, or the mind’s [acquisition of] knowledge 
of its own constitution and constituent faculties as far as it [i.e. such a knowledge of φthe 
constitution of the subject’] is obtained by reflection’.58 
 I give a more detailed discussion of Coleridge’s views on φthe constitution and 
constituent forms’ of the cognitive faculties in 4.3 (cf. 3.4). For now, all that needs to 
noted is that Coleridge conceives of such constitution in purely functional terms. As is 
suggested by his talk of φthe constitutive forms, or constitutional acts and functions, of the 
SENSE and of the understanding’, for Coleridge, to speak of the constitution or the 
constituent forms of a faculty is just to speak of the cognitive activities or functions in 
which the exercise of this faculty is taken to consist. The forms and functions of sense 
and understanding are φconstituent’ or φconstitutional’ only in the sense that, taken 
together, these forms are the cognitive operations which constitute the intuitive sensory 
                                                 
54 CL.II.680; Coleridge is quoting from Essay, II.i.4. 
55 For Coleridge’s further comments on this problem, see Logic, 184n, 233n. See also CL.II.679ff. 
56 See Logic, 146-9; cf. 205-6n, 211-4. 
57 See Logic, 146-7. For further discussion of this issue, see 3.1-4 above, 4.5 below. 
58 See Logic, 12-14, 145-6; cf. 43n, 203n. 
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and discursive intellectual capacities that we designate as φsense’ and φunderstanding’ (this 
is also the case with those intuitive intellectual capacities designated as φreason’, or φthe 
power of ideas’).59 The underlying connection between Coleridge’s conception of 
cognitive constitution and his distinction between a classification of representations and 
a transcendental investigation and analysis of the cognitive faculties by which any such 
representations must be presented to the mind can be seen in the following note, where 
Coleridge explains what he thinks is lacking from the analyses of knowledge offered by 
the Cambridge Platonists, particularly John Smith and Henry More: 
 
What they all wanted was, a pre-inquisition into the mind itself, as part Organ, part Constituent 
of all Knowledge: an examination of the Scales, Weights, and Measures themselves, abstracted 
from the Objects to be weighed or measured by themσin short, a transcendental Analysis 
Æsthetic, Logic, and Noetic. Lord Herbert was at the entrance of, nay, already some paces 
within, the Shaft and Adit of the Mine, but he turned abruptly back [Coleridge does not state 
why]σand the Honor of establishing a compleat Propædia of Philosophy was reserved for 
Immanuel Kant a century or more afterwards.60 
 
I will consider the significance of the crossed out words below, since these offer some 
useful insights into Coleridge’s conception of transcendental knowledge and its limits. 
But first, I want to consider how Coleridge’s claims here relate to his table of the pure 
(and empirical) sciences. The reference to φa pre-inquisition into the mind [λ], as part 
Organ, part Constituent of all Knowledge’ makes clear Coleridge’s view that we need a 
transcendental inquiry into cognition to understand not only how the mind acquires, or 
apprehends, certain kinds of cognitive content (as an organ of knowledge), but also what 
contribution the mind itself makes to the production of such content (as a constituent of 
knowledge). Thus, φthe Scales, Weights, and Measures themselves, abstracted from the 
Objects to be weighed or measured by them’ here represent the φconstitutive forms, or 
constitutional acts and functions’ of sense, understanding and reason, while the φObjects’ 
from which we abstract in a transcendental investigation into such forms and functions 
of cognition represent the different kinds of content given in our various cognitive states 
(i.e. our pure and empirical ideas or representations). Bearing in mind Coleridge’s claims 
                                                 
59 See e.g. Logic, 43-5, 146-7, 151-4ff, 163-5, 248-54. 
60 CM.V.81-2. This annotation was written on the flyleaves of Coleridge’s copy of John Smith’s Select 
Discourses (1660). He makes a similar assessment of Cambridge Platonism (and other areas of seventeenth-
century Latitudinarian thought) at CM.III.918-21, a footnote on the flyleaves of his copy of Henry More’s 
Theological Works (1708). Both sets of marginalia were written c. 1823-4. Although Coleridge is very familiar 
with Spinoza’s theory of knowledge, he does specify if he thinks Spinoza is guilty of the same errors. 
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that the φaim and object’ of transcendental philosophy φis to rise from the knowledge or 
matter [i.e. content] of consciousness to the faculty by which it is known or presented’, we 
can also see how his division of this transcendental φexamination of the Scales, Weights, 
and Measures [of cognition] themselves’ into aesthetic, logic, and noetic is related to his 
table’s division of our pure representations into the a priori evidence or contents of sense, 
understanding, and reason.  
As I explained earlier (see 4.1), in this context, to φrise from’ the content of some 
cognitive state to the faculty or cognitive power φby which it [i.e. a cognitive state and its 
contents] is known or presented’ involves showing (1) that such cognitive content, or 
certain of its fundamental features, must originate in the operations of this faculty, and 
thus (2) that the possibility of the former (as something given or presented to the mind) 
is in some way dependent on the nature and functions of the latter (as the faculty or 
power which makes such presentation possible).61 Thus, a transcendental aesthetic rises 
from the content of pure sensible intuitions to show that these representations are 
dependent upon, or grounded in, the faculty of sense and its operations or inherent 
forms and functions. A transcendental logic rises from the content of pure conceptions 
to show that these representations are dependent upon, or grounded in, the faculty of 
understanding and its operations or inherent forms and functions. Likewise, 
transcendental noetic rises from the content of pure intellectual (or spiritual) intuitions 
to show that these representations are dependent upon, or grounded in, the faculty of 
reason.62 As noted in 4.1 (cf. 2.1), this transcendental account of the cognitive faculties 
and their content has the further implication that, if we accept the claim that the pure 
content or a priori evidence presented by each faculty gives rise to a corresponding pure 
science or nonempirical inquiry, then a transcendental inquiry into the φconstitutive forms, 
or constitutional acts and functions’ of a given faculty is able to explain not only the 
possibility of the cognitive content with which its corresponding pure science is 
concerned, but also the possibility of the knowledge deriving from this content (which in 
turn allows us to account for the possibility of each pure science itself). Consequently, 
transcendental aesthetic enables us to account for the possibility of the evidence of 
sense, and thus for the possibility of the mathematical knowledge deriving from these 
pure sensible intuitions. Transcendental logic enables us to account for the possibility of 
                                                 
61 See Logic, 68-70, 145-7, 152-4, 211-4, 238-45. This is why Coleridge claims that φthe knowledge of the 
constitution of the mental faculties forms the science of transcendental analysis’ (213), conceived as an 
φinvestigation into the constitution and constituent forms of [our mental faculties]’ (147). 
62 See CM.V.81-2; cf. esp. Logic, 34-7, 211-4, 237-8. 
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the evidence of the understanding, and thus for the possibility of the logical knowledge 
deriving from these pure conceptions. Transcendental noetic enables us to account for 
the possibility of the evidence of reason, and thus for the possibility of the noetic 
knowledge deriving from these pure intellectual intuitions. It is these results of the 
transcendental theory of cognition that Coleridge’s table of pure sciences serves to 
summarise, and to which he refers in the marginal note quoted above.63  
In sum, Coleridge’s table shows how, by a transcendental inquiry into our 
cognitive faculties or powers, we can account for the possibility of certain kinds of pure 
(and empirical) cognitive content, and thereby also for the possibility of the different 
kinds of knowledge taken to derive from such content. It is only the a priori evidence 
concerning such claims about the conditions of the possibility of certain kinds of 
cognitive content and the experience and knowledge constituted by or deriving from 
such content that constitutes transcendental representation (i.e. a priori contents and 
cognitions with a transcendental status). Our awareness, e.g., that φLogic = the evidence 
of understanding’, i.e. that logical knowledge is made possible by the pure conceptions 
that have their origin in the understanding and its operations (as the pure representations 
that are made possible by the a priori acts and products of the understanding) would be a 
transcendental representation that yields transcendental knowledge: that special kind of a 
priori knowledge that consists in φris[ing] from the knowledge or matter of consciousness to 
the faculty by which it is known or presented’.64 Given this view, the division of four 
classes of evidence and knowledge presented in Coleridge’s table of sciences, can be read 
as a series of four transcendental claims about the possibility of such evidence and 
knowledge, and particularly about the cognitive capacities which are the conditions 
required to account for the possibility of such cognitive content, divided into the three 
nonempirical or pure kinds of knowledge (noetic, logic, and mathematics), and the single 
kind of empirical knowledge (which gives rise to physics or φthe sciences of experience’). 
We require a transcendental aesthetic, logic, and noetic in order to account for the 
respective contributions which our three cognitive capacities of sense, understanding, 
and reason make to these different kinds of content and the knowledge deriving from it, 
as well as to account for the role each of these capacities plays in the constitution of our 
sensory experience and cognition.65   
                                                 
63 CM.IV.81-2. See also 4.3 below. 
64 Logic, 248. 
65 See CM.IV.81-2 (cf. III.918-21). See also Logic, 139-49 (cf. 34-41, 44-5n). 
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Having considered how Coleridge’s table of pure sciences is informed by, and 
thus reflects, his interpretation of transcendental philosophy, we are now in a position to 
discuss in more detail Coleridge’s views on the application of such a transcendental 
theory of cognition and its principles. In the next few sections (see 4.3-5), I will take a 
closer look at (1) why Coleridge claims that transcendental inquiry serves a primarily 
preparatory function (as what he calls the φcompleat Propædia of Philosophy’); (2) the 
ways in which Coleridge distinguishes transcendental knowledge from the other three 
main categories of a priori knowledge (mathematics, logic, and noetics), with a focus in 
particular on how Coleridge characterises the different kinds of a priori representations 
and cognitions that derive from sense, understanding, and reason, and from 
transcendental theoretical inquiry into the forms and functions of these faculties; and (3) 
how Coleridge characterises the aims, objects, and limits of transcendental inquiry and 
particularly his conception of the kind of pure content given or contained in what Kant 
calls a φtranscendental representation’. To lay the ground for some of this discussion, I 
conclude this section by briefly considering the significance of Coleridge’s crossing out 
of the words φitself’ and φanalysis’ from the overview of the three distinct branches of 
transcendental inquiry in the marginal note quoted above. 
 
iii. Coleridge on Transcendental Inquiry & the Unanalysability of Reason 
Coleridge’s reason for crossing out φitself’ here is quite straightforward. It indicates his 
recognition that although the transcendental theory of cognition is the kind of pure 
inquiry which abstracts from all empirically given sensory content, such a theory must 
still give an account of the role of this material element of cognition (φthe impressions 
from external objects’66) in the constitution of experience and knowledge. To provide a 
complete explanation of the nature of sensible experience and cognition, we need to 
consider not only the φthe Scales, Weights, and Measures themselves, abstracted from the 
Objects to be weighed or measured by them’ (i.e. the a priori forms and functions of our 
cognitive faculties), but also the a posteriori sensory content or matter which is taken to 
come to us, or be given, φfrom without’ whenever external things affect or act upon the 
senses, and which is thus also φpart Constituent of [our] Knowledge’ (at least insofar as 
such knowledge refers to the sensible objects of empirical cognition).67 So, in short, even 
if a Kantian transcendental theory of cognition holds that the mind must condition, and 
contribute to, the content of all our cognitive states, we still need some account of the 
                                                 
66 Logic, 76; cf. 37-8, 111-2, 132-3, 139-43, 262-8. 
67 CM.IV.81. 
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contents and conditions which are not contributed by the mind itself, in order to explain 
what is required for such cognitive states to be possible at all. 
Coleridge’s reasons for crossing out the word φanalysis’ from his marginal note 
on transcendental inquiry and its threefold division are somewhat more complicated, and 
will need to be put in the context of Coleridge’s account of the pure cognitive content 
that he calls φthe evidence of reason’ (see 4.3-5). For now I give only an outline of the 
relevant problems. The main issues here are (i) that Coleridge rejects Kant’s claim that all 
our knowledge must be discursive (φby means of conceptions’ in Coleridge’s definition), 
(ii) that Coleridge holds a different conception of reason and its limits, and thus reassigns 
the source of Kantian φtranscendental illusion’ from reason to the human understanding 
(see 3.2), and (iii) that Coleridge therefore allows for a kind of transcendental knowledge 
that is nondiscursive and nonconceptual (and which is therefore not acquired by means 
of transcendental reflection).68 As we have seen, Coleridge holds that by reflecting on the 
pure contents and operations of our cognitive faculties (their a priori acts and products), 
we can acquire a transcendental conception of the φinherent forms or [λ] several 
functional powers’ of these faculties. He terms this procedure a φtranscendental analysis’ 
of the faculties, φwhere neither the thing nor the knowledge is the subject of investigation 
[i.e. neither the object nor the content of cognition], but the faculty by which the thing is 
known’ (Coleridge adds that φthis perhaps is the most intelligible explanation of the term 
τtranscendentalυ’).69 However, Coleridge also holds that the reason, or φthe power of 
ideas’, is a special kind of cognitive capacity with contents and operations which cannot 
be subject to such analysis. To see why Coleridge claims that reason cannot be subject to 
transcendental analysis, and yet still holds that there can be a φtranscendental noetic’ 
(which seeks to explain the a priori origins and a priori possibility of the pure cognitive 
content deriving from reason), we will need to look briefly at Coleridge’s claims about 
φtranscendental exposition’ and its limits. This will help to show that although Coleridge 
takes our transcendental knowledge to derive from φthe formation of right notions, or the 
mind’s knowledge of its own constitution and constituent faculties as far as it is obtained 
by reflection’, he also holds that there are principles of transcendental knowledge which 
cannot be obtained by reflection.70 
                                                 
68 This is discussed further in 4.3-5 below.  
69 Logic, 154, 213-4. While Coleridge holds that transcendental analysis is not concerned with a priori 
representations and cognitions per se, he nevertheless takes reflection upon such pure cognitive content to 
be part of transcendental inquiry (since it is by means of such transcendental reflection that we identify the 
φconstitutional forms, or constitutional acts and functions’ of the faculties). 
70 Logic, 13; cf. e.g. 18, 242, 265-6n on such reflection. 
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According to Coleridge, the kind of knowledge derived from a φtranscendental     
exposition’ of any given cognitive faculty φrests in the ascertainment of the faculty the 
existence of which we know only by means of reflection, i.e. by an exercise of one of the 
functions of the faculty’.71 Since Coleridge claims here that to know the existence of a 
faculty by means of reflection is to exercise one of the functions of this faculty, it initially 
seems that this definition of transcendental exposition could apply only to the 
understanding and its functions (given that, on Coleridge’s view, the understanding is 
φthe reflective faculty’). However, this statement comes in Coleridge’s chapter on the 
faculty of sense and the pure forms of intuition, so it is arguably more likely that what he 
means here is that acquiring a knowledge of the existence of a particular faculty by 
means of reflection is a process that requires reflecting on the cognitive activities that are 
involved in the exercise of this faculty and its functions (i.e. the process Kant calls 
φtranscendental reflection’).72 In this context, to φascertain’ a faculty means to identify the 
acts and products (or operations and contents) which belong to, or are φsituated in’, this 
faculty. Thus, to ascertain, or explain in transcendental terms, the faculty of sense just is 
to identify the pure forms of intuition by reflecting on the cognitive activity involved in 
the exercise of this faculty and the cognitive content produced by it (i.e. our pure 
sensible intuitions). Likewise, to ascertain the faculty of understanding is to identify the 
pure forms of conception and judgement by reflecting on the cognitive activity involved 
in the exercise of this faculty and the cognitive content produced by it (i.e. our pure 
conceptions).73 In the case of reason however, we cannot identify its forms and functions 
by means of transcendental reflection, because the acts and products of reason cannot be 
given or known through such a discursive and reflective process, and therefore cannot 
be analysed in the same way as the acts and products of the sense and understanding. 
Rather, these pure intellectual intuitions and their contents can only be known intuitively 
through an act of Platonic-style noesis.74 This means transcendental noetic must involve 
some kind of intuitively acquired knowledge of how the inherent forms and functions of 
reason make such intuitions possible. The transcendental principle of explanation is still 
the same: an inquiry into the operations and content of the cognitive capacity in question 
allows us to acquire knowledge of how certain kinds of pure cognitive content and the a 
                                                 
71 Logic, 169. 
72 CPR, B316; see also B33-5, 74-82; cf. Coleridge’s similar statements at Logic, 151-4, 234, 266n; for 
further discussion of transcendental reflection see 4.1 above. 
73 On this procedure of φascertainment’ see esp. Logic, 213-4, where Coleridge claims that the φinherent 
forms and functions or [λ] several functional powers’ of sense and understanding φare capable of being 
enumerated and defined’ (by means of a transcendental or pure analysis of these faculties). 
74 See e.g. Logic, 34-6, 43-4, 236-8. 
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priori cognitions deriving from it are possible; but the means of acquiring this knowledge 
is different. To make sense of Coleridge’s position here, and to clarify what distinguishes 
transcendental noetic from transcendental logic and transcendental aesthetic, we must 
turn now to Coleridge’s more detailed characterisation of the cognitive faculties and their 
a priori contents and operations, considering in particular how this characterisation relates 
to his two-level theory of the a priori. 
 
4.3 Coleridge’s Two-Level Theory of the A Priori: The Grounds for the Distinction 
Between Transcendental Analysis & Transcendental Noetic 
i. Coleridge on Conditionally vs. Absolutely Necessary A Priori Forms 
As noted earlier, in 2.1, in Logic Coleridge defines the a priori as φan act or product of the 
mind itself considered as distinct from the impressions from external objects’ or as those 
conditions and features of our cognition that have their origin ab intra (φfrom within’, or 
φa mente ipsa [from the mind itself]’, as Coleridge puts it elsewhere).75 Put another way, if 
something ς whether an act or product of the mind, or some kind of cognitive content 
deriving from such acts and products ς is characterised as a priori in this way, then φall 
means and materials a posteriori are excluded from [it]’: it must be conceived as being 
independent of whatever can be given empirically, or apprehended through ordinary 
sense-experience.76 This is why Coleridge claims that for some kind of cognitive content 
or knowledge to qualify as a priori, it must φhav[e] a higher evidence than that which the 
senses can afford, or which can belong to objects of the bodily sense considered as 
matters of fact’.77 Similarly, he identifies the a priori with φthe necessary, the permanent, 
the universal, or the truths having these attributes’, and also remarks that φtruths a priori, 
from which the facts of experience are contradistinguished, are characterised by a sense 
of necessity’ (which Coleridge here contrasts with the φsense of contingency’ that 
φaccompani[es]’ the empirically given).78 In sum: Coleridge claims that whatever is a priori 
must (1) derive from within the mind, (2) be given or known independently of sense-
experience, (3) be characterised by universality, necessity, and φpermanence’ (Coleridge’s 
term for what is immutable or invariant in our cognition), and that it (4) may also be a 
necessary condition of the possibility of experience, or a necessary condition of certain 
                                                 
75 Logic, 76; cf. 141-2, 145-6. See also CM.IV.355. For further discussion of this Coleridgean reading of the 
Kantian a priori, see 2.1-3 above. 
76 Logic, 212. 
77 Logic, 36. Cf. 34, 111-2, 139-43. 
78 Logic, 141. See also 40 for Coleridge’s references to the φperception of a truth, permanent, necessary, and 
raised above all accident and change [apprehended] in a geometrical contemplation’. 
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kinds of knowledge (logical, mathematical, metaphysical, and natural-scientific).79 In this 
section I will focus on how Coleridge distinguishes between two different kinds of a 
priori necessity: the φconditional necessity’ that is grounded in the cognitive constitution 
of finite human subjects and the φabsolute necessity’ that is grounded in the infinite or 
φEternal Mind’ of God.80 I will be contending that Coleridge holds a two-level theory of 
the a priori, and that his distinction between absolute and conditional necessity follows 
from his distinction between what I will call a φnoetic’ or Platonic conception of the a 
priori (as objectively real) and a φtranscendental’ or Kantian conception of the a priori (as 
subjectively real).81 First, however, it will be useful to recapitulate the main features of 
Coleridge’s threefold division of the diverse kinds of a priori evidence (nonempirical or 
pure cognitive content) and their respective sources. 
 As was shown in 3.1-4.2, Coleridge recognises one general source of a posteriori 
evidence (sensory experience, taken as the combined activities of the bodily senses and 
our cognitive capacities), but contends that we must distinguish between three different 
sources of a priori evidence: The cognitive capacities of reason, understanding, and sense, 
each of which corresponds to a specific φpure science’ and its field of a priori inquiry. This 
division follows from φthe universally admitted and understood diversity of metaphysic 
[or noetics], logic and mathematics, and the convenience and exact correspondence of these [pure 
sciences] to the three sources of the reason (ƭƯƵƲ), the understanding (ƫόƣƯƲ), and the sense 
(ƬάƨƧƳƧƲ [or ƨƥƹƱία])’.82 As we saw in 4.1, in Coleridge’s terms, what it means for a given 
cognitive capacity to be the source of a pure science is that it is the capacity taken to be 
responsible for (i.e. the ground or origin of) the kinds of pure representations or a priori 
cognitive contents with which a particular nonempirical mode of inquiry is concerned. 
This is why Coleridge claims that he is presenting φa view of the [cognitive] powers from 
which the [pure] sciences derive their name and character’ when he gives his account of 
the capacities of reason, understanding, and sense and the different kinds of cognitive 
content (or evidence) which is presented to the mind through the acts or operations of 
each capacity.83 He takes a priori evidence to concern the operations of a particular 
capacity (its acts) and the cognitive content(s) given a priori through these acts (its φpure 
products’). Thus, the evidence of reason concerns intellectual intuitions and their content 
(i.e. the Ideas, which give rise to noetic knowledge), φthe evidence of understanding’ 
                                                 
79 See e.g. Logic, 39-41, 76, 140-7. See also 2.1-3 above. 
80 See esp. Logic, 146; cf. 43n, 43-4, 236-8. 
81 Coleridge sets out this distinction at Logic, 145-6 (cf. 43-4, 140n, 202n). 
82 Logic, 70. 
83 Logic, 35. 
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concerns pure conceptions and their contents (which give rise to logical knowledge), and 
φthe evidence of sense’ concerns pure intuitions and their contents (which give rise to 
mathematical knowledge). Accordingly, Coleridge contends that we can φdefine reason as 
the power of ideas, the understanding [as] the faculty of conceptions, and the sense [as] 
the source and faculty of intuitions and perceptions’84.  
As I will be arguing in this section (and in those that follow), what distinguishes 
these three cognitive capacities and the different kinds of knowledge that derive from 
their respective operations and contents is that, on Coleridge’s account, those a priori 
truths and principles of mathematics and logic that derive from the forms of sense and 
understanding have a conditional necessity, whereas the a priori truths of noetics that 
derive from reason have an absolute necessity. It is in this distinction that Coleridge’s 
two-level theory of the a priori consists, for his theory is grounded in a distinction 
between subjectively real and objectively real a priori forms, or between those forms or 
principles that are finite-mind-dependent and those which are finite-mind-independent. 
With this in mind, it should be noted that for Coleridge, phrases like φobjectively real’ or 
φproperly and wholly objective’ simply mean or refer to what is real and true independent 
of the conditions of human cognition: i.e. those objects and principles that are taken to 
subsist in a finite-mind-independent way. To use the terms introduced in 2.1, whatever is 
subjectively real or finite-mind-dependent has what Coleridge terms a φrelative’ necessity, 
universality, and permanence (i.e. it is φreal in relation to the human mind as the subject’), 
while whatever is objectively real or finite-mind-independent has what he calls φabsolute’ 
necessity, universality, and permanence (i.e. it is φproperly and wholly objective’, and has 
a φreality beyond [λ] appearances, or beyond the human mind collectively taken’).85 
Simply put, Coleridge’s two-level theory of the a priori distinguishes between the 
conditional a priori, which he takes to be grounded in the φconstituents’ or φcomponent 
faculties’ common to all finite human minds (sense and understanding), and the absolute 
a priori, which he takes to be grounded in the infinite mind of God (which is itself the 
source and ground of reason, including the capacity of the human mind to exercise its 
rational powers). This is why Coleridge distinguishes sharply between the φunindividual 
and transcendent character of the reason as a presence to the human mind, [that is] not a 
particular faculty or component of the mind’ and φthe understanding and the sense [that] 
                                                 
84 Logic, 68. Coleridge uses φidea’ here in a Neoplatonic sense, as an intelligible or noumenal principle taken 
to be apprehensible through non-sensible (spiritual or intellectual) intuition (see Logic, 236-8). 
85 See Logic, 142-6 (cf. 127-31), and esp. 172-3. See also 3.4 above. 
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are the two constituents of the mind’.86 What he means is that sense and understanding 
must be considered φin subordination to [reason], and as more properly constituting the 
mind in its specific sense as the human mind’. (as Coleridge notes elsewhere, all it means 
to say that sense and understanding are constituents or components of the human mind 
is that these are the terms we use to refer to those sensory and intellectual capacities that 
the human mind is ordinarily taken to possess, without any reference to claims about the 
material neurophysiological structures or immaterial spiritual substances in which such 
capacities might be grounded).87 This is also why, in a lengthy footnote on the nature of 
self-consciousness, Coleridge asserts that: 
 
We cannot too early familiarise the mind to the distinction between the conditional finite τIυ, 
which knows itself [only through] distinct consciousness by occasion of experience, [and] 
which is so far not improperly named by the followers of Kant the empirical τIυ (das empirische 
Ich), and the absolute τI amυ, and likewise the inherence of the former in the latter τin whom 
we live and move and have our beingυ.88 
 
In Coleridge’s view, the conditional or finite φI’ is the ground or source of the φprinciples 
of knowing’ which necessarily condition all human sense-experience and sensory 
cognition. These principles, however, govern only the objects of knowledge which are 
apprehended from the finite human standpoint, and can tell us nothing about what 
Coleridge calls φthe wholly and properly objectiveσi.e. [things which] have a subsistence 
independently of the mind which contemplates them’.89 So, in Coleridge’s terminology, 
the forms or principles of sense and understanding, which have a φconditional necessity’ 
deriving from the constitution of the human subject, should not be confused with the 
φprinciples of being’ which govern those objects which subsist independently of the 
human mind and the forms and conditions of its cognition. It is only in God, or φthe 
absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind, the underived and eternal τI Amυ [λ that] we find the 
principle of being and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality, the ground of existence, and 
the ground of the knowledge of that existence, absolutely one and identical’.90 Thus, it is 
God, conceived as the φunderived and eternal τI Amυ’, who is the ground or source of 
those φprinciples of being’ which Coleridge designates as the φDivine Ideas’ that have an 
                                                 
86 Logic, 69-70. 
87 Logic, 44; cf. 70n. 
88 Logic, 85n. Coleridge is of course quoting (with variations) Acts 17.28. 
89 See Logic, 142 for this definition of objectivity (cf. 141n, 145-6ff). 
90 Logic, 84-5 (cf. BL.I.264-86) 
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φabsolute necessity’ (deriving from the eternal, unbounded creative activity of God, φthe 
absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind’).91 Given that only those principles that derive from, or are 
grounded in, the absolute mind of God can function as both epistemic and ontological 
principles, only the Divine Ideas can be considered as objectively real (i.e. as finite-mind-
independent) a priori forms or principles that have a scope and validity extending beyond 
the limits of human sensory cognition and its objects. 
Coleridge holds that the conditionally necessary principles or forms of knowing 
are required to account for the possibility of human sensory experience, as well as for the 
possibility of logical, mathematical, and natural-scientific knowledge. He takes all such 
principles to be a priori in the Kantian sense, as forms which condition all knowledge and 
experience from the finite human standpoint, and holds that we can discover these forms 
through a transcendental φinvestigation into the constitution and constituent forms of the 
understanding [and sense]’, which is carried out through reflection on the contents and 
operations of the human mind (and is therefore a discursive or conceptual kind of 
knowledge).92 Conversely, the absolutely necessary principles or forms of being and of 
knowing are required to account for the existence of all objects (mental and physical), as 
well as for the existence of the human subjects in which the conditionally necessary 
principles of knowing subsist. Coleridge takes these principles of being and knowing to 
be a priori in the Platonic sense, as forms which determine the nature of all objects which 
subsist independently of finite human subjects, and holds that we can discover these 
principles only through a Platonic-style noesis or intellectual intuition (our knowledge of 
these principles is therefore intuitive or nondiscursive, i.e. noetic or acquired by means 
of Ideas rather than concepts).93 In what follows, I discuss how Coleridge’s distinction 
between the φconditionally necessary’ principles of knowing and the φabsolutely necessary’ 
principles of being is closely related to his further distinctions between φreal’ and φformal’ 
knowledge, and subjective and objective necessity (or between the φuniversally subjective’ 
a priori and the φreal objective’ a priori). 
 
ii. Coleridge on the Subsistence of Subjective & Objective A Priori Forms 
An important reference point here is Coleridge’s account in Statesman’s Manual of the 
φthreefold Necessity’ which governs the different kinds of knowing and being: 
 
                                                 
91 Logic, 83-5ff, 146-7, 236-8; see also esp. φOn the Divine Ideas’ in OM, 214-90 
92 See Logic, 146-7, 211-4, 242-8ff. 
93 See Logic, 169, 211-4, 236-8; OM, 214-90 (esp. 206-8ff, 221-4ff, 275-6ff). 
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There is a logical, and there is a mathematical, necessity; but the latter is always hypothetical, 
and both subsist formally only, not in any real object. Only by the intuition and immediate 
spiritual consciousness of the idea of God, as the One and Absolute, at once the Ground and 
the Cause, who alone containeth in himself the ground of his own nature, and therein of all 
natures, do we arrive at the third, which alone is a real objective, necessity. Here the immediate 
consciousness decides: the idea is its own evidence, and is insusceptible of all other. It is 
necessarily groundless and indemonstrable; because it is itself the ground of all possible 
demonstration. The Reason hath faith in itself, in its own revelations.94 
 
We can get a better sense of how Coleridge’s claims in this passage are related to his 
distinction between the two different kinds of a priori necessity, by considering them in 
the context of what he says in Logic about φthe distinction which I have been called upon 
to observe and make between real and formal knowledges, and [between] the real and 
formal sciences in consequence’.95 In particular, what Coleridge means in claiming that 
the necessary truths of logic and mathematics φboth subsist formally only, not in any real 
object’ becomes clearer in his account of the mental acts that are studied by the formal 
sciences (and which are taken to be separate from mind-independent things): 
 
Whether I speak of a man’s soul or his body, I speak of a something which I suppose to 
subsist of itself and not contained in the act of my contemplation. But when I say that what is 
true of all must be true of each, [λ] or simply affirm that [whatever is affirmed of a generic 
conception applies to all subordinates or particulars in that conception], I am not speaking of 
any thing, but of the acts of my own mind and the law or form according to which it acts or 
ought to act. Now the sciences which teach these forms are hence contradistinguished as 
formal sciences, and in this acceptation of the word, logic, geometry, and arithmetic are all 
alike formal sciences.96 
 
These claims reflect Coleridge’s conception of φthe essential Subjectivity of all abstract (or 
formal) Sciences, ex. gr. Logic, Geometry, &c’.97 Coleridge holds the laws of logic and 
mathematics to be universal and necessary (i.e. a priori), but he also claims that these laws 
are objective only in φthe secondary and metaphorical sense of τobjectiveυ, [as] that 
which is universally and permanently subjective, that is, what all human subjects possess 
in common by necessity of their constitution’ (i.e. the universal forms of sense and 
                                                 
94 LS, 32. 
95 Logic, 42-3. 
96 Logic, 43. 
97 CM.II.887. 
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understanding, in which mathematical and logical knowledge are grounded, the former in 
our pure forms of sensible intuition, space and time, the latter in our pure forms of 
conceiving and judging, the categories).98 The sense in which the principles or truths that 
are φuniversally and permanently subjective’ are also objective is further elucidated by 
Coleridge in a different note: φin this connection and use of the words, τobjectiveυ is 
opposed to τsubjectiveυ as τuniversalυ to τindividualυ, and not as τrealυ to τformalυσin 
his terminology in Logic, such formal principles or truths are φuniversally subjective’ rather 
than φaccidentally subjective’: 
 
James sees that as yellow which to men in general appears as red, and this we say is 
[accidentally] subjective: that is, results from the individual subject. But no mind can confound 
the properties of a circle with those of a square. These are truths which subsist in all beings 
possessing the faculties of sense and intelligence, independent of all will and without relation to 
individuality. They are in all minds as though they were but in one mind, and being in one 
mind are the same as in all. Hence they are called universal truths, while those which being 
equally universal are at the same time transcendent to sense, and irrelative to space and time, 
are entitled eternal truths.99 
 
We can see now that when Coleridge claims that φlogical and mathematical necessity’ 
φboth subsist formally only, not in any real object’, what he means is that such necessity 
φsubsists in all beings possessing the faculties of sense and intelligence’ (i.e. in the a priori 
forms of sense and understanding). While the truths of logic and mathematics are 
necessary for all beings with our cognitive constitution, they are only subjectively real, 
because they are grounded in principles or forms φthat have no subsistence but in the 
faculty of a finite mind’.100 Conversely, the other class of universal truths that Coleridge 
mentions in the passage just quoted (the Ideas), are φabsolutely necessary’: they determine 
φall objects and subjects above space and time’ (i.e. everything in the intelligible or 
noumenal world, which for Coleridge means that these truths and principles must also 
determine everything, whether mental or physical, in the sensible or phenomenal world), 
and have a φreal objective, necessity’ because they derive from the φunindividual and 
transcendent’ Reason, considered as φthe living source of living and substantial verities, 
                                                 
98 See Logic, 202n (cf. 43n, 211-4, 236-8). 
99 Logic, 43n. For more on this distinction between the universal and the accidental subjective, see 127-8, 
172-3 (here Coleridge notes the effects jaundice on an individual subject’s perception as an example of 
what is φaccidentally subjective’, while giving the capacity to perceive the spatiotemporally ordered 
manifold of sensible objects as an example of what is φuniversally subjective’).  
100 See OM, 276. 
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[which] presents the Idea to the individual mind and subjective intellect, which receives 
and employs [such Ideas] to its own appropriate ends, namely to understand thereby 
both itself and all its objects’.101 Ideas, as we saw above, do not have their subsistence in 
the faculty of a finite mind’, but in φthe absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind, the underived and 
eternal I Am [in which] we find the principle of being and of knowledge, of idea, and of 
reality, the ground of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of that existence’.102 
They are the noetic or objectively real a priori forms, what Coleridge calls φthe subsistence 
of the universe, material and intellectual’: Those eternal forms which are φcharacterised 
neither as object nor as subject exclusively, but as the identity of both [subject and 
object], as at once formal and real’.103 What makes Ideas φat once formal and real’ is that 
they are both epistemic principles, as the ground of our knowledge of all mind-
independent objects (anything that φI suppose to subsist of itself and not [to be wholly] 
contained in the act of my contemplation’), and ontological principles, as the ground of 
the existence of all such objects. In contradistinction to the formal principles of logic 
and mathematics, Ideas subsist in real objects, and so must be taken to be constitutive, at 
least in part, of those objects (of cognition) that are φproperly and wholly objectiveσi.e. 
[which can be taken to] have a subsistence independent of the mind which contemplates 
them’.104 While Coleridge certainly does not deny the mental reality of logical and 
mathematical principles, he is clear that they are only subjectively real (like space and 
time, taken as pure forms of intuition).105 
 Having considered the main features of Coleridge’s distinction between 
objectively real and subjectively real a priori forms (and between formal or φsubjective 
necessity’ and φreal objective necessity’), I want to turn now to Coleridge’s views on the 
differences between the various kinds of transcendental claims we can make concerning 
how to demonstrate the possibility of the nonempirical knowledge taken to derive from 
these two distinct types of a priori forms. This will also help to make clear Coleridge’s 
reasons for making a distinction between mathematical and logical knowledge on the 
one hand, and noetic knowledge on the other, even though he evidently regards both of 
these classes of nonempirical knowledge as a priori.  In particular, I will show why 
                                                 
101 OM, 274 (cf. LS, 32-3). 
102 See Logic, 85; OM, 276. 
103 See Logic, 43-4, OM, 274-6. Cf. esp. Logic, 87 definition of φthe noetic’ as φthat knowledge in which truth 
and reality are one and the same, that which in the ideas that are present to the mind recognises the laws 
that govern in nature, if we may not say the laws that are nature’ (see also, Friend.I.493n). 
104 Logic, 142. 
105 See e.g. Logic, 172-3 for Coleridge on the subjective reality of space and time (as the grounds of all 
geometrical and arithmetical truths and principles, they are universally subjective in the same way). 
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Coleridge separates the methods and principles employed in transcendental logic and 
transcendental aesthetic from those employed in transcendental noetic. I will take as my 
starting point here Coleridge’s definitions of noetics, and his account of what is involved 
in this nonempirical discipline that is concerned with the a priori contents and operations 
of reason (φthe evidence of reason’). As we will see, Coleridge’s statements here must be 
considered in the context of (i) his two-level theory of the a priori and (ii) his distinction 
between φtranscendent’ and φtranscendental’ philosophical methods. 
 
4.4 From the ‘Point of Reflection’ to the ‘Reality of Reason’: Noetic, the Universal 
Subjective, & the Principle of Subject-Object Identity 
i. Coleridge’s Apriority Criteria & the Evidence of Reason 
Given the first three apriority criteria outlined in 2.1 and 4.3, it is evident that the pure or 
nonempirical cognitive content which Coleridge terms φthe evidence of reason’ and φthe 
truths of reason’ must be regarded as having an a priori status. This is particularly evident 
in Coleridge’s descriptions of the field of pure enquiry he designates as φnoetics’, and his 
account of the relationship between the cognitive capacity or power of reason and the 
contents of noetics (the truths and principles of reason, i.e. Platonic Ideas, as employed 
in the speculative metaphysical fields of ontology, theology, and ethics): 
 
the consideration of [the evidence of reason], as the primary truthsσaeternae verities [eternal 
truths]σindependent of all time and place and in which the reason itself consists, gives rise to 
the science once called the first philosophy, then ontology, by othersσbut more laxly et 
improprie [and improperly]σmetaphysics, but for which the term τnoeticυ, or the science 
corresponding to the ƭƯƵƲ, would be the most unpresuming and most appropriate exponent. 
 
[Noetics involves] those permanent and universal truths which in the peculiar sense are entitled 
truths of reason, and mind contemplated as the source of these is designated the reason, or, 
using the Greek term for the after-convenience of its derivation, the ƭƯƵƲ.106 
 
These statements leave little doubt that Coleridge takes truths of reason to derive from 
the mind, to be given and known independently of ordinary sense-experience (i.e. the 
spatiotemporally ordered manifold of sensible intuition), and possess the characteristics 
of universality and permanence (as φtruths having these attributes’). That he also regards 
such truths as necessary is evident in Coleridge’s identification of these φprimary truths’ 
                                                 
106 Logic, 35-6, 43-4. 
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of reason with what he terms φprimary reality’ (i.e. φobjective reality’, or the world as it 
exists independently of human minds). Coleridge claims that φthe reality of reason’ is a 
ground and source of this primary reality (as well as of all our knowledge of such reality), 
and that truths of reason must thus be characterised by their φabsolute necessity’ (because 
such truths are independent of those conditions which determine and constrain human 
sensory cognition of the world).107 Thus, Ideas or truths of reason meet Coleridge’s first 
three apriority criteria. But as we saw earlier, Ideas are not only principles of knowing, 
but also principles of being, which are required to explain how those objects which have 
a subsistence independent of the finite minds which contemplate or perceive them can 
come to exist independently of such minds. This means the Ideas also meet Coleridge’s 
fourth apriority criterion: since we cannot explain how the objects that occasion sensory 
cognition come to exist without recourse to Ideas, these principles must be recognised as 
finite-mind-independent conditions of the possibility of experience (insofar as we accept 
the view, held by Coleridge, that there could be no experience of sensible objects at all, 
were there not some mind-independent realm of things to occasion such experience by 
affecting the mind through its sensory cognitive capacities). Without these φabsolutely 
necessary’ principles of being, grounded in the absolute mind of God, there would be no 
physical things for finite minds to experience, and indeed, no finite minds or subjects to 
acquire any experience or knowledge of such objects.108 
Given all of this, the truths of reason, and φthe evidence of reason’ from which 
our knowledge of these truths derives, may be considered as fulfilling Coleridge’s main 
criteria for apriority. Given that the evidence of reason does not contain, or refer to, any 
kind of cognitive content given or known a posteriori, it is also evident that the intellectual 
or spiritual intuitions through which such evidence of reason is given or presented to the 
mind qualify as Kantian pure representations (even though such intuitions are not a class 
of pure representations that Kant himself would recognise).109 Yet, when Coleridge first 
introduces his claim that the truths and principles of reason are characterised by their 
φabsolute necessity’, he does so not to indicate that such truths and principles must be 
regarded as one of the possible kinds of a priori cognitive content; rather, he wants to 
emphasise that the absolute necessity exhibited by the evidence of reason needs to be 
distinguished from φthe conditional necessity which inheres in the forms and functions 
                                                 
107 See Logic, 134, 145-6. See also 83-4ff for Coleridge’s claim that God, the absolute mind who grounds 
the reality of reason, must be the ground of existence and of our knowledge of existence, so that God is in 
effect both the ground and source of all reality and all cognition (cf. LS, 32-3).  
108 See Logic, 83-5ff. For a more detailed account, see OM, 214-90 (esp. 220-2ff, 275-6ff). 
109 For Coleridge on Kant’s denial of the possibility of intellectual intuition, see e.g. BL.I.288n.  
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of the understanding and the rules generalised from these, and which [has] the property 
of being affirmed a priori’.110 Coleridge appears to be suggesting here that the truths of 
reason must be contrasted with the kind of pure cognitive form and content which has 
φthe property of being affirmed a priori’. At the very least, he seems to be claiming that 
the cognitive form and content which derives from reason must be a priori in a different 
way to that which derives from the understanding. As we saw earlier (in 4.3), Coleridge 
makes this distinction partly because he holds that those a priori forms which derive from 
understanding (and sense) are subjectively real, or φhave no subsistence but in the faculty 
of a finite mind’, whereas those a priori forms which derive from φthe unindividual and 
transcendent’ reason are objectively real, because they φsubsist independently of the 
[finite, human] mind’.111 Below, I consider in further detail how Coleridge’s usage of the 
term φa priori’ in Logic relates to his distinction between what he calls φthe subjective’ and 
φthe objective’ in the same text. This will help lay the ground for a closer consideration of 
Coleridge’s transcendent/transcendental distinction and its relation to his claims about 
why an inquiry into the contents and operations of our cognitive capacities is required to 
demonstrate how certain kinds of cognitive content(s) are possible. 
 
ii. Coleridge on the Subjective, the Objective, & the Limits of Reflection  
In those sections of Logic which deal with the a priori, Coleridge contends that φthe 
knowledge of our intellectual nature is the substance and life of all our knowledge and 
the ground of intelligibility of all other objects of knowledge’.112 In other words, as he 
puts it elsewhere, in order to acquire a knowledge of the nature of the various possible 
objects of our experience and cognition, φwe surely ought to examine the nature of the 
faculties by which we acquire experience’ or carry out φan examination of our powers of 
knowledge’.113 According to Coleridge, such an inquiry into our φintellectual nature’ or 
φpowers of knowledge’ (i.e. cognitive capacities) 
 
supposes a knowledge first of that which, though common in kind to all men, we yet, each of 
us, are entitled to call τmineυ, or τmyselfυ, as contradistinguished from that which is τnot 
mineυ, τnot of myselfυσthat, viz. which we have so often spoken of as a knowledge of the 
subjective in contradistinction from the objective. And secondly a knowledge of that which is 
not myself, or of me as contradistinguished from that which the mind possesses in itself or 
                                                 
110 Logic, 146. 
111 See OM, 276; see also Logic, 145-6. 
112 Logic, 144. 
113 CN.III.3605. 
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communicates from its own stores, i.e. a knowledge of the objective as contradistinguished 
from the subjective. And lastly a knowledge of that which is distinguished from both, as 
transcending both and [being] of both the root and identity [i.e. a principle of subject-object 
identity, or φa principle of being, and of knowledge, or idea, and of reality’].114 
 
Bearing in mind that Coleridge elsewhere defines φsubjective’ as φthe mind [considered] in 
and for itself, separately from the objects of the senses and sensations’ (i.e. φthe sum of all 
the subjective comprehended in the name of mind or intelligence’) and φobjective’ as φnature [i.e. 
the sum of] all the phenomena by which other existence than our own is made known to 
us’, we can see that he is making distinctions here between (i) our knowledge of the mind 
and its contribution to cognition, (ii) our knowledge, or at least our sensory awareness, 
of what the mind does not contribute to cognition (and which is assumed to come to us 
φfrom without’), and (iii) our knowledge of the principle that makes possible a unification 
of these mind-dependent and mind-independent or mind-external contributions to our 
cognition and its objects, because it is φthe root and identity’ of both the subjective and 
objective elements of cognition.115 As we shall see, Coleridge claims that our knowledge 
of the subjective elements of cognition must be acquired through reflection (especially 
reflection on our cognitive operations), that our knowledge of the objective elements of 
cognition must be acquired through empirical sensible intuition, and that our knowledge 
of the principle that unifies these elements, both at the epistemic and ontological levels, 
must be acquired through intellectual intuition (and is therefore not accessible through 
reflection on our cognitive operations and contents, because such knowledge cannot be 
given or known discursively). 
Before expanding on the implications of these distinctions, Coleridge emphasises 
the connection between our knowledge of the subjective elements of cognition and the 
procedure of reflecting on the operations and contents of cognition:  
 
Now it is evident that the knowledge mentioned in the [first] place, which we may call the 
universal subjective, or that which is common to the race without distinction of individuals, 
must be acquired before we can form any judgement of the [second], the properly objective. At 
least from the point on which we have hitherto stood and are still standing, viz. the point of 
                                                 
114 Logic, 145 (quotation in square brackets taken from 85). 
115 For these definitions and distinctions, see also Logic, 37-8, 42-3. By φme as contradistinguished from that 
which the mind possesses in itself or communicates from its own stores’, I take Coleridge to mean our 
sensory awareness of φthe phenomena by which other existence than our own is made known to us’ (i.e. of 
those elements of cognition which must be given a posteriori, and which do not derive from, or originate in, 
the a priori operations and contents of the mind). 
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reflection. This must be necessary in as much as our knowledge of [the] objective [as acquired 
from the point of reflection] is merely negative. We affirm it to be objectiveσin other words, 
that the objects of such knowledge subsist independently of the mindσonly because it is not 
accompanied by the mark of the subjective, viz. its validity a priori, and because it is not 
included and therefore not to be evolved out of that which we know to be the subject itself.116 
 
Our knowledge of φthe universal subjective’, and of what is φevolved out of that which 
we know to the subject [i.e. the mind] itself’ is acquired from the φpoint of reflection’. 
What Coleridge means by this is only made clear later in the Logic manuscript, where he 
claims that when we analyse the (universally) subjective elements of cognition φwe should 
confine our inquisition to the data presented to us by reflection, and as they appear to us in 
the act of reflecting; or to the immediate inferences from these made necessary by the 
laws of reflection’.117 He will later identify Kant’s categories as φthe laws of reflection’, 
claiming that φAs long as we reflect, the categoric species [or φelementary conceptions’] 
must necessarily appear as the accompaniments of reflection, as the means by which, or 
the modes in which, we reflect, and not as the contingent objects of our reflection, not 
as the materials on which we reflect’.118 Here, however, Coleridge is concerned only with 
describing the standpoint of reflection itself: 
 
What those laws [of reflection] are is a subject for future inquiry, but be they what they may, it 
is easy to imagine some superior being capable of contemplating at once an individual mind 
and its objects, of judging how far and in what manner the objects are modified for the human 
mind by its own mechanism, and lastly of looking at the objects independent of such 
modification. Now he who disclaims all pretensions to any prerogative of this kind [i.e. of 
looking at the objects of cognition independent of their modification by the human mind], or 
who, though believing that a substitute or something analogous to it [i.e. this mind-independent 
perspective] subsists even for the human intelligence, nevertheless abstracts (that is, voluntarily 
withdraws his attention) from it and agrees to reason as though no such power existed, is said 
to stand on the point of reflection [Coleridge’s emphasis].119 
 
                                                 
116 Logic, 145. At this point of the manuscript, Coleridge or his transcriber appears to have confused the 
order of exposition from the preceding paragraph, referring to our φknowledge of the subjective’ as φthe 
second’ and our φknowledge of the objective’ as φthe first’; given that the broader textual context makes it 
clear that this is the opposite of what Coleridge means, I have exchanged his references to φfirst’ and 
φsecond’ here, to bring this passage in line with the previously established order of exposition. 
117 Logic, 245. 
118 Logic, 266n. 
119 Logic, 245. 
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Returning to Coleridge’s earlier commentary on the distinction between the subjective 
and the objective elements of cognition, we can see now that insofar as our knowledge 
of φhow far and in what manner the objects [of cognition] are modified for the human 
mind by its own mechanism’ consists in the knowledge of φthe universal subjective, or 
that which is common to the race without distinction of individuals’ and is taken to be 
φevolved out of that which we know to be the subject itself’, such knowledge is acquired 
by φstand[ing] on the point of reflection’ (as Coleridge himself claims in both passages about 
φthe point of reflection’).120 Moreover, we can also see why Coleridge states that whatever 
knowledge of the objective elements of cognition is acquired from the standpoint of 
reflection must be φmerely negative’: for analysing cognition and its constitutive elements 
from a reflective perspective does not secure for us the φprerogative’ of contemplating or 
φlooking at the objects [of sensory cognition] independent of [their] modification’ by φthe 
human mind by its own mechanism’ or φthat which the mind possesses in itself or 
communicates from its own stores’. Rather, reflection is a procedure that allows us to do 
no more than φaffirm [λ] that the objects of such knowledge subsist independently of 
the mind’, because we know such objects must be given a posteriori (in empirical sensible 
intuition) and so are φnot accompanied by the mark of the subjective, viz. [their] validity a 
priori, and because [these objects are] not included [in] and therefore not be evolved out 
of that which [through reflection] we know to be the subject itself’.121  
 
iii. The Reality of Reason vs. The Reality of Nature: Noumenal & Phenomenal Objects 
Having outlined the limits of the standpoint of reflection, Coleridge goes on to point out 
that knowledge of the subjective elements of cognition is nevertheless a prerequisite for 
complete knowledge of the objective elements of cognition, claiming that our knowledge 
of both sets of elements presupposes some sort of principle of subject-object identity: 
 
[I]t is evident that the knowledge [λ] which we may call the universal subjective [λ] must be 
acquired before we can form any judgement of [λ] the properly objective. [λ] But on the 
other hand, though less obvious, it is no less true that as [λ] the knowledge of the constitution 
of the subject is a necessary precondition of any distinct knowledge respecting the object, yet 
this must presuppose the existence of that [first] and highest insightσan insight into the 
existence of a somewhat that is the common ground of the subject and object, were it only that 
                                                 
120 Logic, 145; cf. 245. 
121 Logic, 145, 245 (cf. 37-41, 139-43). 
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it [this φcommon ground’] is in the order of its formation anterior to reflection, in which power 
the antithesis of subject and object has its birth and origin.122 
 
As we saw earlier (in 4.3), Coleridge claims that this φcommon ground of the subject and 
object’ must be God, conceived of φas the One and Absolute, at once the Ground and 
the Cause [of all reality], who alone containeth in himself the ground of his own nature, 
and therein of all natures’, or φthe absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind, the underived and eternal 
τI Amυ [wherein] we find the principle of being and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality, 
the ground of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of that existence, absolutely 
one and identical’.123 Just as it is through the φpower’ of reflection that we discover φthe 
antithesis of subject and object’ or the distinction between the subjective (formal) and 
the objective (material) elements of our sensory cognition, it is φOnly by the intuition and 
immediate spiritual consciousness of the idea of God’ (i.e. through intellectual intuition 
or noesis) that we can discover φthe root and identity of both [subject and object]’, or the 
principle of subject-object identity.124 In what follows, I discuss Coleridge’s distinction 
between the different kinds of knowledge of subject-object relations which we acquire (i) 
through reflection (i.e. discursively) and (ii) through intellectual intuition, looking at how 
this distinction informs Coleridge’s account of the difference between the principles of 
Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Logic on the one side, and Transcendental 
Noetic on the other. As we will see, to understand Coleridge’s account of this difference, 
we must look carefully at his claims about the contrast between the methods and objects 
of φtranscendental’ and φtranscendent’ philosophy. 
 After outlining his views on the subjective and objective elements of cognition 
and the methods whereby we acquire knowledge of these elements, Coleridge returns to 
some of his earlier claims about the nature of the φprimary reality’ which is taken to be, in 
part, constituted by these two sets of elements: 
 
There is as we have already learnt, a somewhat which, whether we refer it to an agency without 
ourselves or acknowledge it as an immediate presence to and as it were within the mind, we in 
both cases express by the affirmative τisυ. And hence we distinguish from the reflective faculty 
[i.e. understanding] two species of realityσthe reality in nature and the reality of reason.125  
 
                                                 
122 Logic, 146. 
123 LS, 32, Logic, 84-5 (cf. BL.I.264-86) 
124 See Logic, 145-6; LS, 32-3 (cf. Logic, 84-5, 132-3). 
125 Logic, 146. 
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Coleridge is here referring back to a previous passage concerning the relation between 
φprimary reality’, the world as it is taken to exist independently of finite human minds, 
and our φreflective and discursive powers’, the faculty of understanding: 
 
[T]his reality [λ] contain[s] a truth which being antecedent to the act of reflection, and of 
course therefore to all other acts and functions of the understanding, assert[s] a being 
transcendent to the individual subject in all cases and therefore all subjects thinking under the 
same laws. Of this primary reality we discovered two sourcesσone above the reflective and 
discursive powers, the other below them. The one was the reason, and the other the 
impressions from the senses.126 
 
The φbeing transcendent to the individual subject’ is of course God, considered as φthe 
ground of existence, and the ground of [our] knowledge of that existence, absolutely one 
and identical’.127 What Coleridge means by describing reason as a source of reality and by 
such phrases as φthe reality of reason’ is perhaps most neatly summed up in his definition 
of reason and its objects in the 1818 Friend: 
 
I should have no objection to define Reason with Jacobi, and his with his friend Hemsterhuis, 
as an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the Universal, the Eternal, and the 
Necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phenomena. But then it must be added, 
that it is an organ identical with its appropriate objects. Thus, God, the Soul, eternal Truth, &c 
are the objects of Reason; but they are themselves reason. We name God the Supreme Reason; 
and Milton says τWhence the Soul Reason receives, and Reason is her Beingυ.128 
 
That is to say, reason is the φorgan’ or cognitive capacity whereby we acquire knowledge 
of φspiritual truths, the Universal, the Eternal, and the Necessary’, the sorts of knowledge 
which constitute the realm of noetics. Moreover, the capacity we designate as φreason’ is 
φidentical with its appropriate objects’, the Ideas of God, the Soul, eternal Truth, and so 
on.129 On the one hand, Coleridge is simply characterising reason in the same way that he 
characterises our other cognitive capacities, sense and understanding. For Coleridge also 
contends that what we mean when we refer to the φconstituent forms’ or φinherent forms 
and several functional powers’ of these faculties is just the set of cognitive abilities which 
                                                 
126 Logic, 132. 
127 Logic, 85. 
128 Friend.I.155-6 (Coleridge is quoting from Paradise Lost, V.486-7). 
129 Friend.I.155-6; cf. Logic, 44n. That Coleridge uses the term φorgan’ to designate a cognitive capacity of 
some kind is clear at Logic, 154 where he claims that φthe understanding is the organ of our thoughts and 
conceptions’ (cf. SWF.I.332-6 on φThe Soul and its organs of Sense’). 
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are taken to constitute those cognitive capacities which we designate as φsense’ and 
φunderstanding’. Given that the forms of sense and understanding can be considered as 
both φpure acts’ and φpure products’ (i.e. a priori operations and contents), we can say that 
the pure or nonempirical objects of these two faculties (i.e. our pure intuitions and pure 
conceptions) just φare themselves’ sense and understandingσat least insofar as we hold, 
as Coleridge does, that the pure objects of these faculties just are the modes of cognitive 
activity in which the exercise or employment of these faculties consists (see 1.5, 2.3, 3.2). 
To explain: space and time, as the pure forms of sensible intuition, can be considered as 
both objects of the pure sense, and as the cognitive operations or activities in which this 
capacity consists; likewise, the four classes of categories, as the pure forms of conception 
and judgement, can be considered as both objects of the pure understanding, and as the 
cognitive operations or activities in which this capacity consists.130 On the other hand, 
Coleridge is making a further claim about the nature of reason which does not apply to 
sense or understanding: it is a cognitive capacity that is somehow φidentical with’ those 
principles, the Ideas, which are taken to subsist independently of all finite human minds 
(and are thus contradistinguished from the φinherent forms’ of sense and understanding, 
which φhave their subsistence in the faculty of a finite mind’, as φwhat all human subjects 
possess in common by necessity of their constitution’).131  
What separates reason from sense and understanding, then, is (i) that reason is a 
cognitive capacity which is grounded in the absolute mind of God, rather than in the 
common cognitive constitution of finite human subjects, and (ii) that reason is a capacity 
that is φidentical with’ all of its φappropriate objects’ (the Divine Ideas). This is in contrast 
to sense and understanding, which may be said to be φidentical with’ their φconstituent 
forms’, insofar as such forms can also be the pure objects (or contents) of these faculties, 
but which cannot be said to be φidentical with’ the sensory impressions that they receive 
from φsomething acting upon us [i.e. finite human minds] from without’.132 For while the 
forms of sense and understanding make possible our apprehension of sensible objects, 
these forms cannot be said to be φidentical with’ sensible objects in the same way that 
reason is φidentical with’ those non-sensible or intelligible (i.e. noumenal) objects which it 
enables finite human minds to apprehendσor, rather, to partake of or participate inσ
through the act of intellectual (or spiritual) intuition.133 
                                                 
130 For this conception of sense and understanding, see esp. Logic, 146-7, 265-6n. 
131 See e.g. Logic, 202n, OM, 276. 
132 See e.g. BL.I.293n, Logic, 76-7, 143-6ff. 
133 On this process, see e.g. Logic, 43-4, 69-70; OM, 88-92ff, 171-6, 274-6. 
 175 
 With the above claims in mind, we can see now that what Coleridge means by 
φthe reality in nature’ and φthe reality of reason’ is just the material, phenomenal objects 
of the senses on the one hand (as apprehended through sensible intuition or aisthesis), 
and the immaterial, noumenal objects of reason on the other (as apprehended through 
intellectual intuition or noesis).134 These two classes of objects are both distinguished from 
the φreflective faculty’, the understanding and the objects given through its discursive acts 
and products, or φthe data presented to us by reflection, [λ] as they appear to us in the act 
of reflecting’.135 Having presented this tripartite division of our cognitive capacities and 
their respective spheres or objects, Coleridge then goes on to describe the objects of the 
senses as being characterised by their φapparent contingency’, objects of understanding as 
characterised by their φconditional necessity’, and objects of reason as characterised by 
their φabsolute necessity’ (here contrasted with the conditional kind): 
 
[W]e distinguish from the reflective faculty two species of realityσthe reality in nature and the 
reality of reason. The one characterised by its apparent contingency, as proceeding from a 
power separate from our own will and spontaneity, and the other by its absolute necessity, not 
the conditional necessity which inheres in the forms and functions of the understanding and 
the rules generalised from these, and which necessity with its consequence, the property of 
being affirmed a priori, we have aptly compared with the movement of a machine that results 
solely [and] inevitably from the construction of the machine, supposing it to act at all, though 
this is itself not universally necessary, but must be limited to the mind from the faculties of 
which such and such cognitions result.136   
 
Coleridge’s distinction between φabsolute’ and φconditional’ necessity was covered above 
(see 4.3), so I will focus now on how this distinction is related to Coleridge’s division of 
the transcendental or φcritical inquisition into the constitution of the intellectual faculties’ 
into aesthetic, logic, and noetic. In particular, I consider the ways in which this division is 
informed by Coleridge’s contrast between the respective aims and objects of what he 
calls φtranscendental’ and φtranscendent’ philosophy. My principal goal will be to develop 
an outline of Coleridge’s views on the different kinds of transcendental claim(s) involved 
in transcendental aesthetic, logic, and noetic. 
 
                                                 
134 See Logic, 37-41, 43-4, 146-7. 
135 Logic, 245. 
136 Logic, 146. For further discussion of Coleridge’s notion of φconstruction’ (by which he means cognitive 
constitution), see 3.4 above. 
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4.5 Transcendental Inquiry & Transcendent Metaphysics: The Possibility of 
Noetic Knowledge & the Limits of Human Cognition 
i. Transcendent or Transcendental Knowledge? Coleridge’s Case for Noetic 
The first thing to note here is that, after Coleridge introduces the distinction just outlined 
between the φabsolute necessity’ which characterises the forms and objects of reason and 
φthe conditional necessity which inheres in the forms and functions of the understanding 
and the rules generalised from these’, he informs the reader that: 
 
Our present business is [confined] to the latter [i.e. φconditional necessity’] and this again we 
must subdivide into two kinds, each forming a distinct scienceσthese are, first, the universal 
forms of the pure sense and the knowledge [that] has been entitled τtranscendental aestheticυ, 
[λ and, second,] that investigation into the constitution and constituent forms of the 
understanding, which in analogy with the former is termed transcendental logic.137 
 
Now, Coleridge notes at various points in the Logic manuscript that there is a distinction 
between φthe unindividual and transcendent [λ] reason as a presence to the human mind, 
not a particular faculty or component part of the mind’ and the sense and understanding, 
considered as φits two component faculties or species’ (i.e. φas more properly constituting 
the mind in its specific sense as the human mind’).138 Given such a distinction, Coleridge 
contends, we must discuss the respective objects, operations, and contents of sense and 
understanding on the one hand, and of reason on the other hand, separately and within 
different theoretical frameworks. Since transcendental philosophy is concerned primarily 
with the a priori conditions of the possibility of our experience and of the objects of our 
cognition, we must begin with a consideration of sensible or phenomenal objects and the 
conditions under which such objects are given and cognised (i.e. the constituent forms 
of sense and understanding, as disclosed by transcendental aesthetic and transcendental 
logic). Then, having once established the conditions and limits of sensory experience and 
cognition, we can turn our attention to non-sensory cognition, considering intelligible or 
noumenal objects and the conditions under which such objects are apprehended (i.e. the 
constituent forms of reason, as disclosed by transcendental noetic).139 However, although 
Coleridge provides broad outlines of this transcendental project throughout his Logic, he 
appears never to have completed the projected third part of the manuscript concerned 
with noetic, or to have incorporated the detailed discussion of noetic knowledge and its 
                                                 
137 Logic, 146-8. 
138 See e.g. Logic, 43-4, 69-70, 141n, 202n, 237-8. 
139 For references to this division of transcendental labour, see e.g. Logic, 51-2, 76, 154, 169, 212.  
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objects that he offers in Opus Maximum into any later drafts of Logic.140 Indeed, there are 
moments in Logic where Coleridge seems to suggest that the theory of noetic does not in 
fact form part of such a transcendental inquiry into our cognition. But, as I will explain 
below, when we consider such passages in the broader context of Coleridge’s conception 
of transcendental inquiry (as established in 2.1-3 and 3.2-4.2), it is possible to frame his 
account of noetic and its objects in transcendental terms. 
 As noted earlier, the key reference point for making sense of Coleridge’s position 
here (as presented in Logic) is his use of the terms φtranscendental’ and φtranscendent’. As 
we saw in 2.1, when Coleridge first defines the term φtranscendental knowledge’ in Logic, 
he claims that it must consist in φthe knowledge of the conditions that render experience 
itself possible’, which are characterised as follows: 
 
Now to distinguish the truths that are necessarily presupposed in all experience as its condition 
and co-cause, from the facts or knowledge not only occasioned by, but actually derived from, 
experience, whether it be the experience of the world without or the experience acquired by 
reflection on ourselves, and yet at the same time to distinguish the former knowledge from 
pretended cognitions and assertions that transcend our intellectual faculties or, what is 
equivalent, for which the human mind can be shown to possess no appropriate faculty and 
which assertions are called τtranscendentυ, the term τtranscendentalυ has been chosen.141 
 
Having defined these two opposing terms, Coleridge goes on to elaborate further what 
separates φtranscendental’ from φtranscendent’ knowledge, especially with reference to the 
relationship between our φintellectual faculties’ or cognitive capacities and these different 
kinds of philosophical knowledge: 
 
Transcendental knowledge is that by which we endeavour to climb above our experience into 
its sources by an analysis of our intellectual faculties, still, however, as it were, standing on the 
shoulders of our experience to reach at truths which are above experience, while transcendent 
philosophy would consist in the attempt to master a knowledge that is beyond our faculties, an 
attempt to grasp at objects beyond the reach of hand or eye or all the artificial ends and as it 
were, prolongations of eye and hand, of objects therefore the existence of which, if they did 
exist, the human mind has no means of ascertaining, and therefore has not even the power of 
imagining or conceiving.142 
 
                                                 
140 For this system of noetic or φlogic of ideas’, see esp. OM, 214-90. 
141 Logic, 146-7. 
142 Logic, 147. 
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At first glance, it can appear as though Coleridge is ruling out the possibility of noetic 
knowledge here (as, indeed, one might expect from a philosopher who has just endorsed 
Kantian transcendental philosophy and its account of the limits of sensible experience 
and the possible objects of human sensory cognition).143 For, given that Coleridge talks 
of φthe unindividual and transcendent character of the reason’, and refers to the Ideas as 
things which φtranscend the sense’ (or as φeternal truths’ which are φtranscendent to sense, 
and irrelative to space and time’), such noetic or noumenal objects could be said to meet 
the description of the φpretended cognitions and assertions that transcend our intellectual 
faculties’ or φa knowledge that is beyond our faculties’.144 Furthermore, if such statements 
are considered in conjunction with Coleridge’s claim that sense and understanding must 
be considered as φconstituting the mind in its specific sense as the human mind’ as its φtwo 
component faculties’, while reason must be considered as a φpower of ideas’ which is 
φtranscendent’ to the human mind, then it seems plausible to contend that, insofar as the 
Ideas are possible objects of reason, they would be the kind of φpretended cognitions [λ] 
for which the human mind can be shown to possess no appropriate faculty’σlittle more 
than the illusory objects of a φtranscendent philosophy’.145 However, as has been shown 
above (4.1-3), Coleridge clearly does hold that finite human minds can acquire knowledge 
of Ideas through intellectual intuition, and that such subjects can employ Ideas through a 
noetic process whereby they partake of, or participate in, the absolute mind of God. 
Given this, Ideas cannot be φpretended cognitions’: for, even if reason is an φunindividual 
and transcendent’ power, φnot a particular faculty or component part of the mind’, it is 
nevertheless φa presence to the human mind’.146 This means that, on Coleridge’s account, 
the human mind does in fact possess some φmeans of ascertaining’ the existence of such 
noumenal entities and the noetic cognitions that derive from them: insofar as reason is 
acknowledged to be a cognitive capacity that can be exercised by finite human subjects, it 
cannot be said that Ideas are the kind of cognition(s) φfor which the human mind can be 
shown to possess no appropriate faculty’.147 Admittedly, Coleridge does say that, strictly 
speaking, reason is not a faculty, and thus arguably cannot be something that the human 
mind φpossesses’. But the point still stands: Whether human subjects are said to possess 
it, partake of it, or to have it present to their minds, reason clearly is a cognitive capacity 
                                                 
143 Although Coleridge cites ancient precursors of the transcendental approach at Logic, 148-9, he makes it 
clear here that he is following Kant, φthe proper inventor and founder of transcendental analysis’. 
144 See Logic, 43-4, 69-70, 154-5. 
145 See Logic, 69-70, 146-7. 
146 Logic, 69; cf. 43-4. See also OM, 88-92ff, 171-6, 274-6. 
147 Logic, 147 (cf. 43-4, 68-70, 169). See also 4.3 above. 
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that the human mind canσat least potentiallyσexercise or employ, and the Ideas clearly 
are possible objects of cognition for such a mind.148 
 Given the above, what separates the kinds of knowledge dealt with in noetic 
from the kinds of knowledge dealt with in transcendental aesthetic and logic is not the 
fact that the former kinds of knowledge are held to be impossible. Rather, it is the fact 
that, given the difference between reason, as an φunindividual and transcendent’ power, 
and sense and understanding, as φcomponent faculties’ (of the human mind), a different 
method is required to demonstrate how Ideas (taken as non-sensible, intelligible objects), 
and the mental activity of intellectual intuition, are possible (i.e. a method distinct from 
that which we employ to show how sensible objects, and the mental activities of sensible 
intuition and discursive thought, are possible). But before looking more closely at what 
Coleridge says about the possibility of such noetic knowledge in Logic, it will be useful to 
return briefly to his note on the threefold division of transcendental inquiry, considered 
as an investigation into the elements of our cognition which consists in 
 
a pre-inquisition into the mind [considered] as part Organ, part Constituent of all Knowledge: 
an examination of the Scales, Weights, and Measures themselves, abstracted from the Objects 
to be weighed or measured by themσin short, a transcendental Analysis, Aesthetic, Logic, and 
Noetic.149 
 
For our present purposes, this note is important for both chronological and conceptual 
reasons. It is dated to 1824, meaning that Coleridge’s claims here were made after his 
composition of the Logic manuscript (c. 1819-22).150 This shows that Coleridge continued 
to maintain the division of transcendental philosophy into aesthetic, logic, and noetic, in 
the years after his work on Logic had stalled. As we saw in section 4.2, the word φanalysis’ 
is crossed out in this note because Coleridge uses the term φtranscendental analysis’ to 
refer specifically to an φinvestigation into the constitution and constituent forms of the 
understanding [and sense]’, or the φconditionally necessary’ a priori forms of the human 
mind. These forms must be considered separately from the φabsolutely necessary’ a priori 
forms of the divine mind, in which human subjects participate through the exercise of 
reason: the Ideas, which are not objects of transcendental analysis (taken to consist in a 
special kind of discursive or conceptual knowledge of the conditions of the possibility of 
                                                 
148 See Friend.I.155-6; Logic, 68-70; LS, 59-61; OM, 88-92ff, 171-6, 274-6. 
149 CM.V.81. 
150 For the chronological details of the marginal note, see CM.V.80; for those relating to the composition 
dates for MS Logic, see Logic, xxxix-li (φWhen was the Logic Written’). 
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experience), but rather the objects of transcendental noetic (taken to consist in a special 
kind of nondiscursive, intellectually intuited metaphysical knowledge of what Coleridge 
calls φthe subsistence of the universe, material and intellectual’).151 In short, reason and its 
constituent forms are φpart Organ, part Constituent’ of our cognition in much the same 
way as the inherent forms of sense and understanding, and reason is equally amenable to 
transcendental investigation. Below I consider Coleridge’s views concerning what makes 
these two forms of transcendental inquiry (analysis and noetic) different. 
 
ii. Coleridge on the Relationship between Transcendental Analysis & Transcendental Noetic 
Coleridge’s sense of the need for a distinction between transcendental analysis (aesthetic 
and logic) and transcendental noetic is made further apparent in the following series of 
passages in Logic, which pose the questions of whether, and how, the kind of speculative 
metaphysical knowledge he terms φnoetics’ could be possible: 
 
Now it yet remains to be seen whether such a science as that of metaphysics (in the sense of a 
first philosophy) is possible, or whether it be not transcendent of the human faculties instead of 
transcendental, i.e. referable to the constitution of these faculties; in which latter case it would be 
the same as transcendental logic and the name would be superfluous. But this possibility 
cannot be ascertained except by the means of transcendental logic, and the determination, 
whether affirmative or negative, presupposes the knowledge so obtained.152 
 
In this instance, Coleridge seems to be suggesting that if such speculative metaphysics or 
φfirst philosophy’ is possible, then it may be either φtranscendent of the human faculties’ or 
φreferable to the constitution of these faculties’ (i.e. ‘transcendental’). Given his later usage 
of the term φtranscendental noetic’, and his uses of the term φtranscendent’ elsewhere in 
Logic, this passage may also be read as suggesting that if speculative metaphysics is shown 
to be φtranscendent of the human faculties’, then it must consist in some kind of impossible 
φpretended cognitions’, or that if its possibility is provable at all, then it must be φreferable 
to the constitution’ of reason, taken as a capacity for noetic knowledge.153 Yet, Coleridge 
is clear that if such metaphysical knowledge is to be proven possible by being shown to 
be φreferable to the constitution of [the] faculties’, then it would in fact be φthe same as 
transcendental logic’ and thus referable to the constitution of sense and understanding 
                                                 
151 See Logic, 146-7, 211-4; OM, 274-6; see also, Logic, 213: φthe transcendental analysis consists of two parts, 
viz. the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental logic’. 
152 Logic, 169. 
153 See Logic, 146-7, 169; cf. 43-4, 68-70. 
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(which would presumably remove any need for a transcendental noetic). To get a better 
sense of what Coleridge means here, we must consider more closely his contention that, 
regardless of whether speculative metaphysical knowledge of some kind is at all possible, 
φthis possibility cannot be ascertained except by the means of transcendental logic’. 
 As was noted above, Coleridge’s threefold division of transcendental inquiry is 
premised on the assumption that before we can give any account of our experience and 
cognition of non-sensible (or super-sensible) noumenal objects, we must first develop an 
account of our experience and cognition of sensible, phenomenal objects (and its limits). 
On Coleridge’s account, this φpropaedeutic’ task must be jointly carried out by means of 
a transcendental aesthetic and a transcendental logic. He summarises this position in the 
following passage, where, having briefly defined φthe terms which the most profound of 
modern logicians and the proper inventor and founder of transcendental analysis [Kant] 
has adopted’, Coleridge attempts to recast these terms in a φless uncommon’ form: 
 
we prefer [to the term φtranscendental logic’] the more intelligible and less uncommon title of 
the critical or judicial logic, i.e. a criterion of the general and particular judgements passed by the 
understanding as the faculty of reflection, derived from a knowledge of the constitution of the 
understanding itself and of the universal forms of the sense to which the legitimate exercise of 
its functions is confined.154 
 
By φcriterion’, Coleridge means φa test for the distinguishing of truth’, so a transcendental 
logic is concerned with how we determine the truth or φobjective validity’ of all those 
φgeneral and particular judgements passed by the understanding’.155 Since Coleridge takes 
sense-experience to consist primarily in the discursive cognition of sensible objects, and 
takes discursive cognition itself to consist in our judgements about the sensory contents 
or matter of our ordinary cognitive states, for anything to qualify as experience in this 
sense, it must meet this φcriterion’, as established by transcendental logic. In other words, 
for any kind of φcontents or material’ of sensory consciousness to be cognised or thought 
as an object of cognition (or to φbecome experience’, as Coleridge phrases it), it must φbe 
brought under the rules of the understanding [λ], and the forms of sense (= intuitus puri 
[pure intuitions])’.156 As Coleridge notes here, this criterion is φderived from a knowledge 
of the constitution of the understanding itself and of the universal forms of the sense’: 
                                                 
154 Logic, 149. 
155 See Logic, 51-2, 111-2, for Coleridge’s notion of a φcriterion’; cf. Kant’s claims at CPR, B83ff. 
156 Logic, 44n; cf. 263-5ff, esp. 263n: φto think of a thing at all is to superinduce some a priori conception on 
the phenomenon that occasioned and excited the act of thinking’. 
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the former class of forms is a concern of φthe transcendental logic or analysis of the pure 
understanding’, which specifies the conditions under which sensible objects can be 
thought (the categories); the latter class of forms are the concern of φthe transcendental 
aesthetic or analysis of the pure sense’, which specifies the conditions under which such 
objects can be given or apprehended through sensible intuition (space and time), thereby 
determining the bounds of sense-experience, the sphere φto which the legitimate exercise 
of [the understanding, as our capacity for sensory and discursive cognition] is confined’. 
Given this overlap, Coleridge proposes, φThe analysis of both the pure sense and that of 
the pure understanding would stand under the common head [of transcendental analysis] 
and be distinguished only as the several chapters of transcendental logic’.157 Since both of 
these φchapters’ of the transcendental analysis of our cognitive capacities are concerned 
with the conditions under which sense-experience, defined as the discursive cognition of 
phenomenal objects, is possible, the aesthetic can be readily absorbed into the logic, and 
as Coleridge proposes, φmay more conveniently sink into a subdivision and be contained 
under the name of its more comprehensive co-factor’.158 
 Now, bearing in mind that Coleridge includes the transcendental aesthetic and its 
account of space and time as our pure forms of sensible intuition (or φthe principles of 
sense’) within the theory of transcendental logic, as one of its subdivisions, one can see 
why Coleridge claims that the possibility of the non- or super-sensible objects of noetic 
knowledge (as the possible contents of intellectual intuition) is something which φcannot 
be ascertained except by the means of transcendental logic’.159 For when Coleridge raises 
the question of φwhat time and space themselves are’, and whether φthey attach wholly to 
the form of [sensible] intuition, to the subjective nature of the mind [or the] constitution 
of our own faculties’, he also notes that this question is: 
 
indispensable as the condition of all other insight, whether of positive insight into the nature of 
the things which are the proper objects of sensuous intuitions, or, negatively, of those [objects] 
which transcend the sense [i.e. the objects of intellectual intuitions].160 
                                                 
157 The quotations concerning Coleridge’s overview of transcendental aesthetic and logic in this passage 
are all taken from Logic, 213-4. Cf. 153-4: φby the pure sense [λ] the objects are given us, [λ] The 
understanding, on the other hand, is the faculty that enables [us] to think of these objects’ (Coleridge is, of 
course, here following Kant’s claims at CPR, B34-5). 
158 Logic, 214; as we saw in 2.1-3, Coleridge makes clear at 146-7 that what he subsequently refers to as the 
φcriterion’ of our epistemic judgements concerning sensible objects (i.e. the categories) form part of those 
φconditions which render experience itself possible’ (cf. 239-40). 
159 Logic, 169, 237-8. 
160 Logic, 154-5. For Coleridge on the distinction between sensible and non-sensible or intellectual 
intuitions, see BL.I.289n, Logic, 242-4. 
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As we have already seen, Coleridge characterises Ideas as those φeternal truths’ which are 
φtranscendent to sense, and irrelative to space and time’.161 Thus, insofar as we take Ideas 
to be possible objects of intellectual intuition (which is non-sensuous), it is evident that, 
as Coleridge says here, we can acquire φnegative’ insight into their nature, by determining 
φthe nature of the things which are the proper objects of sensuous intuitions’. Since the 
aesthetic shows that φwe are incapable of presenting any object to the understanding by 
means of the sense except under the forms of space and time’, and that these φuniversal 
forms of sense [necessarily determine the sphere] to which the legitimate exercise of [the 
understanding’s] functions is confined’, it also demonstrates that insofar as the Ideas are 
things φtranscendent to sense, and irrelative to space and time’, they cannot be the kinds 
of objects which are given by means of sense, and thought or cognised (discursively) by 
means of understanding.162 In sum, transcendental logic (taken as including the aesthetic) 
is φindispensable as the condition of all other insight’ concerning the possible objects of 
our cognition, particularly the possibility of non-sensible objects of cognition, because it 
shows (i) what kinds of objects cannot be given non-sensibly (i.e. by means of intellectual 
intuition), and (ii) specifies the limits and conditions under which the cognitive faculties 
or capacities that are not appropriately constituted for the apprehension of non-sensible 
content must operate. Thus, transcendental logic provides further φnegative’ insight into 
the conditions under which the apprehension of Ideas, or other kinds of non-sensuous 
objects, may be possible.163 This, in my view, is why Coleridge holds that the possibility 
of noetic or speculative metaphysical knowledge, and of the non-sensible objects of such 
knowledge, φcannot be ascertained except by the means of transcendental logic’. 
 
Coda: A Final Word on Coleridge’s Transcendent/Transcendental Distinction 
There are, however, two further (potential) difficulties remaining here. Firstly, it might be 
contended that a demonstration of which kinds of objects cannot be taken to constitute 
noetic knowledge is not, even if it must form part of, a demonstration that such objects 
are actually possible. Secondly, given the interpretation of transcendental logic outlined 
above, it appears that, insofar as such a theory proves that non-sensible objects (e.g. 
Ideas) cannot be presented to the human mind by means of sense or understanding, it 
can also be taken to prove that such objects are necessarily φtranscendent of the human 
                                                 
161 Logic, 43n; cf. 36, 237-8. 
162 Logic, 154-5. 
163 See Logic, 154-5 (cf. 41 on φnegative idealism’ and φnegative materialism’). 
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faculties instead of transcendental, i.e. referable to the constitution of these faculties’ (and, 
therefore, that things like Ideas are not in fact possible objects of human cognition).164 
This, again, would seem to suggest that Coleridge is inadvertently arguing that the kind 
of knowledge which he says is φthe highest problem of Philosophy’ (i.e. the Ideas) consists 
only in φpretended cognitions and assertions that transcend our intellectual faculties’, or 
objects φfor which the human mind can be shown to posses no appropriate faculty’.165 To 
make sense of these difficulties, we must consider the definition of φnoetic’ that follows 
Coleridge’s claims about transcendent metaphysics: 
 
There is indeed, as we have already noticed, a higher sense of the term τlogosυ, in which it 
signifies the reason as including the understanding. On this assumption there would arise 
relations of the understanding to the reason and of the reason to the understanding, and the 
knowledge of these relations would constitute a higher, or rather the highest branch of logic, 
viz. the logic of ideas and first principles [λ W]e have proposed to designate this branch by 
the name of noetic and have taken it as the subject of our last section, to the introduction of 
which the question (τIs a first philosophy possibleυ) is deferred.166 
 
As I noted above, Coleridge seems never to have completed this φlast section’ of his Logic 
manuscript. However, as we shall see below, he does nevertheless provide a few more 
hints about what noetic knowledge (and any proof of the possibility of such knowledge) 
would involve. But first, let us consider how the passage just quoted may be read in 
relation to the two residual difficulties concerning Coleridge’s employment of the terms 
φtranscendental’ and φtranscendent’, as outlined above. 
 In the first case, one possible solution is to suggest that when Coleridge claims 
that φthis possibility cannot be ascertained except by the means of transcendental logic’, 
he is referring not to (a) the possibility of noetic or speculative metaphysical knowledge, 
but rather to (b) the possibility that such knowledge is φnot transcendent of the human 
faculties [but] transcendental, i.e. referable to the constitution of these faculties’.167 On 
this reading, what transcendental logic would enable us to ascertain is whether the sort of 
metaphysics or φfirst philosophy’ that is possible must be limited to our knowledge of the 
conditions of the possibility of sensory experience and cognition. If such knowledge 
were limited to this realm, then φit would be the same as the transcendental logic and the 
                                                 
164 Logic, 169. 
165 See Logic, 147, 169; LS, 114. 
166 Logic, 169 (Coleridge is referring back to an earlier discussion of the term φlogos’ at 33-6). 
167 Logic, 169. 
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name [φof metaphysics (in the sense of a first philosophy)’] would be superfluous’: i.e. 
transcendental logic, taken as the metaphysics of our knowledge of the sensible world, 
would be the only possible kind of metaphysics.168 However, as I have already shown, 
Coleridge holds that the principal function of transcendental logic is not to determine the 
limits of all possible human cognition, but rather to determine the limits of sensible 
experience and cognition, and thereby to give us φnegative’ insight into the nature of 
those objects which cannot be given by means of sensible intuition or cognised by means 
of the understanding (e.g. Ideas, which can be apprehended by means of reason only, 
through the process of intellectual intuition or noesis). In other words, transcendental 
logic serves to lay the ground for a more comprehensive account of the possible objects 
of human cognition (particularly the non-sensible noumenal kind), rather than to rule 
out the possibility of proving that non-sensible objects of cognition are possible objects 
of cognition for human subjects. From Coleridge’s perspective, then, transcendental 
logic allows us to ascertain that while noetic knowledge of non-sensible objects is not 
φreferable to the constitution’ of sense and understanding, this does not necessarily mean 
that such cognition must be entirely φtranscendent of’ the human cognitive capacities (only 
that it is not apprehensible by sense or understanding).169 
 This brings us to the second problem: the question of whether proving that 
noetic knowledge is not φreferable to the constitution of the human faculties’ (in contexts 
where this term is limited to sense and understanding, considered as the φtwo component 
faculties’ that φconstitut[e] the mind in its specific sense as the human mind’), also entails a 
proof that noetic knowledge is not possible at all for human subjects (i.e. can be taken to 
consist in φa knowledge that is beyond our faculties’).170 In my view, given that Coleridge 
claims noetic or φthe logic of ideas and first principles’ would consist in our knowledge of 
the φrelations of the understanding to the reason and of the reason to the understanding’, 
with reason being considered as φincluding the understanding’, we should be open to the 
possibility that, on Coleridge’s account of human cognition, to say that a certain kind of 
knowledge is φnot referable to the constitution’ of a particular faculty or capacity is not 
also to claim that this capacity plays no role in the acquisition of the kind of knowledge 
in question. To use a different example: when Coleridge contends that the categories are 
φno[t] derived from the sciential or transcendental aesthesis, but [rather] abstracted and 
generalised from general experience’ in a process that φinvolv[es] the exercise, active and 
                                                 
168 Logic, 169. 
169 See Logic, 51-2, 76, 149, 154-5, 211-4, 237-8. 
170 For the quoted definitions, see Logic, 44, 69-70, 147. 
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passive of the senses’, what he means is that, although the categories themselves do not 
derive from the pure forms of sensible intuition, our knowledge of these pure forms of 
conception and judgement nevertheless involves a consideration of the relations between 
sense and understanding. Put another way, while our knowledge of the categories is not 
φreferable to the constitution’ of our faculty of sense, we would not be able to explain 
fully the role the categories play in our cognition without an accompanying account of 
the relation between the forms of understanding and the forms of sense, as conditions of 
the possibility of sensory experience and discursive cognition.171  
By extension, just because our noetic knowledge of Ideas is φnot referable to the 
constitution’ of sense and understanding, this does not mean that a noetic involves no 
consideration of sense or understanding. Indeed, as we have seen, while Coleridge clearly 
holds that objects of noetic knowledge must be φtranscendent to sense, and irrelative to 
space and time’, he also suggests that our knowledge of noetic and its objects (Ideas or 
φfirst principles’) should consist in an account of the relations that hold between reason 
and understanding.172 Thus, just as transcendental logic (or analysis) considers how sense 
and understanding contribute to our cognition of sensible objects, and how these two 
faculties relate to one another, transcendental noetic would consider how understanding 
and reason contribute to our cognition of non-sensible objects, and would involve some 
account of how these two capacities relate to one another. In short, insofar as the human 
understanding plays some role, however small, in the acquisition of noetic knowledge, 
such knowledge cannot be said to be φtranscendent of the human faculties’, or beyond the 
bounds of possible human cognition.173 This brings us to the end of the current project: 
just as Coleridge’s Logic offers a φnegative’ account of the possibility of noetic knowledge 
that points forward to his speculative theology and cosmology in Opus Maximum, I shall 
draw this thesis to a close with the promise of further work on Coleridge’s more detailed 
positive doctrines on reason and the Ideas, noting that such work would not be possible 
without the theoretical framework that I have attempted to develop here. 
                                                 
171 Coleridge makes this clear at Logic, 147-9, 151-2, 260. 
172 See Logic, 169 (cf. 154-5, 236-8). 
173 Coleridge says little about this relationship in Logic, but see e.g. CM.II.293, III. 12-13, for a discussion of 
how discursive cognitive practices are required to lay the ground for the reception or apprehension of an 
intellectual or spiritual intuition (e.g. the Idea of God) through noesis. 
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CL Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Ed. Earl Leslie Griggs (6 vols. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956-1971). 
CM Marginalia. Eds. George Whalley and H. J. Jackson (6 vols. Princeton, 
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1980-2001). 
CN The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Ed. Kathleen Coburn (5 vols. 
Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 1957-2002). 
Friend The Friend. Ed. Barbara E. Rooke (2 vols. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1968). 
LS Lay Sermons (comprising A Lay Sermon and The Statesman’s Manual) Ed. 
R. J. White (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1972). 
OM Opus Maximum. Ed. Thomas McFarland, with assistance of Nicholas 
Halmi (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
SWF Shorter Works and Fragments. Eds. H. J. Jackson and J. R. de J. Jackson 
(2 vols. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
TT Table Talk. Ed. Carl Woodring (2 vols. Princeton, N. J: Princeton 
University Press, 1990). 
 
Abbreviations used in referring to works by other authors: 
 
CPR Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Allen Wood and Paul 
Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
MFNS Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Trans. Michael Friedman  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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